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Stock mispricing is a phenomenon that can be encountered in rational as well as 
irrational environments. Information asymmetry under the rational framework can lead 
to stock price deviation from the true value just because investors, who set the price 
through their trading behavior, do not have all the information they need to reach a 
consensus price that reflects the true value of the stock. On the other hand, behavioral 
finance theories explain stock mispricing by assuming irrationality, where investors 
make systematic errors in forming their beliefs and expectations about the stock value.  
 
Traditional finance theories assume investors to be rational. The capital asset pricing 
model and the efficient market hypothesis are significant examples of such a paradigm. 
The unbounded ability of rational agents to exploit any irrational mispricings in the 
stock market was the main argument behind the assumption of rationality. However, 
the overwhelming evidence against the traditional framework of asset pricing calls for a 
new paradigm that takes into account the fact that some agents are less than rational 
and their trading behaviors affect stock prices. Shleifer and Summers (1990) mention 
limited arbitrage and individuals’ biases as the driving forces behind mispricings in the 
market. Investors adopt biased beliefs about a certain stock or a certain industry, or 
about the market as a whole. Such biases are systematic enough to affect the stock price 
through investors’ trading behaviors. With limited arbitrage, rational investors are not 
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able to exploit such mispricings in the market and as a result, irrationality can have a 
persistent effect on stock prices1.   
 
However, with the numerous theoretical and empirical studies that address mispricing in 
the stock market, the question of whether information asymmetry or investor biases 
causes stock mispricing is still under debate in the finance literature. Rather than trying 
to determine the cause of stock mispricing, this study considers a more important aspect 
of stock mispricing, which is the effect of stock mispricing on real activities in the 
economy.  Specifically, this study asks the question whether stock mispricing leads to 
misallocations of resources in the economy through corporate investment distortions.  
 
The effect of mispricing will be limited if the market is a sideshow for the real economic 
activities. In that case, the only effect will be the redistribution of wealth between 
irrational investors (noise traders) and arbitrageurs (smart traders). However, if the 
market is not a sideshow and stock prices affect corporate decisions, then mispricing, 
being a component of the stock price, can also affect corporate decisions.  
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of stock market mispricings on 
corporate investment decisions. Particularly, this study addresses the three possible 
explanations of the relation between mispricings and corporate investments that are 
mentioned in Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), (MSV) hereafter, and Stein (1996). 
 
                                                
1 Shleifer and Summers (1990), Hirshleifer (2001), and Barberis and Thaler (2003) provide thorough 
reviews of the limited arbitrage and belief biases literature.  
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MSV address three theories that can explain the relation between investments and stock 
mispricing. The first theory states that the stock market affects investments through its 
influence on the cost of external financing.  The second theory states that when 
managers make their investment decisions, they are forced to cater to shareholders’ 
opinions in order to protect their jobs. The third theory states that managers use the 
stock market as a source of information about the state of the economy, the condition 
of the industry, and the value of the firm. Such information is intended to help 
managers in making their investment decisions. However, some of that information may 
be based on irrational beliefs, which will affect investments as well. Stein (1996) 
developed a model that is consistent with MSV’s first and second theories.  Stein argues 
that the investment decision is more responsive to the market valuation when the firm 
depends more on equity. By taking an extreme case, where the firm cannot raise any 
debt, any new investment must be fully funded by equity. In that case, the important 
determinant of the investment decision is the market’s assessment of how attractive is 
the investment. If the investment can be only partially funded by equity, market 
valuation becomes less important to the investment decision. Stein also argues that if a 
manager is acting on behalf of shareholders (including himself) who have to sell their 
stocks in the near future for liquidity reasons, she will be more inclined to maximize the 
current stock price. In contrast, if the manager is acting on behalf of shareholders who 
will be holding the stock for a longer term, she will be more inclined to maximize the 
long-term value of the firm.   
 
The first channel through which mispricing affects investments is the equity 
transactions channel. Stock market conditions help the firm decide when to raise 
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additional capital. Overvalued firms will issue equity and undervalued firms will 
repurchase equity. Issuing more equity will help finance more investments and 
repurchasing equity may be more profitable than engaging in undervalued investment 
projects. Therefore, market timing activities can determine the cost of investing the 
firm’s capital. For overvalued equity, the cost of raising additional equity is lower, which 
gives an opportunity to increase investments in positive NPV projects or even accept 
negative NPV projects that would not be accepted otherwise. However, if the stock is 
undervalued, the firm may pass up some positive NPV projects because they will not be 
worth undertaking.  The more the firm depends on equity as an external source of 
capital, the more sensitive the investment is to stock mispricing. Overvalued financially 
constrained firms issue more equity to invest in projects that they are not able to finance 
otherwise. Undervalued financially constrained firms do not have enough cash to 
engage in both repurchases and real investments at the same time. Consequently, since 
investment projects are undervalued, there is a higher chance that those firms will 
engage in repurchases rather than real investments.  
 
The second channel through which mispricings affect investment decisions is investor 
catering. Managers cater to shareholders’ perception about the firm and this is reflected 
in corporate investment decisions. Managers make investment decisions that are 
consistent with the shareholders’ investment horizon. Short-term investors are more 
concerned about the current stock price than the fundamental value of the firm. When 
the firm is overvalued, the manager increases investments or packages the firm’s assets 
in a way that justifies the overoptimistic view about the firm’s growth. In that case, the 
gain from catering will more than offset any future losses from inefficient investments 
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because short-term investors require a lower rate of return on such investments. On the 
other hand, when the firm is undervalued, managers will refrain from investing in 
projects that do not seem to be attractive to short-horizon shareholders because those 
shareholders will ask for a higher required return on those projects and the losses from 
investment in undervalued projects will not be fully compensated by future gains that 
might result from those projects. Obviously, the shorter the horizon of shareholders, 
the larger the distortions in investment decisions due to stock mispricings. 
 
The third channel through which mispricings affect investment decisions is the noisy 
signal from the market about the firm, the industry, or the market as whole. Investors’ 
assessment of the future state of the economy and their expectations about the 
performance of the industry or the firm are reflected in the stock price. Therefore, if 
investors are rational and can correctly predict the future state of the economy, then the 
market should not affect investments beyond the effect of the fundamentals because 
market expectations and fundamentals will be correlated in an efficient market. 
However, if investors are less rational and the market is not efficient, then there will be 
some errors in predicting the future state of the economy. If managers listen to the 
market and cannot separate the rational part of the market’s prediction from the 
irrational part, then the market will affect investments and the effect will be due to 
investors’ sentiment.  
 
To test the three channels of the mispricing effect on investments, the M/B ratio is 
decomposed into mispricing and growth components. Equity and investor catering 
channels can be tested separately by regressing corporate investments against the 
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mispricing component and the external equity transactions. Controlling for equity 
transactions allows for an independent test of the investor-catering channel. 
Shareholder investment horizon, measured by share turnover, is used as an instrument 
to represent the investor catering effect. In addition, the decomposition approach 
provides an aggregate mispricing component at the industry or at the market level. This 
component is used to test the market’s noisy signal channel.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study analyzes a model 
that includes both financing and shareholder horizons as channels of the effect of 
mispricing on investments. Stein’s model only applies to the financing channel.  Stein 
presented a separate treatment for shareholder horizons. This model includes both 
channels and shows how each channel relates mispricing with investment. The model is 
similar to the one in Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004); however, rather than using 
their reduced form model, this study presents a fuller model that includes capital 
structure constraints and the price impact of equity transactions. Table 1 summarizes 
the special cases of the model that are discussed in the study. These cases include but 
are not limited to the cases analyzed in Stein (1996).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Second, a new methodology presented by Rohdes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 
(2004) is used to decompose the M/B ratio into mispricing and growth components. 
This approach avoids the measurement errors in Tobin’s q and the inseparability of 
mispricing and growth components that haunts several empirical studies. 
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Decomposition provides an approach to assess the role of aggregate mispricing in 
investments. The relation between aggregate mispricing and corporate investments has 
not previously been analyzed at the firm level. 
 
By using a separate growth component, I provide a better understanding of the market’s 
role in the corporate decision-making process. By measuring the effect of investment 
opportunities on investment, this study can determine how much of the relation 
between the market and investments is driven by the fundamental component of the 
stock price and how much of the relation is driven by mispricing.  
 
Third, the study analyzes the investment-mispricing relation for different categories of 
investments. Previous studies usually concentrate on one category of corporate 
investment decisions. This study analyses the mispricing effect on capital expenditures, 
acquisitions, and R&D. It is worthwhile to determine the extent of the mispricing effect 
and know which investment categories are  more sensitive to mispricing than the other.  
 
Fourth, unlike previous studies, the theoretical treatment in this study addresses the 
effect of mispricing on both sides of investment distortions, overinvestment and 
underinvestment. Other studies either assume one side of the story or do not analyze 
the two sides of distortions separately. This study answers the question as to whether 
one side of investment distortions is more sensitive to mispricing than the other.  
 
Finally, the study sheds some light on the disinvestment decisions of the firm and 
whether mispricing affects such decisions. It is quite possible that undervalued firms 
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may switch strategies from investment growth to cost cutting. Managers may shut down 
some projects that are not applauded by investors or they may sell some assets to cut 
operating or maintenance costs.  
 
The results in the study show that the market is not a sideshow and that it affects 
corporate investments in two ways: first, the market value of the firm reflects the 
growth prospects of the firm that are  not contained in other fundamentals like cash 
flow. Second, the deviation of the market value of the firm from the true value through 
stock mispricing also affects corporate investment through the three channels suggested 
in MSV and Stein (1996). 
 
Tests for the first channel show that total investments and net investments are 
determined by market timing motivated equity and debt issuance. In individual 
investment categories, capital expenditure and increase in investments are driven by 
market timing motivated equity issuance; acquisitions and R&D are driven by market 
timing motivated debt issuance. Disinvestment decisions, measured by assets sale and 
percentage decrease in assets, do not seem to be determined by market timing driven 
financing activities differently from non-market timing driven financing activities.  
 
More evidence related to the first channel indicates that highly financially constrained 
firms show higher sensitivity between investment and stock mispricing. This result 
reflects the fact that firms with low debt capacity depend on equity to finance their 
investments, and thus they are more prone to the stock mispricing effect when making 
their decisions.  
 9 
 
Tests for the second channel involve measuring the effect of shareholder catering by 
examining the remaining explanatory power of firm mispricing after controlling for net 
issuance activities, which act as a proxy for the first channel. The results show that 
shareholders catering is significant in explaining the relation between total/net 
investment and firm mispricing. In particular, R&D, increase in investments, and 
percentage decrease in assets are affected by catering to shareholders. Other investment 
decisions including capital expenditure, acquisition, asset sales, and increase in total 
assets are not significantly determined by catering behavior.  
 
Another test for the second channel examines whether firms owned by short-horizon 
shareholders maintain higher mispricing-investment sensitivity than firms owned by 
long-horizon shareholders. The logic of this test is the fact that short-horizon 
shareholders are more concerned about the current stock price than the value of the 
firm in the long-run. Thus, to the extent that managers cater to those shareholders, 
higher sensitivity between mispricing (contained in the current stock price) and 
investment decisions will appear. Shareholder investment horizon is measured by the 
average of the daily shares turnover ratio during the last month of the fiscal year. A 
higher turnover ratio reflects a short shareholder investment horizon. The results of this 
test show that investment-mispricing sensitivity is significantly higher in firms with a 
short shareholder investment horizon than it is in firms with a long shareholder 
investment horizon. This is true when considering total and net investments.  
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The third channel is tested by examining the significance of the mispricing at the 
industry or at the market level in determining the level of investments in the firm.  A 
significant relation between aggregate mispricing and investment suggests that managers 
use current market and/or industry conditions as sources of information when they 
make their investment decisions. Thus, any bubble in the industry or the market can 
affect investment. The results in this study confirm the effect of short-term innovations 
in aggregate market conditions on all kinds of corporate investments under 
consideration.  
 
After confirming the existence of investment distortion in response to stock mispricing, 
the study examines separately the two types of distortions in investment: 
overinvestment and underinvestment. The response of investment to overvaluation is 
classified as overinvestment while the response of investment to undervaluation is 
classified as underinvestment. The results show that firms overinvest in almost all types 
of investments.  
 
Overinvestment in acquisitions, research and development, and capital expenditure is 
caused by the issuance of overvalued forms of capital and by catering to optimistic 
shareholders. Disinvestment, measured by assets sale, is significantly decreased by firm 
overvaluation. In contrast, firms are shown to underinvest in capital expenditure, R&D, 
and increase in investment. However, there is no evidence on underinvestment in 
acquisition. Disinvestment, measured by percentage decrease in total assets, moves in 
the same direction as undervaluation. 
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The rest of the study proceeds as follows: chapter II summarizes the existing literature 
on the effect of stock mispricing on financing and investment decisions.  Chapter III 
develops testable hypotheses about the relation between investment decisions and 
mispricing based on the theoretical framework that addresses the role of equity 
transactions and shareholder investment horizon in the investment – mispricing 
relation. Chapter IV includes the empirical testing methodology along with data 












The first part of this review discusses the early studies of  the market’s role in corporate 
investment decisions. The main theme in these studies was that the market is efficient 
and the information contained in the market return is reliably useful in evaluating the 
investment opportunities of the firm. Early studies were concerned about whether the 
market reveals more information about the firm’s investment opportunities than is 
already revealed by the firm’s fundamentals, such as cash flows. Empirical studies that 
tried to answer this question came up with conflicting answers. Other studies have tried 
to find the reasons for the conflicting results and have come up with innovative 
methodological and theoretical justifications for the reported weak role of the market.  
 
The second part of this review discusses another view of the role of the market. This 
view disagrees with the main theme in the early studies. These studies suggest that 
market inefficiency and investors irrationality are among the driving forces behind the 
market role in corporate investment. These studies in total suggest three mediums by 
which market irrationality or inefficiency may affect corporate investment decisions.  I 
review these mediums in the third and fourth parts of the review. The final part of the 
review discusses acquisitions as natural experiments that show the effect of mispricing 
on the investment decisions of the firm.  
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2.2 The Stock Market and Investment  
2.2.1 Early Studies  
The relation between corporate investments and the stock market has long been 
examined within the q theory framework, under which the corporate investment 
decision should only depend on the present value of the future marginal products of the 
new capital (marginal q). Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969) argue that stock 
prices reflect the marginal product of capital where firms invest until the market value 
of the existing capital assets equals their replacement cost. Accordingly, when the 
market value of the capital assets increases, either because of the expected increase in 
the return on capital or because of the decrease in the perceived discount rate, the firm 
should continue to invest until the marginal product of capital equals the cost of capital 
(q=1). Therefore, in an efficient market, investment is related to Tobin’s q to the extent 
that the latter reflects information about the firm’s investment opportunities.  
 
Several empirical studies, such as Von Furstenberg (1977), Clark (1979), and Summers 
(1981), show that the market valuation has limited power in explaining shocks to the 
firm’s investments. Other studies provide conflicting conclusions on how important the 
market valuation is to the investment decision. Controlling for the fundamental 
variables that the stock market might be forecasting, Barro (1990) concluded that the 
stock market has a significant effect on the investment decision, beyond that of the 
fundamental variables, like cash flows. However, Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) 
find a limited role for market valuation. MSV show that in a firm-level regression, the 
movements in relative share prices are associated with fairly large and statistically 
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significant investment changes when fundamentals are held constant, but the 
incremental explanation of the variations in investment by the market is fairly small. 
They argue that the market’s effect is not central to the investment decision. MSV also 
point out that the rise in stock prices through the 1920s did not lead to a rise in 
investment, nor did the crash of 1987 lead to a drop in investment.  
 
 Some theoretical literature tries to explain the weak performance of the q theory under 
the supposition of an efficient capital market. The central theme in these studies is the 
poor proxy used for the marginal q and the fact that Tobin’s q is measured with error 
when calculating the replacement cost2. However, it is important to note that, as the 
information about profitability and investment opportunities in Tobin’s q is masked by 
the measurement error, mispricing in the market can also mask it. Abel and Blanchard 
(1986) argue that when the market is inefficient, deviations from fundamental value 
become random errors that blur the information in average q about the firm’s 
investment opportunities and result in a weaker relation between Tobin’s q and 
investments. Abel and Blanchard’s argument is based on the assumption that managers 
invest optimally regardless of the noise in the market. This assumption has long been 
                                                
2 Erickson and Whited (2000) assert that, for Tobin’s q to be a good proxy, the marginal q should equal 
the average q and this holds only under linearly homogenous technology and perfect competition.  
Hayashi (1982) discussed those conditions and showed that the q theory performs well when the 
investment decision is associated with changes in expected returns on all forms of capital. However, there 
are certain situations where the change in expected return is only associated with  investment in new 
capital rather than investment in existing capital. Hence, the marginal q, which reflects the investment in 
the new capital, will differ from the average q, which reflects the investment in both existing and new 
capital.  Abel (1980) introduced marginal adjustment costs and argued that the investment decision may 
be related to the current and lagged values of q. For example, due to the time to build technology, the 
investment decision may be correlated with the lagged values of q. Marginal adjustment costs may cause 
the relation between investment and marginal q to be non-linear as indicated by Abel and Eberly (1996). 
Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) show that the constructed marginal q 
they used does not do better than Tobin’s q in explaining investments. Erickson and Whited (2000) found 
a higher significance for Tobin’s q and less significance for the fundamental variable when using a 
measurement error –consistent generalized method of moment estimator.  
 
 15 
debated in the capital-budgeting literature. Some researchers argue that the role of 
mispricing is not limited to its effect on the relation between Tobin’s q and investments 
but also extends to affect the investment decision of the firm directly. The following 
section will shed some light on that debate.  
 
2.2.2 Market irrationality and the capital budgeting decisions  
The question of whether the rational manager should consider the market valuation 
when making corporate decisions even if it is different from his own valuation receives 
different answers in the literature3. Bosworth (1975) argues that managers should simply 
ignore the sideshow provided by the market and act upon their own valuation. 
However, Blanchard et al. (1993) indicate that Bosworth’s argument would be correct 
only if the stock market were used to value existing projects and if shareholders never 
sold their shares. But the stock market is obviously also a market where firms can issue 
new shares and where existing shareholders can realize capital gains.  
 
                                                
3 In our study we hold the assumption that managers are rational. There is a branch of studies in 
behavioral finance that relaxes this assumption. Heaton (2002) developed a model of managerial 
overoptimism, where managers believe that the market undervalues their firm’s risky securities and at the 
same time managers overvalue their own corporate investments. Therefore, managers will be reluctant to 
raise external capital in the market and may decline some positive NPV projects that need external 
financing. In addition, managers will be more inclined to invest in negative NPV projects because they 
overvalue those projects.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2004) test Heaton’s model and find that investment decisions of firms with 
overconfident managers are more responsive to cash flow shocks than other firms. This high sensitivity 
reflects the fact that overconfident managers cut investment that needs external financing and increase 
investments even in negative NPV projects if they have enough internal funds. Malmendier and Tate also 
find that other CEO characteristics like education and expertise affect the sensitivity between cash flow 
and investment. Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2003) argue that moderate overconfidence and optimism 
on the part of the managers may help align their interests with those of the share holders. They also 
suggest that executive stock options are not needed if managers show symptoms of overconfidence. In 
fact, in that case, executive stock options will be like putting more gas on the fire.  
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Fischer and Merton (1984) argue that investment decisions should simply be based on 
the market valuation. If the market is ready to accept a lower rate of return, the firm 
should invest until the marginal product of capital is equal to that rate of return. 
However, this argument does not differentiate between the possible causes of the 
discrepancy between managers and market valuations. Keynes (1936) suggests that stock 
prices reflect an element of irrationality that makes the effective cost of equity different 
from the cost of other forms of capital and that will affect the investment decision. 
Blanchard et al. (1993) list bubbles and fads along with information asymmetry as 
sources of the differences between market valuation of the firm and its true value.  
 
Panageas (2003) argues that managers should consider the fundamental and the 
speculative parts of the stock price as values to shareholders and should invest based on 
the part that will make investors better off. The manager should invest to maximize the 
fundamental part if holding the stock and reaping dividends is better than reselling the 
stock to more optimistic investors and vice versa. Stein (1996) argues that if managers 
are acting on behalf of shareholders who have to sell their stock in the near future for 
liquidity reasons, they will be more inclined to maximize the current stock price. In 
contrast, if they are acting on behalf of shareholders who will be holding the stock for a 







2.2.3 Does Stock Mispricing Affect Corporate Investment Decisions? The Equity 
Market Timing Explanation 
Stein (1996) develops a model that determines the optimal investment for rational 
managers who raise equity in an irrational market. Stein argues that stock mispricing 
affects the investment decision if the firm has to issue equity in order to invest. Firms 
that issue overvalued stocks will be more likely to increase investments because of the 
cheaper cost of capital provided to them. Undervalued firms, however, are less likely to 
invest because of the cost attached to issuing undervalued equity. Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003) provide an empirical test for Stein’s argument and find that equity-
dependent firms have higher investment sensitivity to Tobin’s q than non-equity- 
dependent firms. In addition, to test exclusively for the sensitivity of investment to 
market mispricing, Baker et al. use future realized stock returns as a proxy for the 
nonfundamental component of the stock price. The intuition is that positive future 
returns will indicate an undervaluation of the stock at the time the investment decision 
was made.  Therefore, if undervaluation is related to investments, future returns will 
also be related to investments.  Baker et al. find a negative relation between investments 
and future returns. The relation is stronger for equity-dependent firms. In their analysis, 
Baker et al. assume underinvestment by undervalued firms and do not incorporate the 
possibility of overinvestment by overvalued firms. On the other hand, Gilchrist, 
Himmelberg, and Huberman (2004) develop a model of overvaluation based on the 
dispersion of investors’ beliefs under short-selling constraints. Using the variance of 
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analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for belief dispersions, they find that managers issue new 
equity and increase capital expenditure in response to overvaluation4.   
 
Stein’s argument that overvalued firms issue shares and undervalued firms repurchase 
shares is called market timing. Market timing can exist even in a rational market. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) develop an adverse selection model where it is optimal for firms with 
information asymmetry to raise equity when the stocks are overvalued.  
 
In support of equity market timing, Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 67% of the 
surveyed CFOs time the market when issuing stocks. In Brav et al. (2004), over 86% of 
the surveyed CFOs agree that undervaluation is the most prominent motive for stock 
repurchases. Several empirical studies show a positive relation between equity issuance 
decisions and ex-ante market valuation at the firm level (see e.g., Marsh (1982), Jung, 
Kim, and Stulz (1996), and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001)); at the industry level 
(see e.g., Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Lerner (1994)); and at the aggregate 
market level (see e.g., Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994)).  
 
As evidence of market timing behavior, several studies show that new equity issuers 
earn low future returns. Ritter (1991) and Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995) examine 
IPOs and SEOs respectively and report underperformance of issuers relative to the 
benchmark. Stigler (1964) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) find negative long-term 
returns after both IPO and SEO offerings, which indicates that stocks were overvalued 
                                                
4 The model presented by Gilchrist et al. is not based on investors’ irrationality; rather, it assumes 
unbiased beliefs on average with short sale constraints.  
 
 19 
at the time of the issue and firms issue in a hot market. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995),(2000) find positive long-term returns after stock repurchases in 
samples of American and Canadian firms, which indicates that stocks were undervalued 
at the time of the repurchase. On the aggregate level, Baker and Wurgler (2000) show 
that equity share in new equity and debt issues can predict aggregate US stock market 
returns. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2004) show similar results in several 
international markets. These findings indicate that firms tend to be overvalued at the 
same time and thus equity issuance tends to predict the aggregate return. 
 
However, long-run return event studies, as evidence of market timing, are subject to 
some criticisms. For example, some researchers argue that equity issuers earn lower 
returns because they are less risky. After controlling for leverage and liquidity risks in 
their multifactor model, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2004) 
find no abnormal returns after issuance. Schultz (2003, 2004) and Butler, Grullon, and 
Weston (2004) argue that pseudo market timing or, as known by others, the small 
sample bias, can lead to a false belief of the underperformance of equity issuers5.  
However, the size of the pseudo market timing bias has been shown empirically to be 
trivial. See for example, Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2004), Ang, Gu, and Hochberg 
(2004), Dahlquist and de Jong (2004), and Viswanathan and Wei (2004).  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that historical average market-to-book ratios explain 
the cross-sectional leverage of a firm and interpret the result as more evidence of the 
                                                
5 See for example, Stambaugh (1986, 1999), Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), Nelson and Kim (1993), Kothari 
and Shanken (1997), Lewellen (2004), Polk, Thompson,and Vuolteenaho (2004), Amihud and Hurvich 
(2004), and others. 
 20 
effect of market timing on capital structure. Hovakimian (2003) and Liu (2005) argue 
that historical market-to-book ratios reflect a firm's past investment opportunity set, 
which determines current leverage. Both studies show that market timing does not have 
a persistent effect on capital structure. Liu (2005) shows that historical market-to-book 
ratios obtain their explanatory power from time-varying target leverage ratios and 
adjustment costs rather than market timing.  
 
Although the above mentioned criticisms raise some doubts about the interpretations of 
the findings of long-run return event studies, the market timing hypothesis gets strong 
support from other strands of empirical studies that use specific proxies for stock 
mispricing. Using accounting-based valuation models, D’Mello and Shrof (2000) and 
Jindra (2000) report a significant relation between stocks misvaluation and equity 
repurchases and issuance respectively. Other empirical studies provide results that are 
more consistent with the market timing story. Jegadeesh (2000) and Denis and Sarin 
(2001) show evidence that issuing firms perform poorly in the subsequent earning 
announcement dates compared to non-issuers. Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), and Rangan (1998) provide evidence that firms 
manage their earnings at the time of IPO and SEO issues and those firms that manage 
earnings earn lower subsequent long-run abnormal stock returns than firms that do not 
manage returns. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), and Pagano 
et al. (1998) report a decline in profitability following the IPO. Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) report the same result following SEOs. Jenter (2004) finds that insider selling 
coincides with stock issuance activities, which indicates that managers believe the stock 
to be overvalued at the time of the issue.  
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Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2001) present a model of IPO underpricing and long run 
underperformance based on investor sentiment. The model suggests that some 
investors are irrationally optimistic about certain IPOs (hot market); however, in the 
long-run, more information flows and the optimism fades, which results in the 
underperformance of these IPOs. Ljungqvist et al. argue that the underpricing is needed 
to compensate rational investors (institutional investors who usually get a greater share 
of the offerings) for the risk of the hot market’s ending and having to sell their shares at 
a loss. According to the model, underpricing will not be needed if sentimental demand 
is high enough to absorb the entire offering.  Cook, Jarrell, and Kieschnick (2003) 
examine the predictions of Ljungqvist et al.’s model and find evidence of the role of 
investor sentiment in explaining the different patterns in IPO activities. Helwege and 
Liang (2002) find support for the view that hot market IPOs reflect greater investor 
optimism, though not necessarily active manipulation by managers.  
 
Interestingly enough, other studies uncover a pattern of low stock returns after debt 
issuance. Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1999) show that straight and convertible debt 
issuers underperform the size and book to market matched portfolios significantly. With 
a refined measure of net external financing, Richardson and Sloan (2003) report low 
stock returns following net debt issuance. These results suggest that overvalued firms 







2.2.4 Does Stock Mispricing Affect Corporate Investment Decisions? The Catering 
Explanation 
Many arguments in the literature try to find the logic behind the possible relation 
between stock mispricing and corporate investment decisions. Agency explanations 
provide possible channels by which investments can be affected by stock mispricing. 
MSV and Jensen (2005) argued that managers might cater to investors because they are 
afraid of being fired or being taken over. If stock prices are used to reveal the market’s 
assessment of the managers’ competence and ability to make good investments, 
managers become averse to low stock prices. Consequently, stock mispricing will affect 
investments as the market’s assessment is contaminated with irrationality. Holmstrom 
(1999) develops a model based on the idea discussed by Fama (1980) about the effect of 
career concerns on agents’ behavior. Narayanan (1985) argues that managers who are 
concerned about their labor market reputations may engage in actions that enhance the 
short-term value of the stock at the expense of the long-term value. Managers 
concerned about their career future may favor safe projects over riskier ones 
(Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992)); hesitate to start a new line of business (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003)); and hesitate to shut down a poorly performing line of business 
(Boot (1992), Baker (2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). In addition, managers 
with pay performance that is more tied to stock prices will be more interested in 
maximizing current stock prices. Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) present a 
model where managers engage in more investments to increase the growth option 
component of the stock price at the expense of the long-run value.   Ka, Linck, and 
Rubin (2004) argue that agency theory can explain managers’ propensity to listen to the 
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market. Particularly, firms with smaller boards, more outside monitors, and higher pay-
performance sensitivities are more likely to cancel an uncelebrated acquisition deal.  
 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2004a) provide a different logic behind the effect of investor 
horizons on investment decisions. Gaspar et al. find that firms with short shareholder 
investment horizons are more likely to acquire another firm and experience worse 
abnormal short- and long-run returns. Gaspar et al. argue that such results are 
consistent with the argument that short-horizon shareholders provide weak monitoring 
of managers’ activities, which allows managers to proceed with value-reducing 
acquisitions toward big empires. Qiu (2004) also argues that the monitoring activities 
from certain types of shareholders affect the acquisition decision of the firm. Qiu finds 
that the presence of large mutual fund shareholders, who are known to be passive in 
their monitoring activities, encourages managers to make value-reducing types of 
acquisitions while the presence of large public pension fund shareholders, who are 
known to be active in their monitoring activities, discourages managers from making 
empire-building types of acquisitions. In addition, the long-run post-acquisition 
performance of firms with large public pension funds ownership is better than that of 
firms with large mutual funds ownership.  Although, Qiu (2004) and Gaspar et al. 
(2004a) use the same monitoring story to explain the likelihood of acquisition activity, 
Qiu did not find evidence of the role of shareholder horizons used in Gaspar et al. 
(2004).   
 
Polk and Sapienza (2002) model the effect of mispricing on corporate investments and 
argue that the effect is stronger for firms with short-horizon shareholders. By using 
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different proxies for mispricing, Polk and Sapienza find a positive relation between 
investment and mispricing proxies after controlling for financial slack and investment 
opportunities. They also provide a direct test of the role of investor catering in the 
mispricing-investment relation and report higher sensitivity between mispricing and 
investment in firms with shorter horizon shareholders. In addition, Polk and Sapienza 
show that firms with high (low) investment have low (high) subsequent stock returns, 
and this pattern is stronger for firms with short-horizon shareholders. 
 
Panageas (2003) introduces an infinite horizon continuous time model with short-sale 
constraints and heterogeneous beliefs. The model shows that investments increase in 
response to the speculative bubbles created by the fact that only optimistic beliefs are 
reflected in stock prices6. Unlike other studies that assume an exogenous short horizon, 
the short horizons in Panageas’s model arise endogenously. The manager will decide 
whether maximizing the fundamental component (long term value) or maximizing the 
speculative component (current price) is more profitable for the investor. However, 
Panageas points out that the model works best for investors who have short horizons 
and are willing to sell the stocks in the near future. Panageas applied his model to firms 
that were introduced into the “loan crowd” in 1926 because they were perceived to be 
overvalued and reported an increase (decrease) in investment before (after) introduction 
to the loan crowd. 
 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) study the return around capital expenditure 
announcements and find that increases (decreases) in capital expenditures are associated 
                                                
6 If pessimists are constrained in their ability to short the stocks, then market prices reflect the beliefs of 
optimists and thus market prices rise above fundamental values. 
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with positive (negative) abnormal returns for industrial firms while utility firms do not 
receive any significant reaction from the market regarding their announcements. Such 
results are consistent with firm value maximization. Investors capitalize on the new 
information about capital expenditures and revalue the industrial firms’ stocks 
accordingly. McConnell and Muscarella argue that utility firms are expected to have zero 
NPV projects (rather than positive NPV projects) and that should not affect the value 
of the stock. Rather than using industry classification, Chung, Wright, and 
Charoenwong (1998) measured investment opportunities of firms using the level of 
Tobin’s q. Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong find evidence that increases (decreases) in 
capital expenditures are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns for firms 
with high growth opportunities. On the contrary, increases (decreases) in capital 
expenditures are associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns for firms with low 
growth opportunities. The findings related to increases in capital expenditures in low 
growth firms are not as strong as other findings.  Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Zantout 
(1996) find insignificant market response to such announcements. Brailsford and Yeoh 
(2004) find free cash flow to have a negative impact on the market response to increases 
in capital expenditure when it is in the hands of low growth firms’ managers.  
 
Although researchers interpret the above results as consistent with the maximization of 
firm value, these results are also consistent with investor catering theory. When an 
overvalued firm announces an increase in capital expenditure, optimistic investors react 
positively to the announcement; however, when an undervalued firm announces an 
increase in capital expenditure, investors react negatively to the announcement. The 
weak empirical finding regarding the negative reaction to the increase in capital 
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expenditure by the undervalued firm might be explained by the fact that some 
pessimistic investors actually update their beliefs about the firm based on the new 
information. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) argue that the positive response to capital 
expenditure increases can reflect the fact that firms only announce favorable capital 
expenditures. In addition, higher stock prices around a capital expenditure may be a 
result of market timing rather than a favorable response from the market.   
 
2.2.5 Mergers and Acquisitions: The Mispricing Story 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a theoretical explanation of mergers and acquisitions 
based on the behavior of rational managers who take advantage of an inefficient 
market7. When the stock is overvalued, rational managers try to exchange their 
overvalued equity for the real assets of other firms that are either undervalued or at least 
less overvalued than their own firms8. Such behavior will justify the overvaluation, 
increase earnings, and protect long-term investors when the market corrects for 
                                                
 
7 This model is the opposite of the hubris hypothesis in Roll (1986). In the hubris hypothesis, irrational 
managers of the bidding firms engage in takeover activities because they are overconfident about their 
assessment of targets’ values. The hubris hypothesis predicts that managers’ irrationality (overconfidence) 
drives the premium for the target up and also increases merger activities. Roll argues that managerial 
overconfidence is as powerful as other rational market hypotheses in explaining mergers and acquisitions 
activities. Malmendier and Tate (2002) develop a model of the acquisition decision of an overconfident 
CEO and find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to engage and to overpay in diversifying mergers. 
Malmendier and Tate (2002) also find that overconfidence boosts the number of takeovers on average 
and the market reacts more negatively to takeover bids by overconfident managers. Managerial 
overconfidence is measured by how long CEOs hold on to their stock options in excess of what is 
recommended by normative models of optimal exercise. The longer the CEO holds his options, the more 
optimistic he is about the stock’s future price. Lys and Vincent (1995) analyzed the acquisition of NCR by 
AT&T. The wealth of AT&T shareholders decreased dramatically due to the acquisition.  Lys and 
Vincent (1995) suggest managerial overconfidence as one explanation for the acquisition decision by 
AT&T’s managers.  
 
8 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that the manager of an overvalued firm finds low return T-bills and 
high cost new investments to be unattractive choices relative to the stock-based acquisitions as excuses to 
raise large amounts of equity. Fama and French (2004) report that the amount of equity raised in mergers 




overvaluation. In this model, the long-term combined benefit from the acquisition is 
zero. Therefore, what the acquirer gains, the target loses. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
assume that the target managers have a short-run horizon and are expected to engage in 
mergers because they either want to cash out their stocks or they are offered other 
benefits by the bidder.  
 
The model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) explains the empirical findings of Mulherin 
and Boone (2000), DeLong (2001), and Houston et al. (2001), among others, very well. 
The negative short- and long-run abnormal returns for the bidders are due to the 
overvaluation of the acquiring firms’ stocks. The negative long-run abnormal returns, as 
reported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Gregory (1997), are expected to be even 
worse had the acquisition not taken place. Also, the positive abnormal announcement 
returns are due to the undervaluation or less overvaluation of the target relative to the 
bidder.  
 
In addition, the model suggests that overvalued bidders use cash in more hostile 
acquisitions if the target is undervalued and use stock in less hostile acquisitions if the 
target is less overvalued relative to the bidder. Since it is hard to convince managers of 
undervalued firms to engage in acquisitions, hostile cash tender offers are used because 
they do not require management approval.   
 
However, because it is easier to convince managers of overvalued firms to cash out to 
relatively overvalued equity offers, bidders use friendly stock offers for overvalued 
targets. The model also explains the findings of Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and 
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Vermaelen (1998) that the long-run abnormal return to acquirers who used cash is 
positive while the long-run abnormal return to acquirers who used stocks is negative. 
The model suggests that stock bidders are more overvalued than cash bidders; 
therefore, stock bidders suffer negative long-run abnormal returns.  
 
The model also explains some features of the different merger waves. The 1960s 
diversification wave and the 1990s consolidation wave were clustered in high valuation 
markets and the medium of payment was mostly stocks. However, the 1980s hostile 
takeover wave was during a down-market valuation and involved mostly cash 
acquisitions (see Andrade at al. (2001)).   
 
Ang and Cheng (2003) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2003) test the 
misvaluation hypothesis and find that bidders are overvalued relative to their targets in 
both cash and equity offers, and in both mergers and tender offers. Dong et al. also find 
that the higher the bidder’s overvaluation, the higher the premium paid, the lower the 
announcement abnormal returns, the more likely friendly mergers are used, and the 
more likely stock-based acquisitions are used. In addition, the more undervalued the 
target, the higher the announcement return, the higher the premium paid, the more 
likely it is to be a hostile offer, and the less likely to be a successful acquisition.  
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2003) argue that investors welcome acquisition 
announcements during high valuation periods even though such acquisitions produce 
the worst future returns. Such a result is consistent with an investor catering motive 
behind the acquisition decisions. 
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Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) present a rational theory that posits 
misvaluation as a factor that affects mergers and acquisitions. In their model, target 
firms accept the bidder’s overvalued shares not because they have short-horizon 
managers as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), but rather because managers 
overestimate the gains from the takeover synergies, and such overestimation is 
correlated with the overall valuation error in the market. In the model, the misvaluation 
can be market wide, industry specific, or firm specific. Managers of the target firms 
discount for possible overvaluation of the bidder, but they do not know the source of 
the overvaluation and whether it is market, industry, or firm specific. Hence, when the 
market is overvalued, the target is more likely to overestimate the synergies because it 
underestimates the component of misvaluation that it shares with the bidder and the 
target manager is more likely to accept the merger. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004) test the 









Stock Market and Corporate Investment Decisions 
 
3.1 Background 
MSV is one of the early studies that suggest the direct effect of mispricing on the firm’s 
investment decision. MSV argue that the direct effect of mispricing on investments 
exists simply because managers respond to such mispricing and do not ignore it. MSV 
provide three explanations of why managers would respond to mispricing in the market. 
First, managers care about the cost of external financing. Managers exploit mispricing 
by either issuing overvalued equity or repurchasing undervalued equity. For financially 
constrained firms, these exploitations will determine the amount of funds available for 
the firm to invest. If the financially constrained firm has positive NPV projects, then 
overvalued equity will enable the firm to issue and invest more in its profitable projects. 
However, undervalued firms are more likely to pass up some profitable projects because 
the cost of capital outweighs the gains from the projects. Moreover, even if the firm is 
not financially constrained or does not have positive NPV projects, managers will try to 
lessen the negative impact of the issuance event on the stock price by justifying the 
equity issuance and engaging in real investments. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that 
overvalued firms wishing to issue equity should do something that will be perceived by 
shareholders as valuable to the firm like acquiring another firm. This intuition answers 
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the question why a firm would invest in negative NPV projects where it can issue equity 
and park the proceeds in treasury bills.  
 
Second, managers may cater to investors who happen to be more concerned about 
selling the overvalued stock at a maximum price. Managers may cater to investors 
because they want to protect their jobs (Jensen (2005) and Narayanan (1985)), maintain 
their reputation (Holmstrom (1999)), or maximize their stock-based compensation 
(Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003)). Panageas (2003) indicates that maximizing 
current stock price is part of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Stein (1996) argues that 
investors’ and managers’ horizons are determined by their liquidity needs. 
 
Third, managers use market prices as a guide for predicting the future state of the 
economy and industry. The manager invests more if the economy or the industry is 
expected to grow and holds if the future of the economy or the industry is not that 
promising. However, stock prices may be contaminated by investors’ biased 
expectations, which will affect the investment decisions as well. 
 
Blanchard et al. (1993) point out that the effect of mispricing on investment does not 
depend only on cheaper new equity but also on how long the market value is expected 
to deviate from fundamentals and how long shareholders are expected to hold on to 
their shares.  
 
Stein (1996) developed a model that is consistent with MSV’s first and second 
explanations.  Stein argued that the investment decision is more responsive to the 
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market valuation if the firm is financially constrained and thus relies more on equity. By 
taking the extreme case where the firm cannot raise any debt, any new investment must 
be fully funded by equity. In that case, the important determinant of the investment 
decision is the market’s assessment of how attractive the investment is. If the 
investment can be only partially funded by equity, the market valuation becomes less 
important for the investment decision.   
 
Stein also argued that if managers are acting on behalf of shareholders (including 
themselves) who have to sell their stocks in the near future for liquidity reasons, they 
will be more inclined to maximize the current stock price (use market perception). In 
contrast, if they are acting on behalf of shareholders who will be holding the stock for a 
longer term, they will be more inclined to maximize the present value of the future cash 
flows (use fundamental valuation).  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
This theoretical framework summarizes the rational manager’s objective function in an 
inefficient market and addresses the role of investor horizon and the cost of external 
financing in linking mispricing to investment decisions. The framework is adapted from 
the work of Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) and borrows most from Stein’s model. 
 
In efficient markets, investors and managers evaluate firms using the same information 
set. The fundamental value of the stock in an efficient market reflects all information 
regarding the expected future cash flows of the firm discounted at the rationally risk-
adjusted expected return. However, in a less than efficient market, investors make 
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systematic errors when they predict the mean and variance of the future cash flows. 
Limited arbitrage makes it hard to eliminate those errors. Consequently, stock price will 
deviate from the fundamental value of the firm.  
 
In efficient markets, the value set by investors (market price) is expected to be the same 
as the fundamental value of the firm because there are no systematic biases that make 
the stock price deviate from the fundamental value. Accordingly, when a manager 
maximizes the value of the firm, she is maximizing the fundamental value and the 
market price at the same time. However, when the market is inefficient, market price is 
not necessarily equal to the fundamental value9. Therefore, the manager has two 
different objectives. The first objective is to maximize the fundamental value of the firm 
by maximizing the present value of the future cash flows based on the rationally risk-
adjusted expected return.  
The fundamental value is modeled as  
 
( , )f K E K−  
 
Where f is the expected cash flow at time 1 resulting from investing K at time 0; it is 
an increasing and concave function in the new investment K . E  is the amount of 
external financing raised at time 0. Due to market inefficiency, financing may affect the 
                                                
9 We are not discussing here what might cause the discrepancy between the fundamental value and the 
market value of the firm. However, asset-pricing literature confirms the existence of mispricing in the 
market and behavioral finance literature refers us to the limits of arbitrage and noise trader’s as two main 
causes of persistent mispricing.  
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firm value and enter f in conjunction with investments10. To simplify the algebra, the 
discount rate is set to zero.  
 
The second objective is to maximize the current market price. Stein addresses one 
version of investor catering,  which is the managerial horizon effect, whereby managers 
may be concerned about maximizing current price rather than fundamental value if they 
(or the investors they are catering to) are interested in selling their shares in the near 
future for liquidity reasons.  
 
Managerial horizon is modeled by  λ , where 0 1λ≤ ≤ . If λ  equals zero, the manager 
has a short horizon and cares only about maximizing the current stock price. As λ  
approaches one, managers become more concerned about maximizing the fundamental 
value of the firm and less concerned about maximizing the current stock price.  
 
The mispricing is represented by a percentage δ . The stock is overpriced when ( 0)δ >  
and underpriced when ( 0)δ < . δ  is modeled as ( , )K Eδ , where (.)δ  is a function of 
investment and financing activities.  It is expected that managers’ financing and 
investing behaviors affect the degree of mispricing. Catering to shareholders through 
investment decisions affects the degree of mispricing by increasing the stock price of 
overvalued firms and limiting the undervalued stock from going down further11. 
                                                
10 Inefficiency entails the existence of information asymmetry and adverse selection costs in the form 
proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
11Empirical results are consistent with this assumption. Panageas (2003) shows that investment 
significantly amplifies the effects of speculation on the asset prices by affecting the value of growth 
options embedded in the company’s price. Also, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) show that mispricing can 
persist for a longer time due to investment choices. Titman et al. report negative long run abnormal 
returns for five years after overinvestments. 
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Managers cater to investors by selecting projects that seem more appealing to those 
investors either because of the projects’ perceived low risk or because of the irrational 
expectations about the projects’ future cash flows. Also managers may avoid investing 
in some projects because they are not applauded by shareholders. In addition, managers 
may avoid some long-term projects if they believe that the stock is  underpriced and the 
mispricing will take a longer time to be corrected12. Exploiting mispricing through 
financing decisions, like issuing or repurchasing equity, can lessen the mispricing but it 
is not expected to eliminate it completely13.  Managers will exploit the current mispricing 
to benefit the current shareholders by issuing overvalued equity or repurchasing 
undervalued equity. Such behavior, which is called market timing, is intended to 
produce a gain transferred from the new shareholders to the existing shareholders, and 
such gain will be realized when stock prices are corrected in the long run. The gross 
market timing gain is modeled as Eδ , where E is the dollar amount of net equity 
issued at time 0.  
 
In addition, a manager should consider the effect of his financing and investment 
decisions on the firm’s capital structure. If we assume that at time 0, the firm is at the 
optimal debt ratio, then to maintain that ratio, the firm should use (1 )K d− of equity to 
                                                
12 In a recent study, Aghion and Stein (2004) develop a multi-tasking model where a manager prefers to 
invest more at those times when the market is paying more attention to the growth dimension of the 
firm’s performance.  On the other hand, the manager will put more effort into reducing costs when the 
market is more concerned about the profit margin of the firm. 
13 I assume that corporate decisions that intend to exploit the mispricing do not eliminate the mispricing 
in the market. Issuance or repurchasing of shares usually move prices toward the fundamental value. 
However, these activities are not expected to eliminate mispricing, as managers of mispriced firms will act 
like monopolists when dealing with the firm’s shares. This is in contrast to the rational expectation world 
of Myers and Majluf (1984), where managers’ equity issuance will eliminate the discrepancy between the 
market value and the true value of the firm. My assumption is consistent with the empirical studies that 
report market underreaction to financing and investment decisions. See for example, Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) on seasoned equity offerings and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) on share 
repurchases, and Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) on empire building. 
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finance the new project. d  is the percentage of the new debt the firm can issue to 
finance the new investment. A low value of d  indicates that the firm already exhausted 
too much of its debt capacity and should rather use more equity to finance the new 
investment. If the firm did not have enough cash on hand (C ) and did not raise enough 
equity (E ), then the firm will be over-levered by the amount (1 )D K d C E≡ − − − . 
This amount of over-leverage represents a deviation from the optimal capital structure 
and entails a cost of ( )Z D . Due to market imperfections, the deviation from the 
optimal debt ratio is costly whether it involves less debt or more debt in the capital 
structure mix14. Therefore, when 0D > , / 0Z D∂ ∂ ≥  while / 0Z D∂ ∂ ≤  when 0D < ; 
and 2 2/ 0Z D∂ ∂ ≥ everywhere, and (0) 0Z = . 
 
The overall objective function constitutes maximizing the fundamental value of the 
firm, maximizing the current stock price, and maximizing the market timing net gain 
while taking into consideration the cost of deviation from the optimal debt ratio. 
 
The manager’s objective function is  
 
MAX [ ] ( )( , ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( , )f K E K E K E Z D K Eλ δ λ δ− + − + −     (3.1) 
Subject to 
(1 )D K d C E≡ − − −  
Maximization of the fundamental value and timing the equity market are intended to 
serve the long-term investors; therefore, they are weighted by the managerial horizonλ , 
                                                
14 Such imperfections include taxes, cost of financial distress, and agency costs. 
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while maximizing the current stock price is weighted by (1 )λ− 15. In an efficient market, 
the current price equals the fundamental value and the maximization problem is 
reduced to maximizing the fundamental value without any consideration of the 
managerial horizon or market timing activities because they will be irrelevant in such an 
environment. However, even in an inefficient market, maximizing the current stock 
price may not enter the maximization problem if the manager is maximizing the long-
term value of the firm. In that case, 1λ = and the last term drops out. However, as we 
can see in equation (3.1), the mispricing variable will still play a role for long-horizon 
managers to the extent that mispricing determines the market timing gain to the existing 
long-term shareholders.  
 
The optimal investment and financing decisions are given by the first order conditions 
of the maximization problem16: 
( )( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0f K E K d Z D Kλ λ λ δ λ λ δ′ ′ ′ ′− + − − + − =         (3.2) 
( )( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0f E K E E E Z D Eλ λδ λ δ λ λ δ′ ′ ′ ′+ + + + − =                                (3.3) 
With a little algebra, the optimal investment and financing decisions satisfy, 
( ) 1( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )f K d Z D E Kλ δλ
− ′ ′ ′= + − − + 
 
                                                    (3.2)` 
                                                
15 I follow Stein’s (1996) assumption that the managerial horizon is exogenous in this framework.  
However, it is possible that the managerial horizon becomes endogenous in the model; for example, the 
compensation contract may load more on short-term types of incentives because they are more attractive 
when the stock is overvalued. It is also possible that when the stock is overvalued, managers become 
more concerned about the current price because they are afraid of being taken over. In addition, as in all 
other studies, this framework assumes that the manager’s horizon coincides with the shareholders’ 
horizon. This makes sense if we believe that managers maximize the existing shareholders’ wealth based 
on those shareholders’ horizon preference or if we believe that compensation contracts and career 
concerns shape the manager’s horizon and make it coincide with the investors’ horizon.  
16 For detailed calculations of the equations in section 3.2, please refer to Appendix A. 
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( ) 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )f E Z D K E E Eλδ δ
λ
− ′ ′ ′− + = + + 
 
                                                 (3.3)` 
 
Equation (3.2)` determines the optimal investment decision that a rational manager 
makes in an inefficient market. The marginal value created from the new investment is 
weighted against the cost of capital that is normalized to be one plus the cost of 
deviation from the optimal capital structure. Market timing and investor catering gains 
that result from the impact of investment on mispricing reduce the cost of capital. 
When mispricing exists, 0δ ≠ , corporate investment decisions are subject to 
mispricing ( )Kδ ′ 17. Such mispricing will help managers gain from timing the equity 
market by either issuing equity when the mispricing is positive or repurchasing equity if 
the mispricing is negative. In addition, the mispricing of investment projects will also be 
a factor in determining the required return on those projects. If the manager cares about 
the current stock price and invests in projects that receive positive reactions in the 
market, she will enjoy a lower required return by shareholders.  
 
Due to market timing and investor catering gains, the marginal value created from the 
new investment projects may be less than the standard cost of capital under an efficient 
market, and yet it is the optimal decision for the manager. For example, when the 
manager spots an overvaluation, she will respond to the mispricing by issuing 
overvalued equity and at the same time, depending on the horizon length, she will cater 
to short-horizon investors by investing more in what is perceived to be profitable. 
These two actions will reduce the cost of capital and increase investments. Moreover, 
                                                
17 See detailed analysis of the relation between mispricing and corporate decisions in Appendix B. 
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some negative NPV projects become positive and the firm will be able to finance and 
invest in those projects. On the other hand, when the manager spots an undervaluation, 
depending on the horizon length, she will respond to the mispricing by decreasing 
investments in what is perceived to be less profitable by the market. Decreasing 
investments will make more cash available to repurchase undervalued equity. These two 
actions will increase the marginal value that should be created by the optimal 
investment.  
 
Equation (3.3)` determines the optimal level of equity issued or repurchased by a 
rational manager in an inefficient market. For equity issuance, the marginal value lost 
from issuing more equity plus the cost of deviating from the optimal capital structure is 
weighted against the marginal revenue from market timing δ  net of the price impact 
associated with the issuance ( )E Eδ ′− . The impact of the new equity issued on 
mispricing ( )Eδ ′ is expected to be negative. When a manager issues more equity the 
mispricing will decrease and the more equity issued, the less the gain from market 
timing. Hence, the negative impact on mispricing due to stock issuance is proportional 
to the amount of equity issuedE . This argument is consistent with the reported equity 
issuance announcement effect. The stock price usually goes down when the firm 
announces equity issuance and the larger the size of the issue, the larger the drop in the 
price18.  
 
                                                
18 This argument is consistent with most studies of the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns 
around SEO announcements, See, e.g. Asquith and Mullins, (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986). 
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In addition, the negative impact on mispricing and hence on the marginal net gain from 





−  ′− 
 
. 
Managers issue less equity when they cater to shareholders with short investment 
horizons. Because short-horizon shareholders care about the current stock price, they 
will not applaud the equity issuance. As a result, equity issuance becomes more costly 
for firms with short-horizon shareholders.   
 
For equity repurchase, the marginal value created from the repurchase activities depends 
on the extent of undervaluation δ  net of the cost of deviation from optimal capital 
structure ( )Z D′ and the price impact associated with repurchase ( )E Eδ ′ 19. When a 
manager repurchases more equity, the mispricing will decrease; and the more equity 
repurchased, the less the gain from market timing. Unlike equity issuance, short-horizon 
investors celebrate stock repurchases. Accordingly, stock repurchase becomes less costly 
because the firm will not need to offer very high prices to convince short-horizon 
shareholders to sell their stocks20. Therefore, the price impact due to more repurchases 
is weaker when short-horizon shareholders exist.  
 
                                                
19 Equation (3.3) provides the optimal level of equity issuance or repurchase. The gains from equity 
issuance or repurchase are weighted against the costs attached to them. The gains from equity issuance 
take the positive sign, while the cost of equity issuance takes the negative sign as shown above each term 
as follows, [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0f E E E Z D Eδ δ λ λ δ
− + − − −
′ ′ ′ ′+ + + + − =  . However, in equity repurchases, gains switch signs 
and become (-) while the costs attached to repurchases take the (+) signs as follows, 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0f E E E Z D Eδ δ λ λ δ
− − + + −
′ ′ ′ ′+ + + + − = . 
 
20 Gaspar et al. (2004b) argue that firms’ payout decisions can be explained by shareholder investment 
horizons. Firms held by short-term shareholders have a higher propensity to buybacks shares instead of 
using dividends. Gaspar et al. provide evidence that repurchases are used if managers want to cater to 
short-term oriented shareholders.  
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By combining the two optimal decisions, we can see how a manager invests while 
keeping in mind the effect of the financing decision.  
 
( )1 1( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( , ) ( )f K E K d f E K E E Eλ λδ δ δλ λ
−  −    ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − − + + +    
    
    (3.4) 
 
Here, we can see that the cost of capital is reduced by the net gain from market timing.  
Also the marginal value that should be created by the new investment is reduced by the 
impact of investments on mispricing and the effect of the latter on catering and market 
timing gains. The following cases help us to understand the optimal investment decision 
specified in (3.4) 
 
3.2.1 Case 1  
The first case describes the corporate investment decision in perfect and efficient 
markets. Modigliani and Miller (1985) show that in an efficient and frictionless market, 
capital structure is irrelevant. Therefore, there is no cost of deviating from optimal 
capital structure, ( ) 0Z D′ = , no effect of equity transactions on firm value, ( )f E′ , and 
no systematic mispricing in the market that can affect stock prices, ( ) 0Kδ ′ = . 
Therefore, in a perfect and efficient market, where ( ) ( ) ( ) 0K f E Z Dδ ′ ′ ′= = = , 
equation (3.4) reduces to  
 
 ( ) 1f K′ =                 (3.5) 
 42 
Here, investment and financing decisions are separate. The marginal value created from 
optimal investment will be set to one and there will be no gain from timing the market. 
The firm can issue equity or debt to invest with no constraints.  
 
3.2.2 Case 2 
 
The second case describes the corporate investment decisions of firms that do not issue 
or repurchase equity ( 0E = ), have a long-term investment horizon ( 1λ = ), and exist in 
an inefficient market ( ( ) 0Kδ ′ ≠ ).  In this case, the second term on the right-hand side 
of equation (3.4) equals zero because 0E = and 1λ = . In addition, the last term in 
equation (3.4) equals zero because the firm does not issue or repurchase equity and 
therefore there are no possible gains from equity market timing. Consequently, for a 
firm with 0E = and 1λ = , equation (3.4) reduces almost to equation (3.5) .  
 
Thus, even with mispricing, ( ) 0Kδ ′ ≠ , the optimal investment decision can be similar 
to the optimal investment decision under a perfect and efficient market. This happens 
only if the firm does not react to the mispricing, i.e.  if 0E = and 1λ = , then 
1
( ) 0E K
λ δ
λ
−  ′+ = 
 
. The firm’s reaction may take the form of issuing or 
repurchasing equity and/or responding to the market’s biased perceptions about the 
investment projects of the firm. If the firm does not issue or repurchase equity, 0E = , 
then there will be no effect of equity transactions on firm value  ( ( ) 0f E′ = ) and no 
distortions in the capital structure mix ( ( ) 0Z D′ = ). 
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3.2.3 Case 3 
 
The third case describes the corporate investment decisions of firms that issue or 
repurchase equity ( 0E ≠ ), have a long-term investment horizon ( 1λ = ), and exist in an 
inefficient market ( ( ) 0Kδ ′ ≠ ).  In this case, equation (3.4) reduces to  
( )[ ]( ) 1 1 ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )f K d f E K E E E E Kδ δ δ′ ′ ′ ′= − − + + −        (3.6) 
In equation (3.6), the marginal value created by the optimal investment will be 
determined by the direct net gain from market timing (the second term on the right-
hand side) and by the effect of investment on mispricing and hence the effect of the 
latter on the gains from market timing (the third term on the right-hand side).  
 
The gains from market timing alter the cost of capital, and that generates two outcomes. 
First, the marginal value created from the optimal investment is different from the 
standard cost of capital (normalized to be one here), and therefore the new optimal 
investment level is different from the firm’s optimal investment level under efficient 
market conditions. For example, when the stock is overvalued, 0δ > , the firm issues 
equity to gain from the overvaluation and as a result, the cost of capital is reduced. 
Consequently, some negative NPV projects under efficient market conditions become 
acceptable under the new cost of capital; and that is called overinvestment. Conversely, 
when the stock is undervalued, 0δ < , the cost of equity rises. As a result, firms may 
pass up some positive NPV projects because they cannot issue equity to invest; that is 
called underinvestment.  
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Second, as the firm departs further from the optimal investment level under the 
efficient market, the firm will increase or decrease investments until it reaches a new 
equilibrium where the marginal value created from the new investment equals the new 
cost of capital under inefficient market conditions. In the case of overvalued equity, 
0δ > , the firm will enjoy a cheaper source of capital that will allow it to increase 
investments as long as the new cost of capital is less than the marginal value created 
from those investments. The firm will continue to issue equity and invest until it reaches 
a new equilibrium where there are no significant benefits from market timing. In the 
case of undervalued equity, 0δ < , the firm will continue to repurchase stocks and cut 
investments until the gains from stock repurchases start to disappear21.  
 
 However, it is important to recognize that the direct gain from equity transactions is 
weighted by the debt capacity of the firm d . If the firm is more dependent on equity, 
i.e. d is closer to zero, the effect of the net market timing gain on the cost of optimal 
investment will be more pronounced.  However, if the firm has a higher debt capacity, 
i.e. d is closer to one, the optimal investment decision becomes closer to optimal 
investment under perfect market conditions. In this case, investment and financing 
decisions are not separate and the more dependent the firm is on equity, the more 
sensitive the investment decision is to market imperfections.  
 
                                                
21 I assume that the new equilibrium will be different from the equilibrium under efficient market 
conditions because market timing strategies are not expected to eliminate mispricing completely. 
Managers issue or repurchase shares to the extent that the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost 
and that occurs when prices are above fundamental values. 
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To make this intuition more clear, consider the situation where the stock is 
undervalued ( )0δ < . Here, the manager would like to repurchase shares and at the 
same time she needs the same funds to invest. If the firm is financially flexible, the 
manager can invest and repurchase stocks at the same time without having to balance 
between them. However, if the firm is financially constrained, the manager will have to 
weigh the gains from repurchases against the gains from investments. In that case, the 
marginal value created from the new investment should be higher than one to account 
for the opportunity cost of using that fund for investment rather than for stock 
repurchases. The opportunity cost in this example is particularly the last term in 
equation (3.4), which is the net gain from stock repurchases22. Therefore, the investment 
should create a higher value than is considered under perfect market conditions to be 
acceptable. Consequently, the manager will pass up some investment projects that do 
not compensate for the gains that would rather result from repurchasing shares. Thus, 
stock undervaluation leads to underinvestment even if the firm does not have to issue 
equity in order to invest. The firm may find it more profitable to direct its limited 
resources toward stock repurchases than to investments and that may lead to cutting 
investments in order to increase repurchases.  
 
 In the case of overvalued stock ( )0δ > , the firm will have access to cheaper funds for 
its investments. Even projects that have negative NPV under perfect market conditions 
become acceptable because of the lower cost of capital that is used to finance them23. 
                                                
22 In the case of stock repurchase, the net gain will be added to the marginal value rather than subtracted. 
23 Although equity issuance is expected to be the main theme here, it is possible that debt becomes 
cheaper when the firm is overvalued.  If the equity value increases, the debt capacity increases as lenders 
will tend to use such information in assessing the firm quality. Using the same argument; when the stock 
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The lower cost of capital is a result of issuing overvalued equity. Again, the effect of 
market timing will depend on the debt capacity of the firm and the proportion of equity 
used to finance the investment.  If the firm does not have enough debt capacity and 
depends on equity to finance its investments, then the market required rate of return is 
going to determine which projects to invest in. Case 3 leads us to two main conclusions. 
First, stock mispricing affects corporate investment positively through corporate equity 
transactions, which are driven by market timing strategies. Second, the effect of 
mispricing on investments is more pronounced in financially constrained firms that 
have to depend on equity in order to invest. These two conclusions are to be tested later 
in the study. 
 
It is important to consider the impact of stock issuance or repurchase activities on 
mispricing ( )Eδ ′ . In general, market timing activities will have a negative effect on the 
magnitude of mispricing and therefore will lower the gain from timing the market as 
large quantities of equity issued or repurchased are involved[ ]( ) 0Eδ ′ < .  
 
In the case of overvalued stock, any decrease in the cost of capital due to issuing 
overvalued equity will disappear as more equity is issued; thus, the cost of capital may 
even become higher than the required return under efficient market conditions, and 
thus the optimal investment should create a marginal value that exceeds both the 
                                                                                                                               
is undervalued, the debt value may decline as well. Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1999) and Richardson and 
Sloan (2003) find that debt issuance is followed by lower returns, which suggests an overvaluation at the 




standard cost of capital under efficient market conditions and the reduced cost of 
capital in an inefficient market.  
 
However, when the undervalued firm repurchases stocks, the benefits from stock 
repurchases start to diminish as more equity is repurchased. As a result, the opportunity 
cost of investments declines and the cost of capital approaches the standard cost of 
capital under efficient market conditions. Nevertheless, if the manager of the 
undervalued firm issues stocks in order to fund investments, the cost of capital becomes 
even higher than the required return under perfect market conditions, and thus the 
optimal investment should create a marginal value that exceeds both the standard cost 
of capital under efficient market conditions and the reduced cost of capital in an 
inefficient market.  
 
The different situations discussed so far in case 3 summarize Stein’s (1996) propositions 
about the effect of capital structure constraints and price pressure on the investment 
decisions of the firm. As we did here, Stein (1996) shows that financing considerations 
are important to the investment decision, especially in financially constrained firms.  
The manager of a financially constrained firm will be forced to maximize the current 
stock price because equity is the firm’s main source of funds. Hence, the market’s 
assessment of the quality of the investments is all that matters.  
 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) present a model where equity-dependent firms with 
undervalued stocks show higher investment sensitivity to stock mispricing than non-
equity-dependent firms. The intuition behind that is simple. A financially constrained 
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firm will have to depend on external equity to finance its new investments. However, 
issuing undervalued equity in order to invest will make projects more costly and will 
discourage investments.  Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) did not put too much 
structure into their model. They assume no stock repurchases and argue that 
investments are sensitive to stock prices only when stocks are undervalued. In this 
model, however, I borrowed from Stein’s fuller model by assuming a cost of deviation 
from the optimal capital structure and a price pressure effect. Such generalizations allow 
me to present the sensitivity of investment to mispricing even in overvalued firms.  
 
Alternatively, Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2004) develop a model where 
investment is sensitive to mispricing when the firm is overvalued. They model the 
source of mispricing based on dispersion of investor beliefs under short-selling 
constraints, which predicts an overvaluation24. When the stock is overvalued, managers 
issue cheap equity, which reduces the cost of capital and increases investment. 
  
3.2.4 Case 4 
Case 4 describes the corporate investment decisions of firms that do not issue or 
repurchase equity ( 0E = ), have a short-term investment horizon ( 0λ = ), and exist in 
an inefficient market ( ( ) 0Kδ ′ ≠ ).  
In this case, equation (3.4) reduces to  
1
( ) 1 ( )f K K
λ δ
λ
− ′ ′= −  
 
            (3.7) 
                                                
24 In the model, pessimists are constrained in their ability to short the stock, which means that prices in 
the market reflect the beliefs of the optimists and therefore the stock gets overvalued.   
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A manager who is maximizing short-horizon investors’ wealth (including his own) will 
be interested in maximizing the current stock price, even without considering market 
timing. The maximization of current stock price through catering behavior will reduce 
the marginal value created from the optimal investment and as a result, managers will 
find it cheaper to invest in projects that are more appealing to short-term investors and 
continue to invest more in those projects even over what is considered optimal under 
efficient market conditions.  On the other side, managers will refrain from investing in 
projects that do not attract short-horizon shareholders because those shareholders will 
require a higher return on those projects.  This case provides two main conclusions. 
First, a manager who is maximizing short-horizon investors’ wealth (including his 
own) ( 1)λ < , will be interested in maximizing the current stock price, even distinctly 
from market timing considerations. Second, because the gain from catering is a function 
ofλ , the shorter the investment horizons of shareholders, the more pronounced the 
effect of stock mispricing on corporate investment. 
 
3.2.5 Case 5 
The final case, 5, describes the corporate investment decisions of firms that issue or 
repurchase equity ( 0E ≠ ), have a short-term investment horizon ( 0λ = ), and exist in 
an inefficient market ( ( ) 0Kδ ′ ≠ ). In this general case, investment is affected by 
mispricing through both equity and investor catering channels. The marginal value 
created from optimal investment will be weighted against the standard cost of capital 
net of investor catering and market timing gains.  
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It is important to recognize the effect of shareholder investment horizon on market 
timing gains. Short-horizon shareholders care more about the current stock price. 
Therefore, activities that result in an increase (decrease) in current stock price are 
accepted at low (high) required rates of return by short-horizon shareholders. With that 
in mind, the shorter the shareholder investment horizon, the higher the gains from 
repurchasing undervalued equity and the lower the gain from issuing overvalued equity. 
Interestingly, higher (lower) gains from repurchases (issuance) make investment more 
costly. For example, when the firm repurchases undervalued shares, investors might 
respond positively to the repurchase program and not feel as excited about directing the 
firm’s cash to any investments other than stock repurchases. Also, when the firm 
responds to overvaluation by issuing more equity, the stock price will go down and 
investors will not be as enthusiastic about the quality of the new investments; also, they 
might update their beliefs and re-evaluate the firm’s investments.  This is the reason 
managers who issue overvalued equity should justify the issuing activity by investing 
physically to minimize the issuance cost. This is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s 
(2003) argument that overvalued firms wishing to issue equity should do something that 
shareholders will perceive as valuable to the firm, like acquiring another firm. This 
intuition answers the question why the firm would invest in negative NPV projects 
where it can issue equity and park the proceeds in treasury bills; hence it is like a zero 
NPV project and will not drive down the marginal product of capital. Blanchard et al. 
(1993) indicate that issuing equity and using the proceeds to send a signal to the market 
through investment will affect the valuation of the firm; however, this is not possible if 
the proceeds are used to buy treasury bills. 
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Polk and Sapienza (2002) assert that the acceptance of negative NPV projects by 
overvalued firms may result in a high perceived value of the firm and the market’s 
tendency to overvalue the investment projects more than compensates for the losses 
from the value-destroying investments. Polk and Sapienza (2002) build on Stein’s short-
horizon model and present a framework that describes the optimal investment decisions 
for a manager of a mispriced firm who caters to short-horizon investors. Polk and 
Sapienza conclude that even in the absence of an equity financing channel, mispricing 
can affect investment through catering to short-term investors. Overvaluation 
(undervaluation) encourages managers to invest more (less) as long as their strategy 
increases the current stock price. This catering channel may also encourage managers of 
overvalued firms to invest in negative NPV projects since overvaluation of the projects 
is high enough to compensate for any punishment from the shareholders when they 
update their beliefs.  
 
Panageas (2003) presents a model of overpriced firms with short-sale constraints and 
heterogeneous beliefs. Panageas’s model shows that market based q and investment 
both respond positively to the mispricing, even though such response is not justified on 
the basis of long-run value maximization. In Panageas’s model, investment significantly 
amplifies the effect of speculation on the asset prices by affecting the value of growth 
options embedded in the company’s price, ( ) 0Kδ ′ > . Panageas asserts that the model 
does not need to assume any objective other than maximizing shareholders wealth since 
the manager will consider the fundamental and the speculative parts as values to the 
shareholders and will decide whether holding the asset and reaping dividends is better 
than reselling the stock to more optimistic investors. In this case, a short horizon is 
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modeled endogenously rather than exogenously, as in Stein (1996). However, Panageas 
argued that his intuition might not work if the firm has bulk shareholders who care 
about the fundamental value and may not care much about the speculative bubble. 
Therefore, his intuition is more relevant for short-horizon shareholders. 
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3.3 Testable Hypotheses 
 
After exploring the theoretical underpinnings of the effect of stock mispricing on 
corporate investments, we can identify at least three channels by which stock mispricing 
can affect corporate investment. I shall summarize those channels in five hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1a 
Stock mispricing affects corporate investment positively through corporate equity transactions that are 
driven by market timing strategies.  
 
Stock market conditions help the firm decide when to raise additional capital. 
Overvalued firms issue equity and undervalued firms repurchase equity. Issuing more 
equity will help finance more investments and repurchasing equity may be more 
profitable than engaging in undervalued investment projects. In this case, the market 
timing activities can determine the cost of investing the firm’s capital.  
 
For overvalued equity, the cost of raising additional equity is lower, which provides the 
opportunity to accept some negative NPV projects that would not be accepted 
otherwise. However, if the stock is undervalued, the firm may pass up some positive 





The more the firm depends on equity (Financially constrained) the higher the sensitivity of investment to 
stock mispricing. 
 
The counter argument to the first hypothesis is that, although mispricing can affect the 
way investment projects are financed, it may not necessarily affect the investment 
decisions themselves.25 This argument is easily refuted when we consider financially 
constrained firms. Financially constrained firms depend more on the equity issuance 
proceeds to invest in the projects that could not be financed otherwise. Thus, when 
these firms become overvalued, the cheap cost of equity will allow them to increase 
investments, while when these firms become undervalued, they will not have enough 
cash to engage in both repurchases and real investments at the same time. 
Consequently, since the firm’s projects are undervalued, there is a higher chance that the 
firms will engage in stock repurchases rather than real investments.   
 
From another perspective, the firm that has a limited debt capacity and cannot raise 
more debt to finance its new investment projects will rely on equity. In the extreme 
case, where the project is funded solely by equity, the market’s assessment of the 
project’s quality, and hence the required return on it, becomes the main determinant of 
the corporate investment decision.  
 
                                                
25 Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios in the past issue more 




These two hypotheses are the main conclusions of (case 3) where, 0E ≠  1λ = . In this 
case the cost of capital will be reduced by the net gain from market timing.  The net 
gain is weighted by the debt capacity of the firm d . If the firm is more dependent on 
equity, i.e. d is closer to zero, the effect of the net market timing gain on the cost of 
optimal investment will be more pronounced.  However, if the firm has a higher debt 
capacity, i.e. d is closer to one, the optimal investment decision becomes closer to the 
optimal investment under perfect market conditions. In this case, the investment and 
financing decisions are not separate, and the more dependent the firm is on equity, the 
more the market imperfections affect the investment decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 2a 
Managers cater to the shareholders’ perception about the firm and this is reflected in corporate 
investment decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 2b 
The shorter-sighted the investors, the more pronounced the effect of stock mispricing on corporate 
investments. 
 
As in (case 4), if ( ) 0Kδ ′ > , and (0 1)λ≤ < , a manager who is maximizing short-
horizon investors’ wealth (including his own) will be interested in maximizing the 
current stock price, even in the absence of market timing. The maximization of current 
stock price through catering behavior will reduce the marginal value that should be 
created by the optimal investment, and as a result, managers will find it cheaper to 
invest in projects that are more appealing to short-term investors and continue to invest 
 56 
more in those projects even above what is considered optimal under efficient market 
conditions.  Managers will increase investments or package the firm’s assets in a way 
that justifies the overoptimistic view about the firm’s growth. Such strategies aim to 
maximize the short-horizon shareholders’ wealth by maximizing the current stock price 
since these shareholders are expected to sell their stocks in the near future. In addition, 
when the firm is overvalued, short-term investors require a lower rate of return and 
thus, the gain from catering will more than offset any future losses from inefficient 
investments. On the other hand, managers will refrain from investing in projects that do 
not seem to attract short-horizon shareholders because these shareholders will ask for a 
higher required return on those projects.  More specifically, when the firm is 
undervalued, short-term investors require a higher rate of return, and thus the losses 
from investment in undervalued projects will not be fully compensated by the projects’ 
future gains.  
 
Hypothesis 2a provides a direct test for the investors catering channel by examining the 
gain from catering to short-horizon shareholders and its effect on investments. Because 
the gain from catering is a function of λ , the shorter the investment horizons of 









Mispricing affects investment decisions through the noisy signal about the future state of the economy and 
the industry sent by market participants. 
 
Although this hypothesis is not based on the theoretical model presented earlier, it 
suggests another explanation for the relation between investment and market 
mispricing. The unique element in this explanation is the effect of aggregate mispricing 
on investments.  
 
MSV provide an explanation of how this channel can affect investments. The market 
reveals different kinds of information about the firm, the industry, and the economy. 
Managers use market information to assess the future state of the economy and to form 
expectations about the performance of the industry and the firm. In an efficient market, 
the market should not affect investments beyond the effect of fundamentals because 
market expectations and fundamentals will be correlated. However, in a less efficient 
market there will be some errors in predicting the future state of the economy. If 
managers listen to the market and cannot filter out the error in its predictions, then the 
market will affect investments. MSV assert that this effect is expected to be more 
plausible if managers are confused about the market or the industry conditions but not 
about their own firms since managers are expected to know more about their firms than 
investors26.  
 
                                                
26 Insider trading literatures show that managers make money on trading in their own firms. Insiders 
successfully predict both future idiosyncratic returns and future market return.   
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Recent studies show that managers listen to the market when they make acquisitions. 
Luo (2004) shows that abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement can help 
predict whether the firm will go ahead with the acquisition or not. Thus, firms extract 
information from the market reaction and use it to make final decisions. Luo shows that 
the propensity to learn is higher when it is easier to cancel the deal, less expertise is 
needed to value the deal, and the bidder is small. Luo argues that the last two conditions 
indicate that the learning is more significant when the market knows more than the 
manager. Ka, Linck, and Rubin (2004) argue that agency theory can explain managers’ 
propensity to listen to the market. Particularly, firms with a smaller board and more 
outside monitors, and firms with higher pay-performance sensitivities are more likely to 







Data and Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Mispricing Measure 
4.1.1 Background 
 
Empirical studies that investigate the relation between mispricing and corporate 
investments come up with different ways to measure unobservable mispricing. Polk and 
Sapienza (2002) argue that discretionary accruals and equity issuance can proxy for 
mispricing because they are usually followed by negative future returns. The negative 
future returns indicate that discretionary accruals and equity issuance are conducted by 
overvalued firms. However, Polk and Sapienza fail to recognize that these two measures 
are parts of the various corporate decisions that managers make. Therefore, any relation 
between these variables and investment decisions may stem from the fact that 
managerial decisions are interrelated in nature.  Empirically, these two activities are 
shown to be done simultaneously by managers. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) show 
that issuing firms have high discretionary accruals. Thus, the significant relation between 
accruals and investments may stem from the relation between accruals and equity 
issuance.  In addition, any significant relation between these decisions and the 
investment decision may not necessarily indicate a direct relation between mispricing 
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and investment. For example, a significant relation between equity issuance and 
investment may point to the mechanical process of raising more capital to finance the 
already-scheduled investment projects. In addition, even if high accruals indicate 
overvaluation, lower accruals do not necessary indicate undervaluation. Therefore, 
accruals may point to only one side of the mispricing story.  
 
The last measure that has been used by Polk and Sapienza (2002) is the previous period 
stock returns. Stock returns are used as a proxy for mispricing also by MSV and Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler (2003). It is important to notice that stock returns contain 
information about growth opportunities and varying discount rates. It is hard to 
disentangle the mispricing component of stock returns from other components. Baker, 
Stein, and Wurgler (2003) admit that the negative relation between investment and 
future returns could be a result of changes in the rational cost of capital. Lamont (2000) 
reports the same relation between planned investments and future returns and interprets 
the results as evidence that time-varying risk premia affect aggregate investments. 
Lamont (2000), however, does not make a strong argument about whether his results 
address market efficiency beyond any doubts. Panageas (2003) shows that investment 
can predict future returns, and one cannot interpret this result as a support of either 
efficient market or inefficient market hypotheses because investments react to both the 
fundamental and the non-fundamental components of stock prices. Panageas argues 
that returns’ explanatory power becomes strongest when both fundamentals and 
disagreement about fundamentals are high. As support for using stock returns as a 
mispricing proxy, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) argue that increases in investments are 
associated with negative long-run abnormal returns for five years. The result is 
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interpreted as the market’s underreaction to empire-builder strategies. Richardson and 
Sloan (2003) find that the negative relation between external financing and future stock 
returns is strongest when the proceeds are invested in real investment activities.  
As we can see, it is hard to distinguish between these two views of the relation between 
future returns and corporate investments. As stock returns reflect profitability and 
investment opportunities, they also reflect mispricing by the market.  Therefore, it is 
hard to attribute the role of the stock market to any hypothesis unless one separates the 
stock price into fundamental and nonfundamental components. Chirinko and Schaller 
(2001) provide an approach that extracts the efficient part of the price and separates it 
from the mispricing part by the assumption that bubbles lead to predictable returns 
along with other structural assumptions. From these assumptions, they derive the result 
that if investment reacts to bubbles, certain Euler relations should fail.  
 
Apart from investors’ irrationality, some researchers suggest another source of 
mispricing in their models. Models based on short-sale constraints and heterogeneous 
beliefs predict an overvaluation bubble in the market.  Even in the absence of biased 
investors, on average, short-sale constraints prevent pessimistic investors from short-
selling the stock and as a result only optimistic investors participate in the market and 
drive the price above the fundamental value. As a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs, 
Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2004) used the variance of analysts’ earnings 
forecast. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) show that firms with a higher variance 
of analysts forecast earn abnormally lower future returns, which is consistent with the 
view that firms with high dispersion beliefs are overvalued.  A short-sale constraint is 
also modeled by Panageas (2003) who uses a natural experiment to study mispricing. In 
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the 1920s, the Wall Street Journal reports the names of the firms in the loan crowd 
market along with their rebate rates. According to Jones and Lamont (2002), 
overvaluation was the most likely reason for the introduction into the loan crowd, and 
the lower the rebate rates, the more expensive the short-selling of the stock. It is 
important to note that short-sale constraints models imply overvaluation bubbles in the 
market and are not applicable to undervaluation episodes. 
 
The use of M/B as the market variable follows Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Also, 
Perfect and Wiles (1994) indicate that improvements obtained from the more involved 
computations of Tobin’s q are limited. In addition, the study uses an approach that 
decomposes the M/B ratio into mispricing and growth components. The 
decomposition provides a clear answer to the question of whether the market is a 
sideshow. The answer is not distorted by limitations in previous studies, such as the 
measurement error in Tobin’s q and the inseparability of mispricing and growth 
components. The decomposition of the M/B ratio measures the effect of growth and 
mispricing components separately and hence provides an unambiguous view about the 








4.1.2 M/B Decomposition  
Following the methodology innovated by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 
(2004), (RKV) henceforth, M/B27 is decomposed into growth and mispricing 
components and the fundamental value of the firm is measured using the firm’s 
accounting information. 
 The firm’s market to book ratio (M/B) can break into two components as follows: 
M M V
B V B
= ×           (4.1) 
In equation (4.1), the first term on the right-hand side represents the ratio of the market 
value of the firm to the fundamental value of the firm. This ratio measures the 
discrepancy between the stock price and its true value and thus represents the 
mispricing component of the market to book ratio. The second term on the right side is 
the ratio of the fundamental value of the firm to its book value and that represents the 
growth component in the market to book ratio. In a perfect market where there is no 
mispricing, the (M/V) ratio equals one and the market to book ratio (M/B) becomes 
the fundamental value to book ratio (V/B) and thus, the M/B ratio becomes a clear 
indicator of the growth opportunities of the firm.   




     = +     
     
             (4.2) 
and thus, 
[ ] [ ]
Mispricing Growth
lnM lnB lnM lnV lnV lnB− = − + −
 
                                                      (4.3) 
                                                
27 /M B  is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of the firm and is calculated as the 
market value of equity (Common shares outstanding #25 times price #199) + book assets #6 – book 
equity #60-deferred taxes #74 all divided by total assets #6. 
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Now, let us assume that the fundamental value of firm i at time t can be expressed as a 
linear function of the firm’s specific accounting information at time t, ( itθ ), and a vector 
of conditional accounting multiples ( )α , thus,  
( ) ( ; )it itln V v θ α=                (4.4) 
Using the identification assumption (4.4), we can break equation (4.3) further into three 
components. First, a firm specific error, which is the difference between observed 
market price at time t and the valuation measure based on time-t fundamentals, 
[ ]( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− .  
Second, a time series error, which is the difference between the fundamental value 
based on time-t fundamentals and the fundamental value based on long-run multiples, 
[ ]( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α− .  
Third, the growth component, which is the difference between the fundamental value 
based on long-run multiples and the book value, [ ]( ; )it itv lnBθ α − . Thus, equation (4.3) 
can be written as,  
[ ] [ ] [ ]( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )it it it it t it t it it it
firm error aggregate error growth
lnM lnB lnM v v v v lnBθ α θ α θ α θ α
− −
− = − + − + −
  
        (4.5) 
The first term in the decomposition is the firm mispricing. It is the difference between 
the market price of the stock at time t and the fundamental value of the stock based on 
the firm’s accounting information at time t and the aggregate multiples at time t.  
Therefore, if the market is hot at time t, this will show up in the multiples, tα , and 
consequently in the fundamental value of the stock, ( ; )it tv θ α . Thus, the firm 
mispricing, ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− , reflects only firm-specific deviations from the 
fundamentals but not the market-wide deviation at time t. The second term is the 
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aggregate mispricing which is the difference between the fundamental value of the stock 
based on accounting information and the market multiples at time t, ( ; )it tv θ α , and the 
fundamental value of the stock based on long-run market multiples, ( ; )itv θ α . As we 
can see, the value based on α  without the time t subscript represents the value of the 
firm based on multiples that do not vary over time. Thus, ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α− measures 
the time series error that is due to the fact that the market is acting abnormally at time t 
relative to the long-run average. The third term is the growth component of the book to 
market ratio that is not contaminated by the mispricing element.  
 
4.1.3 Fundamental Value Measure 
Before we discuss how to decompose the M/B ratio empirically, we need to find a 
measure for the unobserved fundamental value (V). RKV use the help of the value 
relevance literature in accounting to build three models that measure the fundamental 
value using accounting data. The theoretical underpinning of these models stems from 
imposing identifying restrictions on the residual income model. According to Ohlson’s 
(1995) residual income model, the intrinsic value of the firm can be written as the book 


















             (4.6) 
where, tV  is the fundamental value of equity at time t, tB  is the book value of assets at 
time t, ROEτ is the return on equity in future periods, and rτ is the time-varying 
discount rate. The residual income model is a transformation of the dividends discount 
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model that is obtained under the clean surplus assumption, where the change in the 
book value of equity equals earnings minus dividends. The residual income model 
expresses value as the sum of current book value and the discounted present value of 
expected earnings that is above the cost of capital. Dechow at al. (1999), Francis at al. 
(1998), Hand and Landsman (1998), and Myers (1999) show that, although the residual 
income model is identical to the dividend discount model, the former does a far better 
job in explaining the cross-sectional variation in market values. Frankel and Lee (1998) 
find that the ratio of a fundamental value computed by the residual income model to 
price can predict stock return even after controlling for the B/M. Chang, Chen, and 
Dong (1999), Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), Piotroski (2001), and Ali, Hwang, 
and Trombley (2003) show the ability of the residual income model to predict future 
returns28.  
 
Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001) argue that with the additional assumptions of 
linear information dynamics, firm value can be restated as a linear function of equity 
book value, net income, dividends, and other information. By assuming constant 
growth rates in book value and net income, RKV assert that the intrinsic value in the 
residual income model can be a linear function of current book value and current net 
income; hence, equation (4.6) can be written as: 
0 1 2t t tV B NIα α α= + +                    (4.7) 
                                                
28 According to Kothari (2001), “Assuming efficient capital markets, one objective of a valuation model is 
to explain observed share prices. Alternatively, in an inefficient capital market, a good model of intrinsic 
or fundamental value should predictably generate positive or negative abnormal returns,” p.178. Based on 
this criterion, the residual income model is a good model for fundamental value.  
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As we can see, the value of the firm at a certain time is a function of the book value of 
assets and the net income at that time. The coefficients ( 'sα ) are multiples that reflect 
discount rates and growth rates29.   
 
The genre of equation (4.7) is quite popular in the accounting literature. Kothari (2001), 
Holthausen and Watts (2001), and Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001) provide 
excellent reviews of the capital market research in accounting and show how equations 
like (4.7) can be used in fundamental analysis or in testing the relevance of the 
accounting numbers for the value of the stock. Francis and Schipper (1999) raise the 
question whether financial statements are still relevant to equity valuation and find a 
decline in the earnings relevance and an increase in the book value relevance to the 
value of equity. On the other hand, Amir and Lev (1996) and Lev (1997) argue that 
book value is less relevant to the value of firms with a considerable portion of intangible 
assets. Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997) point to the role of net income in explaining 
the cross sectional variation in market value of firms with intangibles. Penman (1998) 
shows how to combine the earnings and book value in equity valuation by calculating 
the weights on these two factors.  
 
However, as the coefficients ( 'sα ) are proportional to discount rates and growth rates, 
one would expect those multiples to vary over time as the rates they embody may vary 
over time. Ang and Liu (2001) and Feltham and Ohlson (1999) point to such a 
possibility when they discuss time-varying risk premia and expected growth 
opportunities. To address this concern, I estimate separate equations for each year in 
                                                
29 See Appendix C for the derivation of the multiples.  
 68 
our sample. In this case, discount rates and growth rates do not have to be constant 
over time. Equation (4.7) is estimated using the following model: 
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) itit t t it t it t NI t it itln M ln B ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + + +            (4.8) 
Because the variables are estimated in logs, negative net incomes will not be included. 
To avoid having to remove firms with negative net income, I follow the suggestion of 
RKV and input net income in absolute value form 
it
NI  and use ( 0)itNID <  as a dummy 
variable that equals one if the net income is negative and zero otherwise. By interacting 
the dummy variable with the natural log of the absolute value of net income, negative 
net income observations can enter into the estimation process without contaminating 
the earning’s multiple interpretation of 2α . 
 
Model (4.8) implicitly imposes the restriction that firms be priced against the multiples 
of the average firm in the market at year t. However, some firms have higher or lower 
leverage than the average firm in the market and that difference in leverage level may 
affect the firm value. Therefore, I include leverage in the model as follows: 
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]itit t t it t it t it NI t it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +     (4.9)     
where itLEV  stands for the leverage ratio of the firm at time t. Model (4.9) is similar to 
the third model used by RKV. 
 
Now, to obtain ( ; )it tv θ α , I first perform the cross-sectional regressions (4.9) for all 
firms in the market for each year separately to come up with annual estimates of the 
coefficients. Then, I use model (4.9) to predict the value of the stock using the 
estimated coefficients as follows: 
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0 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ; , , , , )it it it t t t t tv B NI LEV α α α α α =  
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]itt t it t it t it NI t itln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α<+ + + × +          (4.10) 
To obtain ( ; )itv θ α , I average each coefficient over time such that  
1
k ktT
α α= ∑        for k = 0,1,2,3,4            (4.11) 
Then, I predict the long-run value of the stock using the average coefficients as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4( , , ; , , , , )it it itv B NI LEV α α α α α =  
                     0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]itit it it NI itln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α<+ + + × +    (4.12) 
Therefore, the long-run value of the stock varies over time as the accounting 
information of the firm varies over time.  
 
Model (4.9) can also be used to obtain industry-level mispricing. After grouping firms 
into different industries, I perform separate regressions for each industry j at year t and 
allow the estimated coefficients to vary across time and across industries as follows,  
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +      (4.13)  
To obtain the fundamental value of the stock using industry multiples, ( ; )it jtv θ α and 
( ; )it jv θ α , I repeat (4.10),(4.11), and (4.12) for each industry alone. 
 
Coefficient estimates from model (4.12) along with P-values based on Fama-Macbeth 
standard errors are summarized in Table 2. The estimates are the time series average of 
the estimates from cross-sectional regressions of a model similar to (4.9) at industry-year 
level and at market-year level. Industries are classified based on Fama and French’s 12 
 70 
industry classes. The intercept for each industry 0ˆ jα is the time series average of the 
intercepts from annual cross-sectional regression for the industry j, denoted as 0 jα in 
model (4.12). The intercept for each industry could indicate the loading on intangible 
assets and how relevant intangibles are to the value of the average firm in that particular 
industry. The results in Table 2 are consistent with this interpretation. Industries that 
have higher intercepts are the ones that are expected to have large amounts of intangible 
assets. For example, consistent with the findings of RKV, Chemicals (industry 5), 
Business Equipment (industry 6), Telecom (industry 7), and Healthcare (industry 10) 
have the highest intercepts because they are expected to have considerable portions of 
intangible assets that are relevant to the firm value. On the other hand, Non-durable 
Products (industry 1) and Utilities (industry 8) have the lowest intercept because they 
are expected to have minimal amounts of intangibles.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The loadings on book value and on net income are positive and significant in all 
industries and in the market as a whole. The loadings on the negative net income 
indicator variable, 3α̂ , are negative and significant in most of the industries and in the 
market, which indicates a lower loading on net income when the firm realizes a loss. 
The leverage factor plays an insignificant role in most industries. However, 
Manufacturing Firms (industry 3), Energy (industry 4), and Utilities (industry 8) seem to 
load positively on leverage, which indicates a higher capacity of debt on average in these 
low growth industries. Conversely, some high growth industries, like Chemicals 
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(industry 5) and Healthcare (industry 10) load negatively on leverage, which may suggest 
a higher preference for equity. These findings are consistent with Myers’s (1977) 
hypothesis about the tendency of firms with growth opportunities to issue equity rather 
than debt to avoid underinvestment and maximize shareholder wealth. Moreover, Table 
2 reports average 2R above 89%, which indicates that accounting information and 
leverage explains a large portion of variations in market values of firms at the industry-
year level and at the market-year level.  
 
4.1.4 Misvaluation Components 
The fundamental value ( ; )it jtv θ α is calculated using contemporaneous aggregate 
average loadings, which represent average growth and discount rates in the industry or 
the market at a certain time. Although the fundamental value measure is calculated using 
contemporaneous aggregate-average multiples jtα and long-run aggregate-average 
multiples jα , it varies across firms and over time as the underlying accounting 
information varies over time and across firms.  
 
The misvaluation measure FirmDev = ( ; )it it jtlnM v θ α −   represents the difference 
between the market value of the firm and the value of the firm based on aggregate-
average contemporaneous multiples. This difference is attributed to firm-specific 
deviations from the contemporaneous average of the aggregate growth and discount 
rates. That deviation might be caused by market irrationality or the firm’s degree of 
informational asymmetry.  The firm-specific deviation is free from any mispricing at the 
aggregate level. If the market or the industry is heating up at time t, the multiples 
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jtα will incorporate that into the fundamental value of the firm; therefore, the 
mispricing will only measure the pure firm deviation that is not related to any aggregate 
valuation wave. 
 
The misvaluation measure AggDev = ( ; ) ( ; )it jt it jv vθ α θ α −   reflects the time series 
error or the difference between short-term industry multiples jtα and long-term 
industry multiples jα . The deviation of the firm value based on the contemporaneous 
average of the aggregate growth and discount rates from the firm value based on the 
long-run average of the aggregate growth and discount rates suggests a certain valuation 
wave in the industry. Therefore, we call this component the mispricing at the aggregate 
level. It is important to notice that the long-run multiples are a forward-looking 
averaging process where ex ante multiples are used to calculate the long-run multiples. 
Therefore, long-run multiples may reflect some information in the future that was not 
known to investors at the time. In that case, the deviation of the value based on current 
multiples from the value based on long-run multiples may not necessarily indicate 
irrationality on the part of investors because investors are not expected to have some of 
that information. It may, however, proxy for information that was unknown to 
investors but known to management at a certain time. The effect of this mispricing 
component on corporate investment decisions has nothing to do with investors’ ability 
to discover the firm value but rests on management’s ability to value the firm. 
Confusion on the part of the manager as to whether the current valuation multiples are 
rational or not will channel the effect of aggregate mispricing on investment. Hence, 
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this component is used to test the third hypothesis concerning the role of a  noisy signal 
about the future state of the economy or the industry in determining investment.  
 
The third component G= ( ; )it j itv lnBθ α −  is the difference between the value of the 
firm based on long-run multiples and the book value of the firm. It varies over time as 
the accounting information varies over time and is not contaminated by firm-specific or 
aggregate-wide misvaluations. It is rather based on the value of the firm based on long-
run aggregate-average growth and discount rates that are applied to the average firm in 
the industry or in the market. This component reflects the growth in the value of the 
firm.   
 
4.2 Data 
The sample in this study includes panel data for all U.S. firms in Compustat between 
1971 and 2004 with data on investment, financing, market, and other determinants, as 
described in the sections below. Due to the one period lag structure in the 
methodology, the sample period starts from 1972. In addition, each firm is required to 
have at least two consecutive years of data. The sample does not include financial firms 
(SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and firms in the Utilities industry (SIC code between 
4900 and 4949). Firm-year observations that are in the 1st and 99th percentile of total 
assets are not included in the sample to reduce the effect of reporting errors in the data. 
The full sample includes 89,464 firm-year observations, for an average of 4,236 firms 
each year.  To get the share turnover ratio, the initial sample is intersected with the 
CRSP database to create a Compustat-CRSP sample that includes 57,781 observations 
running from 1971 to 2003.  
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4.2.1  Investment  
Corporate Investment decisions are measured in several ways. Total Investment ( )itI  is 
the sum of capital expenditures ( )CAPXit  #128, acquisitions ( )ACQit  #129, R&D expense 
( )RDit #46, and increase in investments ( )IINC it  #113
30. In addition to the total, each 
investment category is analyzed separately. Corporate disinvestment or asset sales are 
measured by the sale property, plant, and equipment ( )SalePPEit  #107. Net corporate 
investment is the difference between total investments and asset sales ( )itNetI . All 
investment variables are divided by the total assets at the beginning of the period 
1( )itA − #6. 
 




A A −∆ ) is also analyzed as an 
alternative measure of investment. To differentiate between investment and 
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A A −∆ ) is the difference between total assets #6 at time t and the total assets 




A A −∆ = 1 1( ) /it it itA A A− −− . Percentage 
increase in total assets includes only positive changes in total assets, 
1 1 1
/ ( ) /
it it it it it
A A A A A
+
− − −∆ = −  where 1( ) 0it itA A −− > . Percentage decrease in total assets includes 
only negative changes in total assets. Percentage decrease in total assets is represented 
by the absolute value of the percentage decrease of total assets, 1 11/ ( ) /it it itit itA A A A A
−
− −−∆ = −  
                                                
30  The item numbers refer to the annual data numbers in Compustat. The symbols in parentheses refer to 






A A −− < . Calculation details are also tabulated in Appendix D. Firm-year 
observations with negative values on individual investment variables are not included in 
the sample. Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the investment variables.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2.2 Financing 
Corporate financing activities are equity and debt external financing. These two 
categories are examined on a net and gross basis separately as well as collectively as 
external capital. Net capital (
itNetCap ) is the sum of net equity issued ( itNetEq ) and net debt 
issued (
itNetDbt ) for firm i at time t. Net equity ( itNetEq ) is the difference between gross 
equity issued (
itEIssue ) #108 and gross equity repurchased ( Re itE p ) #115. Net debt 
(
itNetDbt ) is the difference between gross debt issued ( itDIssue )#111 and gross debt 
retired( Re itD t ) #114. In addition, the sum of gross equity issued ( itEIssue ) and gross debt 
issued (
itDIssue ) is the gross capital issued ( itCapIssue ). The sum of gross equity 
repurchased ( Re itE p ) and gross debt retired ( Re itD t ) is gross capital retired ( Re itCap t ).All 
financing variables are divided by total assets at the beginning of the year 
1( )itA − #6. 
Calculation details are also tabulated in Appendix D.  
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the different financing variables.  By 
looking at the averages of the debt and equity ratios, we can see that the mean ratios of 
external debt to assets are significantly higher than the mean ratios of equity to total 
assets. Firms issue and retire debt more actively and with larger amounts than equity.  
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4.2.3 Market  
The market measures used to determine investments are outcomes of decomposing the 
market to book ratio 1( / )itM B −  into three components: mispricing at the firm level 
( 1
firm
itDev − ), mispricing at the aggregate level ( 1
Agg
itDev − ), and the growth component 
( 1itG − ) for firm i at time t-1. 
 
Mispricing at the firm level ( firmitDev ) is the difference between the market value of firm 
i at time t and the fundamental value of firm i at time t [ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The 
fundamental value of firm i [ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate 
regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The individual time t 
values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln V ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + . Firms are classified as 
over- or under-valued based on the firm mispricing measure. If mispricing at the firm 
level ( firmitDev ) is positive (negative) then the firm is overvalued (undervalued). 
 
Mispricing at the aggregate  level ( AggitDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental 
value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate 
multiples ( tα ’s) and the  fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t 
accounting values ( tθ ) and long-run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The 
long-run aggregate multiples (α ’s) are the over time average of ( tα ’s). If industries are 
used as the aggregate measure, then industries are hot (cold) if they have a positive 
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(negative) aggregate mispricing measure ( AggitDev ).If the market is used as the aggregate 
measure, then the market is hot (cold) if it has a positive (negative) aggregate mispricing 
measure ( AggitDev ). 
 
Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by long-run multiples 
and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. 
 
The decomposition methodology requires a measure of the fundamental value of the 
firm. Such fundamental values can be calculated based on industry multiples or market 
multiples. All the analyses reported in this study are based on industry valuation 
multiples. The Industry classification is based on Fama & French’s 12 industry classes. 
Results that are based on market valuation multiples are qualitatively similar; however, 
they are not reported because of space considerations.  
 
The decomposition methodology and the fundamental value measures are explained in 
detail in the previous section of this chapter. Calculation details are also tabulated in 
Appendix D.  
 
Panel C of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the market to book ratio as well as 
for the decomposition components based on both market and industry multiples. The 
mean values of the decomposition components using industry multiples are similar to 
their counterparts where market multiples are used. However, industry mispricing and 
growth based on industry multiples are more volatile than market mispricing and 
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growth based on market multiples. In fact, the correlation coefficient between firm 
mispricing using industry multiples and firm mispricing using market multiples is over 
0.93 (not reported), which indicates that the two measures are almost identical. That is 
not true, however, when considering the correlation between industry mispricing and 
market-mispricing or when considering the correlation between growth components. In 
addition, the correlations between the three components and the market to book ratio 
are 0.59 for firm mispricing, 0.06 for industry mispricing, and 0.12 for growth (not 
reported). The significant correlations indicate that the three components of the 
decomposed market to book ratio carry much of the information in the market to book 
ratio.  
 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients between investment variables and both 
financing and market determinants. The correlations between investment variables and 
both financing and cash flow variables are much higher than the correlation between 
investment variables and market variables. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Moreover, investment variables are positively related to both financing and market 
variables, while disinvestment variables, like asset sales and percentage decrease in total 
assets, have a negative correlation with the market variables. Except for the correlation 
between net debt issuance and the percentage decrease in total assets, disinvestment 
variables are positively correlated to financing variables, which may indicate that firms 
sell assets and issue capital simultaneously for funding purposes. The negative 
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correlation between research and development and cash flow is due to the fact that 
research and development is expensed and subtracted from net income,  which is one 
of the ingredients of cash flow.  
 
4.2.4 Other Investment Determinants 
The degree of financial constraints (
itZ ) measures the extent to which a firm is 
financially constrained and thus depends on equity. The measure is based on the index 
introduced by Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) (1997) to measure the degree of financial 
constraint. KZ classify low-dividend manufacturing firms into categories of financial 
constraints and use an ordered logit model to relate the degree of financial constraints 
to the relevant accounting variables. The KZ index assigns higher value for firms that 
are more financially constrained.  
 
KZ introduced a five-variable index that includes Tobin’s q as one of the relevant 
variables that measure the degree of financial constraints.  However, Tobin’s q is also a 
proxy for investment opportunity and market mispricing. The main purpose of this 
study is to examine the effect of those two components on corporate investment and 
see how this effect is sensitive to the degree of financial constraints. To make sure any 
change in the sensitivity is driven by the degree of financial constraints rather than the 
level of Tobin’s q, we need an index that is a clean indicator of financial constraints and 
does not proxy for investment opportunity or market mispricing. Therefore, I follow 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and calculate Z based on a modified four-variable 
version of the index, as follows: 
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( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
1.002 39.368 1.315 3.139it it itit it
i t i t i t
CF DIV C
Z Lev
A A A− − −
= − − − +    (4.14) 
Where the cash flow (CF) ratio is income before extraordinary items (#18) plus 
depreciation and amortization (#14) over beginning-of-the-period book asset (#6), 
(DIV) is cash dividends (preferred dividends #19 + common dividends #21), (C) is 
cash and short-term investments (#1), and (Lev) is the ratio of debt over the total of 
debt and equity (long-term debt #9 + current portion of debt #34/[long-term debt #9 
+ current portion of debt #34+ stockholders' equity #216). Firms with negative values 
for dividends, cash, or leverage are not included in the sample.  
 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler show that Tobin’s q is orthogonal to the liner combination of 
the other four variables and thus, dropping Tobin’s q from the index does not affect 
other variables’ coefficients. In the model above we can see that cash flow, dividends, 
and cash have a negative sign, which is consistent with the fact that profitable firms that 
pay dividends and keep cash are less constrained and are expected to have higher debt 
capacity. Leverage, however, enters with a positive sign to indicate that firms with low 
debt capacity are expected to be more financially constrained. It is important to note 
that the coefficients in equation (4.14) may not necessarily be the correct loadings for 
the sample used in this study; however, using the index without re-estimating the 
coefficients is a way to avoid data mining. In addition, as long as the loadings have the 
expected sign, the variable choice is what is important to the index rather than the 
variable loadings. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler show that their results obtain even when 
they reset the weights so that each variable explains an equal portion of the variation in 
the index.  
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Another determinant of corporate investment is shareholder investment horizon ( itH ).  
Long-horizon shareholders are those who hold on to their stocks and are not keen to 
sell the stocks for capital gains. Short-horizon shareholders are those who are willing to 
sell their stocks in the near future to profit from stock price appreciation.  
 
Since shareholder investment horizon can be measured by the length of time investors 
hold their stocks, the share turnover ratio provides a good gauge for that time length. 
Firms that are owned by short (long) horizon shareholders are more likely to have high 
(low) share turnover ratios. Share turnover ratio is calculated as the average of the 
monthly ratios of shares traded to shares outstanding during the fiscal year. Data on 
shares traded and shares outstanding are taken from the CRSP database between 1971 
and 2003. Due to the fact that some firms in Compustat do not have shares data in 
CRSP, the Compustat-CRSP sample has fewer observations than the initial sample.  
 
Calculation details are also tabulated in Appendix D. Panel D of Table 3 presents 
summary statistics for the degree of financial constraint index and its ingredients as well 









4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Corporate Investment and Market Determinants 
Before testing the main hypotheses in this study, let us take a look at the two main 
determinants of corporate investments that are mentioned in the literature. Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and many others introduce Tobin’s q and cash flow as 
the main explanatory variables for corporate investment, especially capital expenditure. 
The cash flow to total assets ratio summarizes the fundamental information about the 
firm. It is supposed to reflect the profitability of the investment opportunities of the 
firm. The market’s role in explaining investment has been reported in many studies, 
although the interpretation of that role is still under debate. Efficient market advocates 
suggest that the market reveals more information about the firm’s investment 
opportunities than is already revealed by the firm’s fundamentals, such as, cash flows; 
hence the significant relation between investment and Tobin’s q. Other researchers 
suggest another role of the market that precludes market efficiency and/or market 
rationality. In this alternative view, at least part of the significant relation between 
investment and Tobin’s q arises from the fact that Tobin’s q contains elements of 
market’s irrationality and/or inefficiency.  
 
In order to differentiate between theses two views, this study unpacks or decomposes 
the market variable into three different components: firm mispricing, industry 
mispricing, and firm growth. Each component carries a different explanation of the role 
of the market. Firm growth is related to the first view, where the market reveals 
important information about the firm’s investment opportunities. On the other hand, 
firm and industry mispricings are related to the second view, where inefficiency and/or 
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irrationality in the market affect investment. To evaluate the relative strength of each 
explanation of market role, I estimate the following investment equation: 
0 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1 1
firm Aggit it





β β β β β ε− − −
− −
= + + + + +     (4.15) 
Where (i) refers to the firm and (t) refers to the year. The dependent and independent 
variables in all regressions are adjusted for firm and year averages in a way similar to the 
least squares dummy approach.31 The efficient market view expects only the growth 
component coefficient 4β  to be significant, while the inefficient market view expects 
the Firm-mispricing coefficient 2β  and/or the industry-mispricing coefficient 3β  to be 
significant.  Because all variables are adjusted for the firm and year averages, 0β is not 
different from zero in all regressions and thus, it is not reported.  
 
Table 5 shows the results of regressions similar to (4.15) for different investment 
decisions. The results (in the first row for each investment variable) show that the two 
hypotheses about the market role are irrefutable. All three components affect the capital 
expenditure, acquisitions, research and development, and increase in investment 
decisions. 
 
The best interpretation for the market role is that the market carries fundamental 
information about the firm’s growth prospects beyond what is already reflected in the 
firm’s cash flow; however, this fundamental information is contaminated by the 
                                                
31 Consider a two-way fixed effect model in a form: 
it it i t it
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irrationality and/or inefficiency inherent in the market. The different investment 
variables in panel A and the percentage change and the percentage increase in total 
assets in panel B show positive and significant sensitivity to all market components. 
Therefore, a firm is expected to increase its investment activities (including capital 
expenditure, acquisitions, research and development, increase in investment, and 
increase in total assets) in response to a high growth prospect, a high valuation from the 
market, and /or a positive wave in the industry.  
 
Disinvestment decisions, however, do not seem to respond to all three market 
components similarly. In Panel A, a sale of assets decision is not significantly 
determined by the growth component of the market variable. The coefficient of the 
growth component has a predicted but insignificant negative sign. The mispricing at the 
firm level is also insignificant for the sale of assets decision. Thus, firm undervaluation 
and lack of growth prospects do not seem to affect sale of assets decisions significantly. 
The only significant market role for the sale of assets is the industry mispricing, which 
has a negative and significant coefficient. This result is consistent with the expectation 
that firms sell assets in response to an undervaluation wave in their industries. In Panel 
B, the percentage decrease in total assets (in absolute value form) is not driven by the 
firm’s growth opportunities. It, however, responds negatively to the firm mispricing 
component, which reflects the propensity of an undervalued firm to decrease its assets 
over the year. Strangely, the percentage decrease in total assets responds positively to 
the industry mispricing component. This result means that firms decrease their assets 
more when the industry experiences a positive wave, and this is inconsistent with the 
predicted role of the market. Combining the results from asset sales with results from 
 85 
the decrease in total assets, we can be assured that the positive relation between 
decrease in assets and industry mispricing is not driven by the sale of property, plant, 
and equipment. It might be driven by changes in current assets.  
 
In addition to the regression that uses market variable components as a replacement for 
the market to book ratio, Table 5 includes two more regressions that include market to 
book ratio in the analysis. The regression in the second row for each investment 
variable includes the market to book ratio along with its components as market proxies, 
while the regression in the third row for each investment variable includes the market to 
book ratio as the sole market variable.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The comparison among all three regressions allows us to evaluate the performance of 
the separate components of the market to book ratio in explaining investment decisions 
and to see how effectively these components mimic the explanatory role of the market 
to book ratio. If the three components are true parts of the market to book ratio, we 
expect the market to book ratio to have less power, if any, in explaining investment 
after controlling for the three variables.  
 
In Panel A, market to book ratio is significantly related to all investment variables when 
it is used as a sole market proxy. However, when the three market components are 
added to the regression, market to book ratio becomes insignificant for acquisition, 
increase in investment, and sale of assets.  
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In Panel B, firm mispricing is not significant to the percentage change in total assets or 
to the percentage increase in total assets after controlling for market to book ratio. In 
contrast, market to book ratio becomes insignificant to the percentage decrease in total 
assets when the three components are added to the regression.  
 
The market to book ratio and the three market components retain significance when 
regressed against total and net investments, capital expenditure, and research and 
development as the dependent variables.  However, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are reduced significantly when all market proxies are included. This reduction in the size 
of the coefficients is true for all investment variables. Moreover, the three market 
components explain as much variation in all investment variables as the market to book 
ratio. The R square values for the regressions with only the three market components 
are either close to, or higher than, the R square values for regression with only the 
market to book ratio. The reported change in R square ( 2R∆ ) due to adding market to 
book ratio in the regression is very small and varies between 0.0005 up to 0.0047. In 
addition, I run a partial F test that examines  whether the change in the F statistics due 
to the addition of market to book ratio is significantly different from zero. The reported 
p-values of the partial F test show that the addition of market to book ratio is significant 
to the regression of total investment, net investment, capital expenditure, research and 
development, and increase in investment.  
 
Therefore, the three components seem to mimic the effect of the market to book ratio 
and in some cases do better than the market to book ratio in determining the different 
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investment variables. However, to make sure that we add all relevant variables that 
affect investment decisions in my regressions, I regress the market to book ratio against 
the three components of the market and use the residual from that regression as a 
controlling variable (RME) for the remaining effect of the market to book ratio that is 
not accounted for by the three components. This remaining effect of the market to 
book ratio is orthogonal to the three components and is added to all regressions in this 
study. Although we can not be sure of the nature of this variable, it may reflect the 
nonlinear relation between market to book ratio and the different investment decisions. 
Since the components of the market that we use are in log form, they do not account 
for any nonlinear relation between market to book ratio and investment.  
 
The cash flow variable indicates that profitability determines the level of total and net 
investments as well as capital expenditure and changes in total assets. The cash flow 
variable is not significant for acquisition decisions when we control for market variables. 
Thus, market perception rather than firm performance is what drives the acquisition 
decision. This is consistent with the general observations about the destructive nature of 
many recent acquisitions, and it may also indicate that some firms try to enhance their 
performance by buying other firms. The cash flow variable is negative and insignificant 
for research and development investment. The negative sign attached to the cash flow 
variable is probably due to the fact that research and development is considered to be 
an expense which is subtracted from the net income. In addition, the cash flow variable 
is positive and significant to the sale of property and equipment. One would expect a 
negative relation between profitability and sale of assets. However, gains from selling 
assets or tax savings from loss of selling assets might affect the relation between asset 
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sales and the cotemporaneous cash flow variable. By using a one-period lag cash flow 
variable instead of the cotemporaneous cash flow, I find a negative relation between 
asset sales and the lag cash flow variable (results not reported). Thus, the lower the 
firm’s profitability in one period, the higher the firm’s asset sales in the following 
period. The percentage decrease in the total assets variable, however, has a negative and 
significant relation with the cotemporaneous cash flow variable. This is also consistent 
with prediction that less profitable firms reduce their assets.  
 
4.3.2 Testing Hypothesis 1a 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that equity transactions, especially the transactions that are 
driven by market timing, affect the investment decisions of the firm. The basic test for 
hypothesis 1a involves adding financing variables to the basic regression (4.15). 
Although the main financing method in hypothesis 1a is equity, I examine debt and total 
capital as well. 
 
 It is important to notice that hypothesis 1a concerns the market timing-driven 
financing transactions. Thus, two dummy variables are created and interacted with the 
financing variable under consideration. The first dummy variable is named (Time) and it 
equals one (Time=1) if the overvalued firm has a positive net issuance activity or if the 
undervalued firm has a negative net issuance activity; Time=0 otherwise. The second 
dummy variable is named (NOTime) and it equals one (NOTime=1) if the overvalued 
firm does not have positive net issuance activities or if the undervalued firm does not 
have negative net issuance activities; NOTime=0 otherwise. Firms are classified as over- 
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or under-valued based on the beginning-of-the-period firm-level mispricing. If 1
firm
itDev −  
is greater (less) than zero, then the firm is overvalued (undervalued).  
 
The basic regressions used to test hypothesis 1a are:  
0 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
1 1 1
firm Aggit it it
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Where (i) refers to the firm and (t) refers to the year. In regression model (4.16a) the 
equity financing variable has a coefficient 5β . In model (4.16b) the coefficient  5β  is 
divided into parts based on the market timing behavior of the manager. 5aβ is the 
coefficient of equity financing if this financing activity is driven by market timing. 5bβ is 
the coefficient of equity financing if this financing activity is not driven by market 
timing.  
 
For the purpose of examining the financing role, market and cash flow variables act as 
controlling variables in regressions (4.16a,b). Panel A in Table 6 reports two regressions 
for each investment variable. The first regression (4.16a) (on the first row for each 
investment variable) includes net equity issuance with no interaction. The second 
regression (4.16b) (on the second row for each investment variable) includes the net 
equity issuance that is interacted with both (Time) and (NOTime) dummies.    
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Results in Table 6 show that net equity issuance is significantly related to acquisitions 
and to research and development decisions after controlling for fundamentals and 
market variables. However, both (Time) and (NOTime) interactions are statistically 
significant with about the same magnitude. Thus, market timing-driven net equity 
issuance activities do not affect acquisitions and research and development decisions 
differently from the net equity issuance activities that are not driven by market timing.  
 
In regressions where capital expenditure, increase in investments, net investment, or 
total investments is the dependent variable, net equity issuance (in the first regression) 
and market timing (Time) interactions (in the second regression) are significant, while 
the coefficient of the (NOTime) interaction is not statistically different from zero. Thus, 
the significant relation between net equity issuance and the investment decisions (capital 
expenditure, increase in investments, net investment, and total investments) is driven 
mostly by market timing of issuance activities32. Therefore, market timing interaction 
(Time1) and net equity issuance are measuring the same relation and hence, both 
become insignificant.  
 
The inclusion of the financing variables in asset sales regressions improves the relation 
between the market variables and the asset sales. The coefficient of the Firm-mispricing 
variable becomes significant, while it was insignificant before financing variables are 
                                                
32 It is interesting to note that market timers are always significantly less than non-timers in all samples. 
Thus, the significance of market timing transactions compared to non-market timing transaction is not 
driven by the possibility that timers significantly outweigh non-timers.  
 91 
added.  In addition, market timing interactions, (Time) and (NOTime), are both 
significant, which indicates that market timing-driven equity transactions do not affect 
asset sales differently from equity transactions that are not driven by market timing. The 
positive relation between net equity issuance and asset sales indicates that firms that 
need funding use asset sales and equity issuance simultaneously to raise funds.  
 
In Panel B, the percentage change in total assets and the percentage increase in total 
assets are significantly determined by net equity issuance, which is driven by firm 
mispricing. The market timing interaction (Time) is significant while the (NOTime) 
interaction is not significant.  However, net equity issuance is negatively related to the 
percentage decrease in total assets (in absolute form), and that is consistent with the 
prediction that firms who issue more equity reduce their assets less.  However, this 
relation seems to be related to the decrease in current assets rather than the decrease in 
fixed assets since the relation between asset sales and net equity issuance is positive and 
significant. Since both (Time) and (NOTime) have significantly negative coefficients 
with a percentage decrease in total assets, market timing-driven activities do not affect 
the decrease in assets differently from activities that are not related to market timing. In 
fact, activities that are not driven by market timing may have a stronger economic and 
statistical effect on the percentage decrease in total assets. 
 
To summarize the results in Table 6, net equity issuance explains relatively more 
variations in all investment decisions examined, particularly the variation in acquisitions, 
research and development, and increase in investments.  Although net equity issuance 
seems to affect most investment decisions, the market timing-driven net equity issuance 
 92 
does not seem to add anything to the effect of equity financing on acquisitions, research 
and development, asset sales, and percentage decrease in total assets. In contrast, most 
of the significance between net equity issuance and capital expenditure, increase in 
investments, net investments, total investments, and percentage increase in total assets 
is driven by market timing (Time). Net equity issuance activities that are not driven by 
market timing do not seem to affect those investments.  
 
A caveat is in order here. Although my theory and empirical design follow most 
empirical studies that link only equity transactions to market timing, in this part of the 
analysis I consider debt transactions to be driven by stock mispricing.  If the firm is 
timing the market, equity transactions would be the natural choice, as equity is more 
sensitive to changes in firm value. However, debt transactions show a tendency to 
follow stock mispricing. Empirical findings of underperformance after both equity and 
debt IPOs (Ritter (1991)), public debt issues (Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999)), and 
bank loans (Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2002)) suggest that firms issue debt when 
they are overvalued. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) find underperforming issuers to 
be small, young, and NASDAQ-listed. These are features of firms that are more likely 
to be mispriced. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) also find strong evidence that the 
underperformance is limited to offerings that occur in periods with high issue volume. 
All of this evidence is consistent with interpreting debt offerings as a signal that the firm 
is overvalued.  The fact that debt issues result in valuation effects that are so similar to 
the previously documented effect for equity offerings is consistent with capital structure 
models, such as  Miller and Rock (1985), that suggest that all security issues should 
result in negative stock price effects. Richardson and Sloan (2003) find a consistently 
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strong and negative relation between equity and debt financing and future stock returns 
and link the negative future returns to overinvestment of the proceeds from debt and 
equity issuance.  
 
Now, let us take a look at the role of net debt issuance that is driven by market timing in 
explaining investment decisions. The net equity variables in regression models (4.16a,b) 
are replaced by net debt variables. The market timing dummy and no market timing 
dummy are interacted with net debt issuance.  
 
Panel A in Table 7 shows that acquisitions, R&D, total investments, and net investment 
decisions are determined by the net debt issuance activities that are driven by firm 
mispricing only. The interaction term (Time) is significant and higher in magnitude than 
the net debt issuance, while the (NOTime) interaction is insignificant for all these 
variables. Net debt issuance is not significant for capital expenditure and increase in 
investments even when considering the market timing interactions. The positive relation 
between net debt issuance and asset sales indicate that firms with financing needs use 
asset sales and debt issuance to simultaneously raise fund. Market timing and no market 
timing interactions are significant in asset sales regressions.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
In panel B, the percentage change in total assets and the percentage increase in total 
assets are significantly determined by the net debt issues that are driven by firm 
mispricing. Net debt issuance that is not motivated by market timing does not affect the 
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changes in assets and the increase in assets in particular. The percentage decrease in 
assets does not seem to be determined by net debt issuance activities whether they are 
market timing-driven or not.   
 
In general, R square is higher when adding the debt financing variable to the baseline 
regression (4.15). Debt financing explains more variations in total investments, 
acquisitions, asset sales, and net investments than does equity financing. In summary, 
net debt issuance that is driven by firm mispricing significantly affects acquisitions, 
R&D, total investments, net investments, and increases in total assets. Net debt issuance 
is not a significant determinant to capital expenditure, increase in investment, and 
percentage decrease in total assets.  
 
Now, net equity and debt issuance are examined at the same time through net capital 
issuance activities. In Table 8, net capital is examined for a possible relation with the 
different investment decisions after controlling for market and fundamental variables. 
Panel A shows that net capital issuance activities affect all investment decisions. 
Moreover, net capital issuance that is motivated by market timing significantly affects 
capital expenditure, total investments, and net investments while issuance activities that 
are not driven by market timing are not significant to these decisions. The other 
separate investment decisions do not show any difference in their sensitivities to timing-
motivated versus non-timing-motivated net capital issued. Moreover, the positive 
relation between net capital issuance and asset sales indicates that firms that need 
funding use asset sales, equity, and debt issuance to simultaneously raise funds. 
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[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Panel B shows that percentage change in total assets in general and percentage increase 
in total assets in particular have a strong relation with net capital issuance activities that 
are driven by market timing (Time). Net capital issuance activities that are not 
necessarily motivated by market timing do not affect the increase in assets. In contrast, 
the percentage decrease in assets is not affected by net capital issuance activities in 
general. 
 
After reviewing the results of testing hypothesis 1a for equity issuance activities as well 
as for debt issuance activities, I can conclude the following: although net equity and net 
debt issuance activities affect most investment decisions in general, only capital 
expenditure and increase in investments are especially sensitive to net equity issuance 
activities that are driven by market timing of firm mispricing (Time).  Market timing of 
equity issuance does not affect the acquisition and R&D decisions. However, 
acquisitions and R&D show higher sensitivity to net debt issuance that is driven by firm 
mispricing. In addition, net investments, total investment, and increases in total assets 
are sensitive to net equity and debt issues that are driven by market timing (Time) only.  
 
4.3.3 Testing Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b asserts that the relation between stock mispricing and investment 
decisions is economically stronger in financially constrained firms. The Kaplan and 
Zingales financial constraint index is used to assign firms into quartiles based on the 
value of their index score. For each quartile, I estimate a model similar to (4.15) for each 
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investment variable. The pattern of the coefficients on firm- and industry mispricing is 
examined and compared among the different quartiles. The best measure of the 
economic effect of the financial constraint on the investment-mispricing sensitivity is 
the difference in mispricing coefficients between the bottom quartile and the top 
quartile. Hypothesis 1b predicts the coefficients of mispricing to be significantly higher 
as we move to the top quartile. The top quartile is supposed to include the most 
financially constrained firms. In Table 9, each row corresponds to the investment 
variable used in the regression. The coefficient of the firm mispricing (b) and the 
coefficient of industry mispricing (c) for each quartile are reported, as well as the t-test 
of the difference in coefficients b and c between the top and the bottom quartiles.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Table 9 shows a strong relation between the degree of financial constraints and the 
effect of mispricing on investment. The effect of firm mispricing on investment is 
significantly higher in the top quartile of the financial constraint index than it is in the 
bottom quartile of the index. Total investment, capital expenditure, acquisition, and net 
investment decisions in financially constrained firms are almost three times as sensitive 
to firm mispricing as those decisions in unconstrained firms. The difference in the 
sensitivity of research and development to firm mispricing between top and bottom 
quartiles is smaller in magnitude but significant.  The degree of financial constraint does 
not affect the relation between mispricing and the increase in investment variable. In 
addition, the asset sales variable is positively related to firm- and industry mispricing in 
the top quartile but negatively related to firm- and industry mispricing in the bottom 
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quartile. This result suggests that highly constrained firms may use asset sales as a source 
of funds rather than an investment strategy. Therefore, when a financially constrained 
firm is overpriced and tries to invest more, it uses the proceeds from selling old assets 
to invest in the new projects. The degree of financial constraints significantly affects the 
relation between changes in assets and firm mispricing. Percentage increase and 
decrease in total assets are significantly more sensitive to firm mispricing in the top 
quartile compared to the bottom quartile.  
 
The sensitivity between investment decisions and industry mispricing is significantly 
different between the top and the bottom quartiles only in total investment, capital 
expenditure, acquisition, and net investment. In addition, the sensitivity of the 
percentage decrease in total assets to industry mispricing is positive and significant in 
the top and bottom quartiles, with lower magnitude in the top quartile compared to the 
bottom quartile.  
 
Although the differences in the (b) and (c) coefficients between the top and the bottom 
quartiles are significant for most of the investment variables, the patterns in the (b) and 
(c) coefficients are non-monotonic, except for the (b) coefficient across quartiles in 
capital expenditure and in percentage change in total assets and the (c) coefficient across 
quartiles in  percentage change in total assets. In all other investment variables, the (b) 
and (c) coefficients bounce around quartiles non-monotonically.  
 
The result (not reported) of capital expenditure sensitivities to the market to book 
variable is consistent with the prediction that the higher the constraints index, the 
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higher the sensitivity. The market to book coefficient in the bottom quartile (0.011) is 
significantly smaller than the coefficient in the top quartile (0.029). This result is quite 
similar to the results reported by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), where the sensitivity 
of capital expenditure to Tobin’s q is 0.012 in the bottom quintile and 0.033 in the top 
quintile.  
 
Although it is not a concern in this study, capital expenditure sensitivity to cash flows 
has been shown to be affected by the degree of financial constraints. It is interesting to 
look at the pattern of the cash flow coefficient in capital expenditure regressions across 
the quartiles of the financial constraint index. The results (not reported) show that the 
cash flow coefficient is significantly larger  in the bottom quartile (0.30) than in the top 
quartile (0.07) and it keeps decreasing monotonically as we move toward the most 
financially constrained firm.  This result adds more to the controversy in this issue. This 
result is consistent with the empirical findings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary 
(1999) and is contrary to the empirical findings of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988) that financially constrained firms have higher sensitivity between investment and 
cash flow. The review of the different studies in this issue suggests that the results are 
sample-specific. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) argue that findings similar to the ones 
here can be explained by the negative cash flow that occurs to the most financially 
constrained firms which weakens the cash flow-investment sensitivity. Although it is not 
applicable to the sample used here, Allayannis and Mozumdar also mention influential 
observation in a small sample as a possible cause of the results. Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003) could not find a significant difference in cash flow coefficients between 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. However, their sampling process might 
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have caused that result since I included many small firms that have been excluded in 
their sample.  
 
4.3.4 Testing Hypothesis 2a 
Hypothesis 2a asserts that corporate investment decisions are in part determined by the 
general perception in the market about the firm’s future. Managers use the stock price 
as a guide to understand the perception of the market and invest accordingly. In this 
hypothesis, managers recognize the probable bias in the shareholders’ view but that 
does not stop them from following the shareholders’ perception.  This hypothesis 
suggests another cause for the relation between investment and firm mispricing. 
Obviously, confirming the significant relation between firm mispricing and investment 
does not tell us much about what might cause that relationship. Therefore, in order to 
test for a particular cause (which is catering to shareholders here), we need to control 
for any other cause (which is equity issuance, especially equity issuance activities that are 
related to market timing). If firm mispricing is still a significant factor in determining 
investment even after controlling for market timing issuance activities, then at least 
there is a proof that the equity issuance channel is not the only cause of the relation 
between firm mispricing and investment. To test this hypothesis, I do not need to run 
new regressions. Rather, I use the results from regression (4.16). However, instead of 
testing the significance of net equity variables by controlling for firm mispricing, I look 
at the significance of the Firm-mispricing variable while controlling for the net equity 




In Table 6, the control variables are the net equity issuance along with interaction terms 
for the market timing motives.  The purpose here is to examine the behavior of the 
Firm-mispricing coefficient when regressed against the different investment variables. 
Panel A shows that all investment decisions, except for capital expenditures, are still 
significantly related to firm mispricing even after controlling for net equity issuance 
activities. In general, the size of the coefficient of firm mispricing is reduced when we 
add the financing variables into the regression. Interestingly, the asset sales variable 
shows a negative and significant (at 0.10 level) relation to firm mispricing only after 
controlling for equity issuance. Without adding the equity issuance variable to the 
regression, the coefficient of firm mispricing is not significant in asset sales regressions. 
However, the effect of firm mispricing on asset sales is very small in magnitude.  
 
In Panel B, the percentage change in total assets and the percentage increase in total 
assets are no longer related to firm mispricing after controlling for net equity issuance. 
In contrast, the percentage decrease in total assets is negatively and significantly related 
to firm mispricing, while it is negatively and insignificantly related to net equity issuance.  
 
Panel A in Table 7 summarizes the regressions with net debt issuance control variables. 
The Firm-mispricing variable retains significance even after the inclusion of the debt 
financing variables for all investment variables, except for asset sales. Firm mispricing is 
not significant for asset sales after controlling for net debt issuance variables. This may 
indicate that undervalued firms that need financing usually issue debt more than equity 
and at the same time use asset sales as another way to raise funds.  
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In Panel B, the inclusion of the debt financing variables did not have any effect on the 
significance of the Firm-mispricing variable in relation to the percentage changes in total 
assets. However, the magnitude of the effect of firm mispricing is reduced to nearly half 
when the market timing interaction terms are used rather than the net debt issuance 
without interaction.  In addition, the percentage increase in total assets is not 
significantly determined by firm mispricing after controlling for market timing-driven 
net debt issuance. For percentage decrease in total assets, firm mispricing is significant 
while debt issuance is not significant.  
 
In Table 8, I control for both net equity and net debt by including net capital issuance 
variables. The Firm-mispricing variable is significant for all investment variables except 
for acquisitions. The net capital issuance absorbs most of the explanatory power of the 
Firm-mispricing variable. In addition, the sum of equity and debt help clarify the 
relation between asset sales and firm mispricing. The relation between asset sales and 
firm mispricing is significantly negative, while it is insignificant when we consider debt 
only and it is significant but smaller when we consider equity only. Panel B shows that 
the inclusion of net capital neutralizes the effect of firm mispricing in explaining the 
percentage change in total assets and the percentage increase in total assets. However, 
the percentage decrease in total assets is still negatively and significantly related to firm 
mispricing. 
 
In sum, if we measure the effect of shareholder catering by examining the remaining 
explanatory power of firm mispricing after controlling for net issuance activities, then 
we can say that shareholder catering is significant in explaining the relation between 
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investment and firm mispricing. After controlling for net financing activities, the 
remaining effect of firm mispricing is due to catering to the shareholder perception that 
is inherited in the mispricing variable. There are four cases where shareholder catering 
may not be the significant channel for the investment-mispricing relationship. First, 
after controlling for net equity and/or net debt financing variables, percentage increase 
in total assets is no longer determined by firm mispricing. Second, after controlling for 
net capital financing variables, acquisition is no longer determined by firm mispricing. 
Third, after controlling for net debt financing variables, asset sales is no longer 
determined by firm mispricing. Fourth, after controlling for net equity financing 
variables, capital expenditure is no longer determined by firm mispricing. 
 
4.3.5 Testing Hypothesis 2b 
Hypothesis 2b asserts that firms owned by short-horizon shareholders maintain higher 
mispricing-investment sensitivity due to the fact that short-horizon shareholders are 
more concerned about the current stock price than the value of the firm in the long-run. 
In a world where managers maximize shareholders’ wealth, it is quite logical to find a 
stronger relation between investment and mispricing in firms where the majority of 
shareholders measure their wealth based on short-run capital gains.  In contrast, firms 
with long-horizon shareholders are expected to maintain weaker mispricing-investment 
sensitivity because their shareholders are not concerned about the current stock price 
movements and the best way to cater to them is by investing in long-term value 




The investment horizon for shareholders is measured by the trading volume of the 
stock relative to the total number of shares in the firm, i.e. the share turnover ratio. 
Specifically, for each firm-year, I calculate the average of the monthly shares turnover 
ratio during the fiscal year. Then, I sort firms into quartiles based on the average 
turnover ratio for all firm-years. The highest turnover ratio reflects the shortest 
investment horizon. For each quartile, I estimate a model similar to (4.15) for each 
investment variable. The pattern of the coefficient of stock mispricing is examined and 
compared among the different horizon quartiles. Hypothesis 2b predicts the coefficients 
of firm mispricing to be significantly higher as we move toward the top quartile. The 
top quartile is supposed to include firms with the shortest shareholder investment 
horizon. The pattern of the industry-mispricing coefficient is also examined.  
In Table 10, each row corresponds to the investment variable used in the regression. 
The coefficient of firm mispricing (b) and the coefficient of industry mispricing (c) for 
each quartile are reported as well as the t-test of the difference in coefficients b and c 
between the top and the bottom quartiles.  
 
The test for hypothesis 2b is an essential step to confirm the role of shareholder 
catering in enhancing the mispricing-investment sensitivity. In hypothesis 2a, I showed 
that firm mispricing has a separate effect on investment beyond that of the equity 
issuance channel. The test for hypothesis 2a provides a necessary but insufficient proof 
of the existence of the catering effect. In hypothesis 2b, I examine the difference in 
mispricing-investment sensitivity between firms with short-horizon shareholders and 
firms with long-horizon investors. These two parts of the second hypothesis become 
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collective evidence for how shareholder catering causes the mispricing-investment 
sensitivity.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Table 10 shows that mispricing-investment sensitivity is significantly higher in firms 
with short-horizon shareholders (top quartile) than it is in firms with long-horizon 
shareholders (bottom quartile). Total investment, capital expenditure, acquisitions, 
increase in investments, and percentage change in total assets show significant 
differences in the sensitivity to firm- and industry mispricing between top and bottom 
quartiles.  
 
R&D, net investment, and percentage increase in total assets show significant 
differences between top and bottom quartiles only in the sensitivity to firm mispricing. 
However, the sensitivity of asset sales to firm- and industry mispricing is not affected by 
shareholder investment horizons. Coefficient b in the asset sales regression is not 
significant in the top and bottom quartiles. It is interesting to notice that firms with the 
shortest and longest investor horizons base their asset sales decisions in part according 
to industry mispricing rather than firm mispricing.  
 
Percentage decrease in total assets is significantly more sensitive to industry mispricing 
when the firm has short-horizon shareholders. Coefficient c is not significantly different 
from zero in the first quartile and it is significantly negative in the top quartile. 
 
 105 
In general, coefficients b and c bounce around quartiles non-monotonically for all 
investment variables. In addition to the statistical significance of the difference in 
coefficients b and c between the extreme quartiles, the economic difference is also large. 
At the least, coefficients b and c in the top quartile are 1.3 times those in the bottom 
quartile. This relative amount goes up to 2 times in percentage increase in total assets, 
and up to 4 times in increase in investment.  
 
The results in Table 10 show clearly that managers do cater to investors by establishing 
investment strategies that are believed, by those investors, to be the best for their 
wealth. The strong relation between investment and mispricing in firms with short- 
horizon shareholders is a direct indication of this clientele effect. In sum, acquisition, 
R&D, increase in investment, and total and net investm nt decisions are determined 
by stock mispricing due in part to the catering behavior of the manager. Capital 
expenditure decisions, however, do not pass the necssary test (hypothesis 2a) and 
therefore, we can not prove its relation to mispricing through catering even though it 
has passed the sufficient test (hypothesis 2b).  
 
4.3.6 Testing Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis is tested by examining the coefficient of the aggregate mispricing 
variable. A significant coefficient suggests that managers use market and/or industry 
conditions as sources of information when they make their investment decisions. Thus, 
any bubble in the industry or the market can affect investment. This study reports the 
results for industry mispricing only. A similar analysis using the market mispricing 
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variable produces similar results. However, those results are not reported because of 
space considerations.   
 
Across all the previous tables (5 through 8) presented, industry mispricing significantly 
affects all investment decisions. The coefficient of the industry-mispricing variable 
maintains its magnitude and significance after controlling for all financing variables, 
which indicates the uniqueness of this variable and how relevant it is in testing the third 
hypothesis without interfering with the previous two hypotheses. However, when 
controlling for market timing-driven net equity issuance, the industry-mispricing 
variable become insignificant to the capital expenditure decision. This result may 
indicate that when managers try to raise funds for capital expenditure purposes, they not 
only time the firm mispricing but they also time the industry mispricing as well.  
 
Industry mispricing is positively related to investment variables and negatively related to 
asset sales. Thus, firms in cold industries are prone to sell more of their assets and have 
low investment levels, while firms in hot industries have high investment levels with less 
asset sales.  
 
Moreover, the percentage change in total assets and the percentage increases in total 
assets are positively related to industry mispricing, which indicates that firms increase 
their assets in accordance with the positive movements in the industry. On the other 
hand, the relation between percentage decrease in total assets and industry mispricing is 
positive. This result suggests that firms decrease their assets when the industry is over-
heating, and that is inconsistent with the predicted role of industry mispricing. This 
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result is hard to reconcile with the rest of the results, but it is surely not driven by the 
sale of property, plant, and equipment. It may rather be driven by changes in current 
assets. The positive relation between the percentage decrease in total assets (in absolute 
form) and industry mispricing is consistent with the view that firms in over-heating 
industries tend to draw more cash and use up more of their current assets to invest.  
 
4.3.7 Is the mispricing –investment relation a one-sided phenomenon? 
Previous studies that examine the relation between mispricing and investment depend 
on certain theoretical treatments that force them to assume one side of the mispricing. 
For example, Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) present the equity dependence model of 
the mispricing –investment relation and the model is assumed to work only for 
undervalued firms. Panageas (2003) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2004) 
present models based on heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints which imply 
overvaluation only. Polk and Sapienza (2002) argue that the relation between mispricing 
and investment works for both sides of mispricing, under- and over- valuation; 
however, in their testing methodology, they did not separate the two types of mispricing 
to know whether both sides can show a mispricing –investment relation.  
 
In this section, I classify firms as undervalued ( FirmDev <0) or overvalued ( FirmDev >0) based 
on firm mispricing. Then, I estimate equation (4.15) for every investment variable in 
each class of firms separately. The effect of firm mispricing on every investment 
variable is compared between the two classes of firms based on the significance and size 
of the Firm-mispricing coefficient.  
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The beauty of the analysis in this section is the chance to examine overinvestment and 
underinvestment in firms. The theoretical treatment in this study addresses the effect of 
mispricing on both sides of investment distortions, overinvestment and 
underinvestment. Overvaluation of the firm value will lead to overinvestment and 
undervaluation of the firm value will lead to underinvestment. Although, we can not 
measure over- or under- investment directly without having a model for expected 
investment level, we can measure the effect of both investment distortions using firm 
mispricing. Regressions that include only overvalued firms are supposed to analyze the 
overinvestment distortion, while regressions that include only undervalued firms are 
supposed to analyze the underinvestment distortion.  
 
The following two tables include separate analyses for overvalued firms (Table 11) and 
undervalued firms (Table 12).  
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
Table 11 summarizes the investment response to mispricing in overvalued firms. The 
first regression (in the first row for each investment variable) includes only cash flow 
and market variables. The next three rows add gross capital issued, gross equity issued, 
and gross debt issued, respectively. Controlling for gross issuance activities is relevant 
for overvalued firms. Overvalued firms are more likely to issue equity and debt in 
response to overvaluation, which might also lead to overinvestment. Overinvestment 
can be caused by either the issuance of overvalued capital or by catering to shareholders 
or by a combination of the two. The effect of the issuance of overvalued capital 
 109 
(whether equity or debt or both) is measured by the coefficients of capital, equity, and 
debt. The effect of catering to shareholders is measured by the coefficient of firm 
mispricing after controlling for the different financing variables. 
 
Panel A shows that acquisition, research and development, total investment, and net 
investment variables are significantly determined by firm overvaluation and total capital 
issuance activities. Capital expenditure is significantly determined by firm overvaluation. 
However, equity but not debt is significant for the capital expenditure decision in 
overvalued firms. Equity issuance is the main determinant of increase in investment 
decisions in overvalued firms. Firm mispricing becomes insignificant to the increase in 
investment decision after controlling for gross equity issued.  The asset sales variable is 
negatively related to firm overvaluation, which indicates the tendency of overvalued 
firms to reduce asset sales as the overvaluation increases. Equity and debt issuance 
variables are positively related to asset sales which indicate that overvalued firms use 
asset sales along with equity and debt for funding purposes. In general, although the 
overvaluation measure retains significance after controlling for gross issuance activities, 
the size of the coefficient declines significantly. The reduction in the economic effect of 
the mispricing is due to the fact that gross issuance of debt or equity is motivated in part 
by overvaluation.   
 
In Panel B, percentage change in total assets and percentage increase in total assets are 
mainly determined by issuance of overvalued capital. Firm mispricing is no longer 
significant after controlling for capital issuance. This result suggests that the effect of 
overvaluation on the increase in total assets is absorbed by the issuance of overvalued 
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capital. In contrast, the percentage decrease in total assets is neither determined by 
overvaluation nor by capital issuance. The coefficients of firm mispricing and debt 
issuance are insignificant, while the coefficient of equity issuance is negative and 
significant at the 0.1 level.  The negative coefficient of equity issuance indicates the 
propensity of overvalued firms to reduce fewer of their assets when they issue equity.  
 
This result suggests that the degree of mispricing in overvalued firms has no effect on 
the decrease in total assets. Industry mispricing is positively and significantly related to a 
decrease in assets. Thus, overvalued firms tend to decrease their assets when their 
industries experience a bubble. That might be related to decrease in current assets more 
than it is related to decrease in fixed assets since the sale of property, plant, and 
equipment is negatively related to industry mispricing. Also, it is quite expected that 
overvalued firms may draw large amounts of cash to invest more in hot industries.  
 
From the above results, we can see that overinvestment exists either because of the 
issuance of overvalued capital and/or because of catering to shareholders. These two 
causes lead to overinvestment in total and net basis. Overinvestment in acquisitions, 
R&D, and capital expenditure is also caused by the two factors; however, equity 
issuance rather than debt issuance affects capital expenditure decisions. Overinvestment 
in increase in investments and increase in overvalued assets are not caused by catering 
to shareholders. They are mainly caused by the issuance of overvalued forms of capital; 
equity for increase in investment, and total capital for increase in overvalued assets.  
Disinvestment measured by asset sales is significantly decreased by firm overvaluation. 
However, the decrease in total assets is not affected by mispricing in overvalued firms.  
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[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
Table 12 presents the investment behavior of undervalued firms.  The first regression 
(in the first row for each investment variable) includes only the cash flow and market 
variables. The next three rows add gross capital retired, gross equity repurchased, and 
gross debt retired, respectively. The repurchase of equity is an expected behavior of 
undervalued firms. Stock repurchases compete with investment for the same funds that 
are available to the firm. If the firm repurchases more equity, it will have fewer funds 
for investment (underinvestment). Debt retirement might play a similar role to equity 
repurchase. In addition, underinvestment by undervalued firms may not necessarily be 
related to financing activities. Instead, catering to shareholders may also cause 
underinvestment by undervalued firms. Therefore, underinvestment can be caused by 
either the repurchase of undervalued capital or by catering to shareholders or by a 
combination of the two. The effect of the repurchase of undervalued capital (whether 
equity or debt or both) is measured by the coefficients of retired capital, equity, and 
debt. The effect of catering to shareholders is measured by the coefficient of firm 
mispricing after controlling for the different financing variables. 
 
Panel A in Table 12 shows that underinvestment is supported in the data for total 
investment, net investment, research and development, and increase in total assets. 
Capital expenditure is significantly determined by firm undervaluation only before 
controlling for retirement and repurchasing activities. The positive coefficient of firm 
mispricing against these investments shows that firms invest more as the undervaluation 
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become less severe. For acquisitions and asset sales, there is no significant relations to 
firm mispricing in undervalued firms. In addition, all financing variables are significant 
and positively related to all kinds of investments. These results do not support the 
proposition that capital retirement leads to underinvestment. The results, however, 
show that firms invest and retire capital simultaneously and do not chose between them.   
 
Panel B reports a positive and significant relation between firm mispricing and 
percentage change in total assets. This positive relation suggests two interpretations: 
first, as undervaluation loosens, firms increase total assets. Second, as undervaluation 
soars, firms decrease total assets. However, the first interpretation does not seem to be 
supported when we look at the insignificant coefficient of firm mispricing against the 
percentage increase in total assets. In contrast, firm mispricing is negatively related to 
percentage decrease in total assets, which is consistent with the second interpretation 
that severely undervalued firms tend to decrease more of their assets. Capital retired 
(equity and /or debt) is positively related to percentage decrease and percentage increase 
in total assets. The relation between percentage decrease in total assets (in absolute 
form) and capital retired is consistent with the view that the decrease in equity or 
liability is also a decrease in assets.  However, the positive relation between percentage 
increase in total assets and capital retired is not consistent with the previous view and it 
indicates that firms increase assets and buy back capital at the same time.  
 
In sum, evidence shows that firms underinvest in capital expenditure, R&D, and 
increase in investment. However, there is no evidence for underinvestment in 
acquisition. This result makes more sense if we think of acquisition as a one-time 
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decision that is made by the firm at the appropriate time (overvaluation) and when the 
time is not right (undervaluation), the acquisition is not made. This is different from 
capital expenditure and R&D, which are part of the firm’s operation and can be 
adjusted (but not necessarily canceled) when the firm is undervalued. In addition, 
although firm reduction of fixed assets does not seem to be affected by the level of 
undervaluation, firm reduction of current assets is negatively determined by the level of 
undervaluation. The positive relations between capital retired and all investments and 
between capital retired and percentage increase in total assets show that capital 
retirement and investment are done simultaneously and undervalued firms do not 











In this study I try to shed more light on the role of the market in determining corporate 
investments. The market role is related to fundamental information contained in the 
market to book ratio or non-fundamental information inherited in the market to book 
ratio because of market inefficiency. By decomposing the market to book ratio into 
fundamental parts (growth) and nonfundamental parts (firm and aggregate mispricing), 
the study can test for the relation between these separate components and corporate 
investment decisions while controlling for financial slack.  
 
It is agreed that the fundamental component of the market to book ratio reflects the 
investment opportunities of the firm and hence the significance of such a component in 
determining investment level. However, the non-fundamental component of the market 
to book ratio receives a different explanation in the literature. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990) and Stein (1996) suggest two reasons why stock mispricing can affect 
corporate investment. First, stock mispricing affects the cost of external financing and 
thus affects the cost of capital used to evaluate investments. Managers raise funds when 
the stock is overvalued (market timing) to enjoy a lower cost of external financing, and 
they refrain from raising funds when the stock is undervalued to avoid the  high cost of 
external financing. The low cost of external financing translates into a low discount rate 
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used to evaluate investment projects and a higher chance of accepting negative NPV 
projects.  
 
Second, managers base their investment decisions, in part, on shareholder investment 
horizons (the catering effect). When shareholders have a short investment horizon (care 
about current stock price), any temporary mispricing in the stock price will affect the 
investment decisions of the firm. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) suggest a third 
explanation based on managers’ confusion about the future state of the industry or the 
economy. In that explanation, managers use the stock market as a source of information 
about the state of the economy, the condition of the industry, and the value of the firm. 
Such information is intended to help managers when making their investment decisions. 
However, some of that information may be based on irrational beliefs, which will affect 
investments as well.  
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of stock market mispricings on 
corporate investment decisions through testing these three explanations. Corporate 
investments analyzed include capital expenditure, acquisitions, R&D, increase in 
investments, asset sales, and changes in total assets.  
 
The study starts with a model that includes both financing and shareholder horizons as 
channels of the effect of mispricing on investments. The model is similar to the one in 
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004); however, rather than using their reduced form 
model, this study presents a fuller model that includes the capital structure constraints 
and the price impact of equity transactions that are imposed in Stein’s (1996) model.  
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The results in the study can be summarized as follows: First, both fundamental (growth) 
and non-fundamental components of the market to book ratio significantly determine 
the level of corporate investments.  
 
Second, the cost of external financing is significant in explaining the relation between 
total/net investment and firm mispricing. In particular, capital expenditure and increase 
in investments are driven by market timing-motivated equity issuance. Acquisitions and 
R&D are driven by market timing-motivated debt issuance. 
 
Third, highly financially constrained (and thus equity dependent) firms show higher 
sensitivity between investments and stock mispricing.  
 
Fourth, shareholder catering is significant in explaining the relation between total/net 
investment and firm mispricing. In particular, acquisitions, R&D, increase in 
investments, and percentage decrease in assets are affected by catering to shareholders. 
Other investment decisions, including capital expenditure, asset sales, and increase in 
total assets, are not significantly determined by the catering behavior.  
 
Fifth, investment-mispricing sensitivity is significantly higher in firms with a short 
shareholder investment horizon (firms with a high shares turnover ratio) than it is in 
firms with a long shareholder investment horizon (firms with a low shares turnover 
ratio). Because managers cater to shareholders, their investment decisions become more 
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sensitive to current stock movements if shareholders are concerned about current stock 
prices.  
Sixth, there is a significant relation between industry mispricing and all corporate 
investments under consideration. Thus, corporate investments are determined, in part, 
by bubbles in the industry or the market. 
 
Finally, to the extent that overvalued firms tend to overinvest and undervalued firms 
tend to underinvest, overinvestment is confirmed in acquisitions, R&D, and capital 
expenditures, while underinvestment is confirmed in capital expenditure, R&D, and 
increase in investment. There is no evidence of underinvestment in acquisition. 
Disinvestment measured by asset sales is significantly decreased by firm overvaluation 
while disinvestment measured by percentage decrease in total assets moves in the same 










Abel, A., and J. Eberly, 1996, Optimal investment with costly reversibility, Review of Economic Studies 
63, 581-593. 
Abel, A., and O. Blanchard, 1986, The present value of profits and cyclical movements in investment, 
Econometrica 54, 249-274. 
Abel, A.,1980, Empirical investment equations: an integrative framework, in K. Brunner and A. Meltzer 
(eds.), On the state of macroeconomics, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series, vol. 12. 
Aghion, P., and J. Stein, 2004, Growth vs. Margins: destabilizing consequences of giving the stock market 
what it wants, working paper (Harvard University). 
Ali, A., L. Hwang, and M. Trombley, 2003, Residual-Income-Based Valuation Predicts Future Returns: 
Evidence on Mispricing versus Risk Explanations, Accounting Review 78, 377-396. 
Amihud, Y., and C. Hurvich, 2004, Predictive regressions: A reduced-bias estimation method, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming). 
Amir, E., B. Lev, 1996, value-relevance of nonfinancial information: the wireless communications 
industry, Journal of Accounting and Economics 22, 3–30. 
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, E. Stafford, 2001, New evidence and perspectives on mergers, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120. 
Ang, A., and J. Liu, 2001, A general affine earnings valuation model. Review of Accounting Studies 6, 
397–425. 
Ang, A., L. Gu, and Y. Hochberg, 2004, Is IPO underperformance a peso problem?, working 
paper.(Columbia University) 
Ang, J., and Y. Cheng, 2003, Direct evidence on the market-driven acquisitions theory, working paper 
(Florida State University). 
Asquith, P., and D. Mullins, 1986, Equity issue and offering dilution, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 
61 - 89. 
Baker, M., 2000, Career concerns and staged investment: evidence from the venture capital industry, 
Working Paper (Harvard University). 
Baker, M., and J. Wurgler, 2000, The equity share in new issues and aggregate stock returns, Journal of 
Finance 55, 2219-2257. 
Baker, M., and J. Wurgler, 2002, Market timing and capital structure, Journal of Finance 57, 1-32.  
Baker, M., J. Stein and J. Wurgler, 2003, When does the market matter? Stock prices and the investment 
of equity dependent firms , Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 969 - 1005. 
Baker, M., R.  Ruback, and J.  Wurgler, 2004, Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey, In Espen Eckbo, 
eds., Handbook in Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance. 
Baker, M., R. Taliaferro, and J. Wurgler, 2004, Pseudo-market timing and predictive regressions, working 
paper (Harvard University). 
Barberis, N., and R. Thaler , 2003, A survey of behavioral finance, In G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and 
R. Stulz, eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Chapter 18, 1052 - 1114.(Elsevier Science 
B.V.). 
Barro, R., 1990, The stock market and investment, Review of Financial Studies 3, 115-132. 
Barth, M., W. Beaver, W. Landsman, 2001, The relevance of the value relevance literature for financial 
accounting standard setting: another view, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 77–104. 
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan, 2003, Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial 
preferences, journal of Political Economy 111 , 1043-1075. 
Billett, M., M. Flannery and J. Garfinkel, 2001. The long-run performance of firms following loan 
announcements. Working paper (University of Iowa). 
 119 
Blanchard, O., C. Rhee, and L. Summers, 1993, The stock market, profit, and investment, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108, 115-136. 
Bolton, P., J. Scheinkman, and W. Xiong, 2003, Executive compensation and short-termist behavior in 
speculative markets, working paper (Princeton University). 
Boot, A., 1992, Why hang on to losers? Divestitures and takeovers, Journal of Finance 47, 1401-1423. 
Bosworth, B., 1975, The stock market and the economy, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 1975, 
257-290. 
Bouwman, C., K. Fuller, and A. Nain, 2003, The performance of stock-price driven acquisitions, working 
paper (University of Michigan). 
Brailsford, T., and D. Yeoh, 2004, Agency problems and capital expenditure announcements, The Journal 
of Business 77, 223-256. 
Brainard, W., and J. Tobin. 1968. Pitfalls in financial model building, American Economic Review 58, 
99-122. 
Brav, A., J. Graham, C. Harvey, and R. Michaely, 2004, Payout policy in the 21st century, Journal of 
Financial Economics(forthcoming). 
Butler, A., G. Grullon, and J. Weston, 2004, Can managers forecast aggregate market returns?, Journal of 
Finance (forthcoming). 
Chang, C., Z. Chen, and M. Dong, 1999, Investing with a stock valuation model, Working paper, (Ohio 
State University and Yale University). 
Chirinko, R., and H. Schaller, 2001, Business fixed investment and "Bubbles": The Japanese case, 
American Economic Review 91, 663-680. 
Chung, K., P. Wright, and C. Charoenwong, 1998, Investment opportunities and market reaction to 
capital expenditure decisions, Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 41-60. 
Clark, P., 1979, Investment in the 1970s: Theory, Performance and Prediction, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1, 73 - 113. 
Collins, D., E. Maydew, I. Weiss, I., 1997, Changes in the value-relevance of earnings and book values 
over the past forty years, Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 39–67. 
Cook, D., S. Jarrell, R. Kieschnick, 2003, Investor sentiment and IPO cycles, Working paper. 
Dahlquist, M., and F. de Jong, 2004, Pseudo market timing: Fact or fiction?, working paper. (University of 
Amsterdam) 
DeChow, P., A. Hutton, and R. Sloan, 1999, An empirical assessment of the residual income valuation 
model, Journal of Accounting and Economics 26, 1–34. 
DeLong, G., 2001, Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers, Journal of 
Financial Economics 59, 221-252. 
Denis, D., and A. Sarin, 2001, Is the market surprised by poor earnings realizations following seasoned 
equity offerings? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 169-193. 
Diether, K., C. Malloy, and A. Scherbina, 2002, Differences of opinion and the cross-section of stock 
returns, Journal of Finance 57, 2113 –2141. 
D'Mello, R. and P. Shrof, 2000, Equity undervaluation and decisions related to repurchase tender offers: 
An empirical investigation, Journal of Finance 55, 2399- 2424. 
Dong, M., D. Hirshleifer, S. Richardson, and S. Teoh, 2003, Does investor misvaluation drive the 
takeover market? Working Paper, (Ohio State University). 
Eckbo, B., and O. Norli, 2004, liquidity risk, Leverage, and long-run IPO returns, Journal of Corporate 
Finance (Forthcoming). 
Eckbo, B., R. Masulis, and O. Norli, 2000, Seasoned public offerings: Resolution of the `new issues 
puzzle, Journal of Financial Economics 56, 251-291. 
Erickson, T., and T. Whited, 2000, Measurement error and the relationship between investment and q, 
Journal of Political Economy 108, 1027-1057. 
Fama, E., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy °88, 288-
307. 
Fama, E., and K. French, 2004, Financing decisions: Who issues stock? Journal of Financial Economics 
(forthcoming). 
Feltham, G., and J. Ohlson, 1999. Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and financial 
activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 74, 165–183. 
Fischer, S., and R. Merton, 1984, Macroeconomics and finance: The role of the stock market, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Poliy 21, 57-108. 
 120 
Francis, J., K. Schipper, 1999, Have financial statements lost their relevance?, Journal of Accounting 
Research 37, 319–352. 
Francis, J., P. Olsson, and D. Oswald, 1998, Using mechanical earnings and residual income forecasts in 
equity valuation, Working paper (University of Chicago). 
Frankel, R. and C. Lee, 1998, Accounting valuation, market expectation, and the book-to-market effect, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 25, 283–321. 
Gaspar, J., M. Massa, and P. Matos, 2004a, Shareholder investment horizon and the market for corporate 
control, Journal of financial economics (forthcoming). 
Gaspar, J., M. Massa, and P. Matos, R.  Patgiri, and Z. Rehman, 2004b, Can buybacks be a product of 
shorter shareholder horizons?, Working paper (INSEAD). 
Gervais, S., J. Heaton, and T. Odean, Overconfidence, investment policy, and executive stock options, 
2003, working paper. (Duke University). 
Gilchrist, S. and C. Himmelberg, 1995, Evidence on the role of cash flow for investment, Journal of 
Monetary Economics 36, 541-572. 
Gilchrist, S., C. Himmelberg, and G. Huberman, 2004, Do stock price bubbles influence corporate 
investment? Working Paper (Federal Reserve Bank of New York #177). 
Graham, J., and C. Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field, 
Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243. 
Gregory, A., 1997, An examination of the long run performance of U.K acquiring firms, Journal of 
Business Finance &Accounting 24, 971-1002. 
Hand, J. and W. Landsman, 1998, Testing the Ohlson model: v or not v, that is the question, Working 
paper (university of north Carolina). 
Hayashi, F., 1982, Tobin's average q and marginal q: a neoclassical interpretation, Econometrica 50, 213-
224. 
Heaton, J., 2002, Managerial optimism and corporate finance, Financial Management 31, 33-45. 
Helwege, J., and N. Liang, 2002, Initial public offerings in hot and cold markets, working paper (Ohio 
State University). 
Henderson, B., N. Jegadeesh, and M. Weisbach, 2004, World markets for raising new capital, working 
paper (University of Illinois). 
Hirshleifer, D., 2001, Investor psychology and asset pricing, Journal of Finance 64, 1533-1597. 
Hirshleifer, D., and A. Thakor, 1992, Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt, Review of 
Financial Studies 5, 437-470. 
Holmstrom, B., 1999, Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective, Review of Economic 
Studies 66, 169-182. 
Holthausen, R., R. Watts, 2001, The relevance of the value relevance literature for financial accounting 
standard setting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 3–75. 
Houston, J., C. James, and M. Ryngaert, 2001, Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers from 
the perspective of insiders and outsiders, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 285-331.  
Hovakimian, A., T. Opler, and S. Titman, 2001, The debt-equity choice, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 36, 1-24. 
Hovakimian, A., 2003, Are Observed Capital Structures Determined by Equity Market Timing?, Working 
paper. 
Ikenberry, D., J. Lakonishok and T. Vermaelen , 1995, Market underreaction to open market share 
repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181-208. 
Ikenberry, D., J. Lakonishok, and T. Vermaelen, 2000, Stock repurchases in Canada: Performance and 
strategic trading, Journal of Finance 55, 2373-2397. 
Jain, B., and O. Kini, 1994, The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, Journal of Finance 49, 
1699-1726. 
Jegadeesh, N., 2000, Long-run performance of seasoned equity offerings: Benchmark errors and biases in 
expectations, Financial ManagementJournal9, 5-30. 
Jensen, M., 2005, Agency costs of overvalued equity, Financial Management (forthcoming). 
Jenter, D., 2004, Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions, Journal of Finance (forthcoming). 
Jindra, J., 2000, Seasoned equity offerings, overvaluation and timing, Working Paper (Ohio State 
University). 
Jones, C., and O. Lamont, 2002, Short Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, Journal of Financial 
Economics 66, 207-239. 
 121 
Jung, K., Y. Kim, and R. Stulz, 1996, Timing, investment opportunities, managerial discretion, and the 
security issue decision, Journal of Financial Economics 42, 159-185. 
Ka, J., J. Linck, and P. Rubin, 2004, Do managers listen to the market?, Working paper (Emory 
University). 
Kaplan, S., and L. Zingales, 1997, Do financing constraints explain why investment is correlated with cash 
flow?, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 169-215. 
Keynes, J., 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan, London).  
Kothari, S., 2001, Capital markets research in accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 105–
231. 
Kothari, S., and J. Shanken, 1997, Book-to-market, dividend yield, and expected market returns: A time-
series analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 44, 169-203. 
Lamont, O., 2000, Investment plans and stock returns, Journal of Finance 55, 2719-2745. 
Lee, C., Myers, Swaminathan, B., 1999, What is the intrinsic value of the dow? Journal of Finance 54, 
1693–1741. 
Lerner, J., 1994, Venture capitalists and the decision to go public, Journal of Financial Economics 35, 
293-316. 
Lev, B., 1997, The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them, Working Paper (New York 
University). 
Lewellen, J. 2004, Predicting returns with financial ratios, Journal of Financial Economics, (forthcoming) 
Liu, L.,2005, Do firms have target leverage ratios? Evidence from historical market-to-book and past 
returns, Working Paper. 
Ljungqvist, A., V. Nanda, and R. Singh, 2001, Hot markets, investor sentiment, and IPO pricing, Working 
Paper. 
Loughran, T., and A. Vijh, 1997, Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate acquisitions?, Journal 
of Finance 52, 1765-1790. 
Loughran, T., and J. Ritter, 1995, The New Issues Puzzle, Journal of Finance 50, 23-51. 
Loughran, T., and J. Ritter, 1997, The operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity 
offerings, Journal of Finance 52, 1823-1850. 
Loughran, T., J. Ritter, and K. Rydqvist, 1994, Initial public offerings: international insights, Pacific Basin 
Finance journal 2, 165-199. 
Luo, Y., 2004, Do insiders learn from outsiders? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions, Journal of 
Finance (forthcoming). 
Lys, T., and L. Vincent, 1995, An analysis of value destruction in AT&T's acquisition of NCR, Journal of 
Financial Economics 39, 353-378. 
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate, 2002, Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's 
reaction, Working Paper. 
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate, 2004, CEO overconfidence and corporate investment, Journal of finance 
(forthcoming). 
Mankiw, N., and M. Shapiro, 1986, Do we reject too often? Small sample properties of tests of rational 
expectations models, Economics Letters 20, 139-145. 
Marsh, P., 1982, The choice between equity and debt: An empirical study, Journal of Finance 37, 121-144. 
Masulis, R. and A. Korwar, 1986, Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial 
Economics 15, 91-118.  
McConnell, J., and C. Muscarella, 1985, Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of 
the firm, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 399-422. 
Mikkelson, W., M. Partch, and K. Shah, 1997, Ownership and operating performance of companies that 
go public, Journal of Financial Economics 44, 281-307. 
Miller, M. and K. Rock, 1985, Dividend policy under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance 40, 
1031–1051. 
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment, American Economic Review 48, 261-297. 
Morck, R., R. Vishny, and A. Shleifer, 1990, The stock market and investment: Is the market a sideshow? 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 157-215. 
Mulherin, J., and A. Boone, 2000, Comparing acquisitions and divestitures, Journal of Corporate Finance 
6, 117-139. 
Myers, J., 1999, implementing residual income valuation with linear information dynamics, The 
Accounting Review 74, 1-28. 
 122 
Myers, S., and N. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 1 87-221. 
Narayanan, M., 1985, Managerial incentives for short-term results, Journal of Finance 40, 1469-1484. 
Nelson, C. and M. Kim, 1993, Predictable stock returns: The role of small-ample bias. Journal of Finance 
48, 641-661. 
Ohlson, J., 1995, Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation, Contemporary Accounting 
Research 11, 661–687. 
Pagano, M., F. Panetta, and L. Zingales, 1998, Why do companies go public? An empirical analysis, 
Journal of Finance 53, 27-64. 
Panageas, S., 2003, Speculation, overpricing and investment: theory and empirical evidence, Working 
paper (MIT). 
Penman, S., 1998, Combining earnings and book value in equity valuation, Contemporary Accounting 
Research 15, 291–324. 
Perfect, S., and K. Wiles, 1994, Alternative constructions of Tobin’s q: An empirical comparison, Journal 
of Empirical Finance 1, 313-341. 
Piotroski, J., 2001, Value investing: The use of historical financial statement information to separate 
winners from losers, Journal of Accounting Research 38, 1–41. 
Polk, C., and P. Sapienza, 2002, The real effects of investor sentiment, Working Paper (Northwestern 
University). 
Polk, C., S. Thompson, and T. Vuolteenaho, 2004, Cross-sectional Forecasts of the Equity Premium, 
working paper (Harvard University) 
Qiu, L., 2004, Which institutional investors monitor? Evidence from acquisition activity, working paper 
(Brown University). 
Rangan, S„ 1998, Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings, Journal of 
Financial Economics 50, 101-122. 
Rau, R., and T. Vermaelen, 1998, Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring 
firms, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 223-253. 
Rhodes-Kropf, M., and S. Viswanathan, 2003, Market valuation and merger waves, Journal of Finance 
(forthcoming). 
Rhodes-Kropf, M., D. Robinson, and S. Viswanathan, 2004, Valuation waves and merger activity: the 
empirical evidence, Journal of financial Economics (forthcoming). 
Richardson, S., and R. Sloan, 2003, External financing and future stock returns, working paper (University 
of Pennsylvania). 
Ritter, J., 1991, The long-run performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 46, 3-27.  
Roll, R. 1986, The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, Journal of Business 59, 197-216. 
Schultz, P., 2003, Pseudo market timing and the long-run underperformance of IPOs, Journal of Finance 
58, 483-517. 
Schultz, P., 2004, Pseudo market timing and the stationarity of the event-generating process, working 
paper (University of Notre Dame). 
Shleifer, A., and L. Summers, 1990, The noise trader approach to finance, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 4, 19-33. 
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 2003, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 
295-489. 
Speiss, K., and J. Affleck-Graves, 1995, Underperformance in long-run stock returns following seasoned 
equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 243-267. 
Spiess, D., and J. Affleck-Graves, 1999, The long-run performance of stock returns following debt offers, 
Journal of Financial Economics 54, 45-73. 
Stambaugh, R., 1986, Bias in regressions with lagged stochastic regressors, working paper (University of 
Chicago). 
Stambaugh, R., 1999, Predictive regressions, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 375-421. 
Stein, J., 1996, Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world, Journal of Business 69, 429-455.  
Stigler, G., 1964, Public regulation of the securities markets, Journal of Business 37, 117-142. 
Summers, L., 1981, Taxation and corporate investment: a q-theoretic approach, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 1, 67-140. 
Szewczyk, S., G. Tsetsekos, and Z. Zantout, 1996, The valuation of corporate R&D expenditures: 
Evidence from investment opportunities and free cash flow, Financial Management 25, 105-110. 
 123 
Teoh, S., I. Welch, and T. Wong, 1998a, Earnings management and the long-term market performance of 
initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 53, 1935-1974. 
Teoh, S., I. Welch, and T. Wong, 1998b, Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned 
equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 50, 63-99. 
Teoh, S., T. Wong, and G. Rao, 1998, Are accruals during an initial public offering opportunistic? Review 
of Accounting Studies 3, 175-208. 
Titman, S., K.C.  Wei, and F. Xie, 2004, Capital investments and stock returns, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 39, 677-700. 
Tobin, J., 1969. A general equilibrium approach to m netary theory. Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 1, 15-29. 
Viswanathan, S., and B. Wei, 2004, Endogenous events and long run returns, working paper (Duke 
University) 
Von Furstenberg, G., 1977, Corporate investment: Does market valuation matter in the aggregate?, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 347-397.
 124 
Appendix A:  Mathematical Details of the Optimization Problem   
 
 
The maximization problem in section 3.2 is  
 
Max S = [ ] ( )( , ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( , )f K E K E K E Z D K Eλ δ λ δ− + − + −    (A.1) 
s.t.  
(1 )D K d C E≡ − − −  
 
The first order conditions of the maximization problems are the partial derivatives of 
the objective function S with respect to the variables K and E    
 
The partial derivative of S with respect to K: 
 
By using chain rule:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )( ) * (1 )Z K d C E K d C EZ D Z D d Z D
K K K




 Thus,  
( )( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0S f K E K d Z D K
K
λ δ λ δ∂ ′ ′ ′ ′ = − + − − + − = ∂
   (A.2) 
 
Equation (A.2) is similar to equation (3.2) of section 3.2 
 
The partial derivative of S with respect to E: 
 
By using product rule:  
 
[ ]( , ) ( , )
* ( , ) * ( , ) ( )
E K E E K E
K E E K E E E
E E E
δ δδ δ δ




By using chain rule:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )( ) *Z K d C E K d C EZ D Z D Z D
E E E






[ ] ( )( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0S f E K E E E Z D E
E
λ δ δ λ δ∂ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + − =
∂
   (A.3) 
 
Equation (A.3) is similar to equation (3.3) of section 3.2. 
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Algebraic simplifications of the partial derivative of S with respect to K: 
 
Equation (A.2) can be written as: 
 
( )( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 1 ( )f K E K d Z D Kλ λ λ δ λ λ δ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − − −    (A.4) 
By taking common factors (A.4) is written as: 
 
( )( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) 1 ( )f K d Z D E Kλ λ λ λ δ′ ′ ′ = + − − + −       (A.5) 
 
By dividing both sides of (A.5) by 1/λ , we get  
 
( ) 1( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )f K d Z D E Kλ δλ
− ′ ′ ′= + − − + 
 
     (A.6) 
 
Equation (A.6) is similar to equation (3.2)` of section 3.2. 
 
 
Algebraic simplifications of the partial derivative of S with respect to E: 
 
Equation (A.3) can be written as: 
 
( )( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )f E K E E E Z D Eλ λδ λ δ λ λ δ′ ′ ′ ′= − − − − −     (A.7) 
 
By taking common factors (A.7) is written as: 
 
[ ] ( )( ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( )f E K E Z D E Eλ λ δ λ λ δ′ ′ ′= − + − + −       (A.8) 
 
 
By dividing both sides of (A.8) by -1/λ , we get  
 
( ) 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )f E Z D K E E Eλδ δ
λ
− ′ ′ ′− + = + + 
 
     (A.9) 
 












Combining A.6 and A.9 in one equation 
 
We can re-write equation A.9 as  
 
1
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )Z D f E K E E E
λδ δ
λ
− ′ ′ ′= − − − + 
 
     (A.10) 
 
By substituting A.10 into A.6, we get  
 
1 1
( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( )f K E K d f E K E E E
λ λδ δ δ
λ λ
−  −    ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − − + + +    
    
 (A.11) 
 






We can solve the maximization problem using the Lagrange method and obtain A.11 
directly. 
 
Max S = [ ] ( )( , ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( , )f K E K E K E Z D K Eλ δ λ δ− + − + −  
s.t.  
(1 )D K d C E≡ − − −  
 
The Lagrangian equation is: 
( )( , ) ( , ) ( ) (1 )L f K E K E K E Z D K d C Eλ δ = − + − − − −   
      ( ) ( )1 ( , ) (1 )K E D K d C Eλ δ γ+ − − − − + +      (A.12) 
 
The first order conditions of the Lagrangian equation are: 
 
[ ] ( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) 0L f K E K K d
K
λ δ λ δ γ∂ ′ ′ ′= − + + − + − =
∂
    (A.13) 
[ ] ( )( ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0L f E K E E E E
E
λ δ δ λ δ γ∂ ′ ′ ′= + + + − − =
∂
    (A.14) 
( )(1 ) 0L D K d C Eγ
∂ = − − − + + =
∂








From equation (A.14) , 
 
[ ]( )( ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( )f E K E E E Eγ λ δ δ λ δ′ ′ ′= + + −      (A.16) 
 
By substitute equation (A.16) into (A.13), we get 
 
[ ] ( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )L f K E K K
K
λ δ λ δ∂ ′ ′ ′= − + + −
∂
 
        [ ] ( )( )( ) ( , ) ( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) 0f E K E E E E dλ δ δ λ δ′ ′ ′+ + + + − − =    (A.17) 
 
By dividing both sides of (A.17) by 1/λ , we get 
 
1
( ) 1 ( ) ( )
L








(1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) 0d f E K E E E E
λδ δ δ
λ
− ′ ′ ′+ − + + + =  
    (A.18) 
 
By re-arranging and taking common factors, we get  
 
1 1
( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )f K E K d f E K E E E E
λ λδ δ δ δ
λ λ
− −   ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − − + + +      
(A.19) 
 
Equation (A.19) is similar to equation (3.4) of section 3.2. 
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Appendix B: More Insights on Investment and Financing policies in 
an Inefficient Market 
 
 
 The two first order conditions in section 3.2, (3.2)` and (3.3)`, determine the optimal 
investment and financing decisions.  
 
( ) 1( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )f K d Z D E Kλ δλ
− ′ ′ ′= + − − + 
 
     (B.1) 
( ) 1( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )f E Z D K E E Eλδ δ
λ
− ′ ′ ′− + = + + 
 
     (B.2) 
 










 and  
determine how financing and investment respond to changes in stock mispricing. To do 
that, I differentiate equation (B.1) and (B.2) with respect to mispricing δ  as follows:  
 




( ) 1 ( ) ( )
K D E
f K d Z D K E
K
λ δδ
δ δ δ λ δ
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   (B.3) 
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δ δ λ δ
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Differentiae (B.2) with respect to δ  
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 ∂ − ∂ ′′ ′′− = − + +  ∂ ∂ ∂  


























 ∂ − ∂ − + +  ∂ ∂ ∂∂   =
∂  ′′ ′′− −  
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 − ∂ − + +  ∂ ∂∂   =
′′ ′′∂ −
        (B.9) 
 
In (B.8), the denominator is negative because ( )f K′′ <0 and ( )Z D′′ >0, by definition. 






>0. Although the model does not have enough structure to specify a 







, it is expected to be positive as the sensitivity of  
mispricing to investment becomes higher with more irrationality in the market. 





 is positive, .i.e. investment 
increases with overvaluation and decreases with undervaluation. It is also worth noting 
that the response of investment to mispricing is proportional to investor catering and 
market timing gains and also determined by the response of mispricing to investment.  
 
In (B.9), ( )Z D′′ >0 and ( )f E′′  >0. Thus, the sign depends on whether ( )Z D′′  




 is positive and vice 
versa. With such abstractive model and no specifications of the different functions, it is 
hard to be assured of the signs of this partial derivative. However, the model implies a 
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if  the equity book value grows at a constant rate, such as,  1B Bτ τθ −=   then, 
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Equation (C.7) shows that the intrinsic value of the firm can be written in terms of the 
book value of assets in place and the net income at time t. knowing the constant growth 




Appendix D: Data Definitions and Calculation Details  












































1/t tA A−∆  
 
 
Corporate investment can be 
defined as capital expenditures 
( CAPX ), acquisitions ( ACQ ), 
Research and Development 
expenses ( RD ), or increase in 
investments ( IINC ) . Investment 




Asset sales are considered to be 
disinvestments or negative 
Investments.   
 
 
Net corporate investment is total 
investments minus asset sales. 




An alternative measure of 
investment is the percentage 
change in total assets ( /A A∆ ) or 
more specifically the percentage 
increase in total assets ( /A A
+
∆ ). 
An alternative measure of 
disinvestment is the percentage 




Investment (I) = capital expenditures ( CAPX )#128 + acquisitions 
( ACQ ) #129 + R&D expense( RD ) #46 + increase in investments 













Net Investment (NetI) = [capital expenditures ( CAPX )#128 + 
acquisitions ( ACQ ) #129 + R&D expense( RD ) #46 + increase in 




Percentage change  in total assets ( /A A∆ ) is the difference between 
total assets #6 at time t and the total assets #6 at time t-1 divided by 




A A A− −− . Percentage increase in 
total assets include only positive differences between total assets #6 at 
time t and the total assets #6 at time t-1. 
1 1
/ ( ) /
t t t
A A A A A
+




A A−− > . Percentage decrease in total assets include only negative 
differences between total assets #6 at time t and the total assets #6 at 
time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of 
the decrease percentage of total assets, 1 1/ ( ) /t t tA A A A A
−




A A−− < . 
 
 
I analyze each type of 
investment and 












/M B  
 
The ratio of the market value of 
the firm to the book value of the 
firm. 
 
/M B= the market value of equity (Common shares outstanding #25 x 
closing stock  price #199) + book assets #6 – book equity #60-
deferred taxes #74 all divided by total assets #6. 
 
 




Net capital is the sum of  net 






Net capital(NetCap)=Net equity (NetEq)+Net Debt (NetDbt). 
 
Net  equity (NetEq) = equity issued(EIssue) #108 – equity 
repurchased(ERep) #115.  
 





In some models,  gross 
equity issued (EIssue) and 
gross debt issued (DIssue) 
are used in sum and 
separately. The sum of 
gross equity issued (EIssue) 
and gross debt issued 
(DIssue) is the gross capital 
issued (CapIssue).  
 
In some models, equity 
repurchased (ERep) and 
debt retired  (DRet) are 
used in sum and separately. 
The sum of equity 
repurchased (ERep) and 
debt retired (DRet) is 
capital retired (CapRet).  
 
Mispricing 





The difference between the 
market price of the stock and the 
fundamental value of the stock 
implied by the firm’s accounting 
information and aggregate 








FirmDev  = ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− , which is the difference between the market 
value of firm at time t and the fundamental value of the firm at time t . 
The fundamental value of the firm is obtained by applying annual, 
aggregate regression multiples sα  to the firm-level accounting values θ . 
The individual time t values of the sα are obtained using this model , 















The difference between the 
fundamental value of the stock 
implied by current aggregate 
multiples and the fundamental 
value of the stock implied long run 
aggregate multiples. any difference 
between the long run value and 
the current fundamental value 
suggests a time series error and 
indicate a certain valuation wave at  
the aggregate level. 
 
( ; ) ( ; )
Agg
it jt it jDev v vθ α θ α
 = −   , which is the difference between  the 
fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting 
values θ and time t aggregate multiples sα and fundamental value of the 
firm at time t based on time t accounting values θ and long run 
aggregate multiples. The fundamental value of the firm is obtained by 
applying annual, aggregate regression multiples sα  to the firm-level 
accounting values θ .  
 
The individual time t values of the sα are obtained using this model ,  
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +
. the long run 
aggregate multiples sα are the over time average of sα . 
 
 
The aggregate level can be 
evaluated at the industry 
level or at the overall 
market level. The Industry 
classification is based on  
Fama & French 12 industry 
classification. 
 
 Although all analysis are 
done using both levels, 
only the results using 
industry level are reported. 
Results are similar when 
using overall market level 







The difference between the 
valuations implied by long run 
multiples and current book values. 
The difference between these two 
values can be used as a proxy for 




Growth= ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − . The fundamental value of the firm is based on 
the long run multiples sα and the accounting numbers at time t. The 








The degree of shareholder 
investment horizon. Shareholders 
have either short investment 
horizon or long investment 
horizon. Long horizon 
shareholders are the ones who 
hold their stock and are not keen 
to sell their stocks for capital gain. 
Short horizon shareholders are 
those who are welling to sell their 
stocks in the near future. 
 
Investor horizon is measured by the turnover ratio which is the average 
of the monthly ratios of shares traded to shares outstanding during the 
fiscal year. 
 
The data for this variable is 













Z measures the extent to which 
the firm is financially constrained. 
A high value of Z implies more 
binding constraints and less ability 
to issue debt and thus more 
dependence on equity.  
 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) Z index is measured as 
1.002 39.368 1.315 3.139
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
CF DIV Cit it itZ Levit itA A Ai t i t i t




Cash flow (CF) ratio is 
income before extra 
ordinary items #18 plus 
deprecation and 
amortization #14 over 
beginning of the period 
book asset #6. (DIV) is the 
cash dividends (preferred 
dividends#19+ common 
dividends#21.  
(C) is cash and short-term 
investments #1. (Lev) is 
the ratio of debt over the 
total of debt and equity. 
Lev= [long-term debt #9 + 
current portion of debt 
#34]/[long-term debt #9 + 










Summary of Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions in an Inefficient Market 
 
The table summarizes the special cases of the model presented in section 3.2. 0E≠  refers to equity issuance or repurchases. 0E=  means the firm does not enter the equity market through neither issuance nor repurchases. λ  refers to 
the degree of managerial horizon., where 0 1λ≥ ≤ . If λ  equals zero, the manager has a short horizon and cares only about maximizing the current stock price. As λ  approaches one, managers become more concerned about 
maximizing the fundamental value of the firm and less concerned about maximizing the current stock price. d  is the percentage of the new debt the firm can issue to finance the new investment. A low value of d  indicates that the 





Mispricing Investment Financing Notes 
 
 
a) No equity transactions ( 0E = ) and Long term investment horizon ( 1λ = ) 
 
Overvaluation Optimal - 
Undervaluation Optimal - 
Similar to efficient market case, investment decision is not distorted by mispricing. 
 
 
b) Equity transactions 0E ≠  and Long term investment horizon 1λ =  
 
Overvaluation Overinvestment Issue 
Undervaluation Underinvestment Repurchase 
The relation between investment and mispricing is stronger when the firm is financially 
constrained and has to depend on equity to finance its investments (as d approaches zero). 
 
 
c) No equity transactions 0E =  and Short term investment horizon 0λ =  
 
Overvaluation Overinvestment - 
Undervaluation Underinvestment - 
The relation between investment and mispricing is stronger the shorter the investment 
horizon (as λ approaches zero). 
 
 
d) Equity transactions 0E ≠  and Short term investment horizon 0λ =  
 
Overvaluation Overinvestment Issue 
The relation between investment and mispricing is stronger the shorter the investment 





Fundamental Value Regressions for the Whole Market and across Industries 
 
The cross sectional regression model  
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +
 is estimated at industry-year level and at market-year level. The 
subscripts i,j, and t denote firm, industry, and year, respectively. Industry classification is based on Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Results for industry number 11 
which refer to financial firms are not reported because the sample does not include financial firms. ( )itln V
is the log of market value of firm i at time t. ( ) itln B
is the log of book 
value of firm i at time t. 
( )itln NI
 the log of net income of firm i at time t. 
( 0)itNI
D <
is a dummy variable that indicate negative net income interacted with the log of absolute value 
of net income. 
itLEV
is the leverage of firm i at time t. Lev= [long-term debt #9 + current portion of debt #34]/[long-term debt #9 + current portion of debt #34+ 
stockholders' equity#216]. ˆ
kα
 is the time series average of estimated coefficients in the model for k=0 to 4. 2R is the time series average of R squares for each industry or for 
the market  in percentage form N is the time series average of the number of firms in each industry or in the whole market. P-values (in parentheses) are obtained using 






























































































































































































Summary Statistics for Investments, financing, and investment determinants 
 
The table presents the number of observations, mean, median, and standard deviation of investment variables and their determinants for US firms 
from compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables are 
ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis.  
 
Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total assets 
(compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is 
acquisitions (compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  
total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  
at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of 
PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. 
 
Change in total assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  
is increase in total assets include only positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total 
assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the decrease percentage of total assets.   
 
1/t tEIssue A−
is equity issued at time t (compustat item #108) divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1Re /t tE p A −
is equity repurchased at time t(compustat 
item #115) divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tNetEq A−
is the difference between 
1/t tEIssue A−  and 1Re /t tE p A − . 1/t tDIssue A−  is debt issued at 
time t (compustat item #111) divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1Re /t tD t A −
 is debt retired at time t (compustat item #114) divided by total assets at 
time t-1. 
1/t tNetDbt A− is the difference between 1/t tDIssue A−  and 1Re /t tD t A − . 1/t tCapIssue A−  is the sum of 1/t tEIssue A−  and 1/t tDIssue A− . 
1Re /t tCap t A−
is the sum of 
1Re /t tE p A−
 and 
1Re /t tD t A −
.  
1/t tNetCap A−
 is the sum of 
1/t tNetEq A−  and 1/t tNetDbt A− .  
 
Mispricing at the firm level ( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the fundamental value of the firm i at time t 
[ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level 
accounting values (θ ). The individual time t values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +
.  Mispricing at the aggregate  level ( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the 
fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  fundamental value of the 
firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run aggregate multiples 
(α ’s) are the over time average of (
tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by long run multiples and current book 
values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on  Fama & French 12 
industry classification. Degree of financial constraints is measured by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) Z index. Z is calculated using Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003) four variable version, 1.002 39.368 1.315 3.139
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
CF DIV Cit it itZ Levit itA A Ai t i t i t
=− − − +
− − −
. Cash flow (CF) is income before extra ordinary items(compustat 
item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14). Dividends (DIV) is preferred dividends (compustat item #19)+ common 
dividends (compustat item #21). Cash (C) is cash and short-term investments (compustat item #1). Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of debt (compustat item 
#9) + current portion of debt(compustat item #34) over the total of debt and equity (compustat item #216). Investor horizon is measured by the 
turnover ratio which is the average of the monthly ratios of shares traded to shares outstanding during the fiscal year. High turnover ratio indicates 
short investor horizon and vice versa. Total Assets is compustat item #6. Net Income is compustat item #172. 
 
 
Variable Symbol N Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Panel A: Investment 
Investment to Total Assets 1/t tI A −  78,639 0.202 0.108 1.118 
Capital Expenditures to Total 
Assets 
1/t tCAPX A−  83,604 0.094 0.053 0.417 
Acquisition to Total Assets 1/t tACQ A−
 76,018 0.034 0.000 0.249 
Research & Development to 
Total Assets 
1/t tRD A−  44,737 0.083 0.032 0.226 








Variable Symbol N Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Sale of PPE to Total Assets 1/t tSalePPE A−
 60,965 0.011 0.000 0.050 
      
Net Investment to Total Assets 
1/t tNetI A −  78,558 0.193 0.102 1.107 
      
Change in Total Assets 1/t tA A−∆
 85,105 0.291 0.069 6.098 
Increase in Total Assets 1/t tA A+ −∆
 56,317 0.526 0.154 7.484 
Decrease in Total Assets 1/t tA A− −∆
 28,571 0.169 0.109 0.175 
Panel B: Financing 
Net Capital Issued to Total 
Assets 
1/t tNetCap A−
 89,464 0.096 0.001 1.080 
Gross Capital Issued to Total 
Assets 
1/t tCapIssue A−
 89,464 0.213 0.038 1.601 
Gross Capital Retired to Total 
Assets 
1Re /t tCap t A−
 89,464 0.117 0.032 1.147 
      
Net Equity Issued to Total 
Assets 
1/t tNetEq A−
 89,464 0.062 0.000 0.547 
Gross Equity Issued to Total 
Assets 
1/t tEIssue A−
 89,464 0.075 0.002 0.531 
Gross Equity Retired to Total 
Assets 
1Re /t tE p A −
 89,464 0.013 0.000 0.163 
      
Net Debt Issued to Total 
Assets 
1/t tNetDbt A−
 89,464 0.034 0.000 0.923 
Gross Debt Issued to Total 
Assets 
1/t tDIssue A−
 89,464 0.139 0.011 1.384 
Gross Debt Retired to Total 
Assets 
1Re /t tD t A −
 89,464 0.104 0.022 1.106 
Panel C: Market 
Market to Book Ratio 1( / )itM B −  89,464 1.785 1.208 2.312 
      
Firm Value using Industry Multiples 
Mispricing at the firm level 
.
Firm
IndDev  89,448 -0.041 -0.071 0.477 
Mispricing at the aggregate  level IndDev  89,448 0.031 0.055 0.807 
Growth .I n dG  89,448 0.330 0.316 0.833 
      
Firm Value using Market Multiples 
Mispricing at the firm level Firm
MktDev  89,448 -0.049 -0.102 0.509 
Mispricing at the aggregate  level MktDev  89,448 0.043 0.084 0.215 
Growth 
M k tG  89,448 0.326 0.341 0.282 
Panel D: Other Investment Determinants 
Degree of Financial 
constraints 
Z 89,464 0.465 0.382 18.311 
Cash Flow to Total Assets 
1/t tCF A −
 89,464 0.047 0.084 0.984 
Dividends to Total Assets 1/t tDIV A −
 89,464 0.016 0.000 0.287 
Cash to Total Assets 1/t tC A −
 89,464 0.177 0.066 0.605 
Leverage  Lev 89,464 0.442 0.332 4.283 
      
Investor Horizon H 57,781 0.001 0.000 0.001 
      
Other Variables       
Total Assets (millions) A 89,464 835.82 89.039 2345.91 






Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Investment, Fi ancing, and other investment determinants 
 
The table presents Pearson correlations among investment variables and their determinants for US firms from compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for 
investment variables are ignored. Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided 
by total assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions (compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at 
time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at 
time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  is increase in total assets include only positive differences between total assets at time t and the total 
assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total 
assets is represented by the absolute value of the decrease percentage of total assets.  
1/t tCF A −  is  cash flow at time t calculated as income before extra ordinary items (compustat item #18) plus deprecation and 
amortization(compustat item #14) divided by total assets at time t-1. 
t-1M/B
 is  the market value of equity (Common shares outstanding (compustat item #25) x closing stock  price (compustat item #199)) + book assets (compustat 
item #6) – book equity (compustat item #60)-deferred taxes (compustat item #74) all divided by total assets (compustat item #6) all at time t-1. 
.
Firm
IndDev  is the mispricing at the firm level using industry multiples to calculate 
fundamental value. IndDev is the mispricing at the industry level. 
.IndG
is the difference between the book value of the firm and the fundamental value obtained using industry multiples. Firm
MktDev  is the mispricing at the firm level using 
market multiples to calculate fundamental value. MktDev  is the mispricing at the market level. 
MktG
 is the difference between the book value of the firm and the fundamental value obtained using market multiples. 
1/t tNetEq A−
is the 
difference between equity issued at time t (compustat item #108) and equity repurchased at time t(compustat item #115) divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tNetDbt A− is the difference between debt issued at time t (compustat item 
#111) and debt retired at time t (compustat item #114) divided by total assets at time t-1.  
1/t tNetCap A−
 is the sum of 
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Firm Investment Decisions and Market Determinants 
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total 
assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions 
(compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is 
increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at 
time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total 
assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  is increase in total assets include only 
positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative 
differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the 




 is is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  
total assets at time t-1. 
1( / )tM B −  is  the market value of equity (Common shares outstanding #25 x closing stock  price #199) + book assets #6 – book equity #60-deferred 
taxes #74 all at time t-1 divided by total assets #6 at time t-1. Mispricing at the firm level ( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the 
fundamental value of the firm i at time t [ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to 
the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The individual time t values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +
.  Mispricing at the aggregate  level ( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm 
at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) 
and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run aggregate multiples (α ’s) are the over time average of ( tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference 
between the valuations implied by long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The 
Industry classification is based on Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
 
The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables 
are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. 
 
Panel A shows the results for investment variables. Panel B shows results for the changes in total assets. Regression coefficients are estimated using OLS regression with p-
values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. The P-values are in parentheses. 2R∆  is the change in R-square and 
the associated p-values of the partial F statistics as 
1( / )tM B − variable is added to the regression. Coefficients starred with one, two, and three asterisks are statistically 
significant at the ten, five, and one percent respectively.  
 
Panel A: Investment Decisions as the Dependent Variables  
Dependent Variable  
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Panel B: Changes in Total Assets as the Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable  
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N=85,105 
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N=56,317 
 




















































Net Equity Issuance and Firm Investment Decisions 
 
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total 
assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions 
(compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is 
increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at 
time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total 
assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  is increase in total assets include only 
positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative 
differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the 




 is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  
total assets at time t-1. Mispricing at the firm level ( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the fundamental value of the firm i at time t 
[ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The 
individual time t values of the (
tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + .  Mispricing at the aggregate  level 
( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  
fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long-run aggregate multiples 
(α ’s) are the over time average of (
tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. 
The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
1/t tNetEq A− is net equity 
issued at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Net equity issued is equity issued (compustat item #108)- equity repurchased(compustat item #115). 
1* /t tTime NetEq A−
is 
the interaction between the firm mispricing timing (Time) and the net equity issuance. Time=1 if net equity issued (
tNetEq
) and mispricing at firm level (
1
Firm
tDev− ) carry the 
same sign and Time=0 otherwise. 
11* /t tNOTime NetEq A−
is the interaction between the firm mispricing non-timing (NOTime) and the net equity issuance. NOTime=1 if net 
equity issued (
tNetEq
) and mispricing at firm level (
1
Firm
tDev− ) do not carry the same sign and NOTime=0 otherwise. RME is the residual market effect. It is represented by 
the residual from the following regressing: 
1 0 1 2 3( / )
firm Agg
it it it it itM B Dev Dev Gα α α α ε− = + + + +  
 
The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables 
are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. 
 
Panel A shows the results for investment variables. Panel B shows the results for the changes in total assets. Regression coefficients are estimated using OLS regression with 
p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and 







Panel A: Investment Decisions as the Dependent Variables                                                                   
Dependent Variable  
































































































Dependent Variable  
































































































































































































Panel B: Changes in Total Assets Decisions as the Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable  












































































































































Net Debt Issuance and Firm Investment Decisions   
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total 
assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions 
(compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is 
increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at 
time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total 
assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  is increase in total assets include only 
positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative 
differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the 




 is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  
total assets at time t-1. Mispricing at the firm level ( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the fundamental value of the firm i at time t 
[ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The 
individual time t values of the (
tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + .  Mispricing at the aggregate  level 
( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  
fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run aggregate multiples 
(α ’s) are the over time average of (
tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. 
The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
1/t tNetDbt A −
is net debt 
issued at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Net debt issued is debt issued (compustat item#111)- debt retired(compustat item#114). 
1* /t tTime NetDbt A−
is the 
interaction between the firm mispricing timing (Time) and the net debt  issuance. Time=1 if net debt issued (
tNetDbt
) and mispricing at firm level (
1
Firm
tDev− ) carry the same 
sign and Time=0 otherwise. 
1* /t tNOTime NetDbt A−
is the interaction between the firm mispricing non-timing (NOTime) and the net debt issuance. NOTime=1 if net debt issued 
(
tNetDbt ) and mispricing at firm level ( 1
Firm
tDev− ) do not carry the same sign and NOTime=0 otherwise. RME is the residual market effect. It is represented by the residual 
from the following regressing: 
1 0 1 2 3( / )
firm Agg
it it it it itM B Dev Dev Gα α α α ε− = + + + + . 
 
The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables 
are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. 
 
Panel A shows the results for investment variables. Panel B shows the results for the changes in total assets. Regression coefficients are estimated using OLS regression with 
p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and 








Panel A: Investment Decisions as the Dependent Variables                                                                            
Dependent Variable  



























































































Dependent Variable  







































































































































































































Panel B: Changes in Total Assets Decisions as the Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable  







































































































































Net Capital Issuance and Firm Investment Decisions   
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total 
assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions 
(compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is 
increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at 
time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total 
assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  is increase in total assets include only 
positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative 
differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the 




 is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  
total assets at time t-1. Mispricing at the firm level ( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the fundamental value of the firm i at time t 
[ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The 
individual time t values of the (
tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + .  Mispricing at the aggregate  level 
( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  
fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run aggregate multiples 
(α ’s) are the over time average of (
tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. 
The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on  Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
1/t tNetCap A− is net 
capital issued at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Net capital issued is the sum of net equity issued [equity issued(compustat item #108)- equity repurchased(compustat 
item #115)]and net debt issued [debt issued(compustat item #111)- debt retired(compustat item #114)]. 
1* /t tTime NetCap A−
is the interaction between the firm mispricing 
timing (Time) and the net capital  issuance. Time=1 if net capital issued (
tNetCap ) and mispricing at firm level ( 1
Firm
tDev− ) carry the same sign and Time=0 otherwise. 
1* /t tNOTime NetCap A−
is the interaction between the firm mispricing non-timing (NOTime) and the net capital  issuance. NOTime=1 if net capital issued (
tNetCap ) and 
mispricing at firm level (
1
Firm
tDev− ) do not carry the same sign and NOTime=0 otherwise. RME is the residual market effect. It is represented by the residual from the 
following regressing: 
1 0 1 2 3( / )
firm Agg
it it it it itM B Dev Dev Gα α α α ε− = + + + + . 
 
The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables 
are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. 
 
Panel A shows the results for investment variables. Panel B shows results for the changes in total assets. Regression coefficients are estimated using OLS regression with p-
values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and 









Panel A: Investment Decisions as the Dependent Variables                                                                            
Dependent Variable  
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Dependent Variable  






tDev−  1tG −  1































































































































































































Panel B: Changes in Total Assets Decisions as the Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable  
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Financial Constraints and Investment-Mispricing Sensitivity 
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital 
expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions (compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) 
divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total assets 1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the 
total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
+
−∆  is increase in total assets include only positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A
−
−∆  is 
decrease in total assets include only negative differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the decrease 




 is is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. Mispricing at the firm level 
( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the fundamental value of the firm i at time t [ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate 
regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The individual time t values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + .  Mispricing at the 
aggregate  level ( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  fundamental value of the firm at time t based on 
time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run aggregate multiples (α ’s) are the over time average of ( tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by 
long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on  Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
 
Firms are sorted into quartiles based on the degree of financial constraints which is measured by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index. (Z) which is calculated using Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) four variable version, 
1.002 39.368 1.315 3.139
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
CF DIV Cit it itZ Levit itA A Ai t i t i t
=− − − +
− − −
. The higher the value of Z,  the more financially constrained the firm. The following regression is separately performed for each group,  
Dependent Variable = Intercept 
.
/ 1 1 1 1
Firm Agg
aCF A bDev cDev dGt t t t t ε+ + + + +− − − − .   The coefficients b and c are reported for each group as well as the difference in these coefficients between the group in the top Z quartile 
and the group in the bottom Z quartile. The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables are ignored.  
Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis.  All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and three asterisks are statistically significant at the ten, five, 
and one percent respectively.  
 
 
Dependent  variable Bottom Quartile 
b              c 
2nd Quartile 
b              c 
3rd Quartile 
b              c 
Top Quartile 
b            c 
Top – Bottom 
b∆           c∆  
1/t tI A −  
0.0877 ***           0.2059*** 
(0.000)                (0.000) 
0.0850***        0.2734*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.1554***      0.2211*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.2449***        0.3001*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.1572***        0.0942*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
 
1/t tCAPX A−  
0.0223***           0.0513*** 
(0.000)               (0.000) 
0.0411***        0.0563*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0570***      0.0386*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0843***        0.0788*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0620***        0.0275** 





Dependent  variable Bottom Quartile 
b              c 
2nd Quartile 
b              c 
3rd Quartile 
b              c 
Top Quartile 
b            c 
Top – Bottom 
b∆           c∆  
1/t tACQ A−  
0.0225***            0.0490*** 
(0.000)                (0.000) 
0.0115***        0.0585*** 
(0.003)            (0.000) 
0.0468***      0.0398*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0562***        0.0753*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0337***        0.0262** 
(0.000)            (0.014) 
 
1/t tRD A−  
0.0444***         0.0606*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0444***        0.0573*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0505***      0.0625*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0556***        0.0616*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0112***       0.0002 
(0.000)            (0.977) 
 
1/t tIINC A−  
 
0.0301***         0.0379*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0188***        0.0756*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0190***      0.0346*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0234***        0.0388*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
-0.0067            0.0009 
(0.245)            (0.931) 
1/t tSalePPE A−  -0.0020**        -0.0068*** 
(0.025)             (0.000) 
-0.0005           -0.0059*** 
(0.567)            (0.001) 
-0.0016       -0.0061*** 
(0.133)          (0.001) 
0.0025**          0.0034* 
(0.023)            (0.062) 
0.0045***        0.0035 
(0.002)            (0.171) 
 
1/t tNetI A −  
0.0900***         0.2069*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
 
0.0856***       0.2767*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.1554***     0.2260*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.2416***        0.3014*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.1516***        0.0944*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
1/t tA A−∆  0.2445***         0.7960*** (0.000)             (0.000) 
0.2918***        0.8923*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.4739***      0.9324*** 
(0.000)           (0.000) 
0.7754***       1.1390*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.5309***        0.3430*** 





0.0306           1.4850*** 
(0.608)             (0.000) 
0.2021***        1.5248*** 
(0.006)             (0.000) 
0.4636***      1.9537*** 
(0.000)           (0.000) 
0.7242***        1.4940*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.6936***        0.0090 





0.0022           0.0664*** 
(0.670)            (0.000) 
 
-0.0182***        0.0069 
(0.000)             (0.438) 
-0.0218***     0.0127 
(0.001)          (0.140) 
-0.0229***       0.0172** 
(0.000)             (0.011) 
-0.0251***       -0.0492*** 







Shareholders Investment Horizon and Investment-Mispricing Sensitivity 
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital 
expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions (compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) 
divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total assets 1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the 
total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
+
−∆  is increase in total assets include only positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A
−
−∆  is 
decrease in total assets include only negative differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the decrease 




 is is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. Mispricing at the firm level 
( firm
itDev
) is the difference between the market value of firm i at time t and the fundamental value of the firm i at time t [ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate 
regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting values (θ ). The individual time t values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + .  Mispricing at the 
aggregate  level ( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  fundamental value of the firm at time t based on 
time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run aggregate multiples (α ’s) are the over time average of ( tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by 
long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on  Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
 
Firms are sorted into quartiles based on the degree of shareholder investment horizon (H). Investor horizon is measured by the turnover ratio which is the average of the monthly ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding during 
the fiscal year. The higher the turnover ratio the shorter the shareholders investment horizon. The following regression is separately performed for each group,  
Dependent Variable = Intercept 
.
/ 1 1 1 1
Firm Agg
aCF A bDev cDev dGt t t t t ε+ + + + +− − − − .   The coefficients b and c are reported for each group as well as the difference in these coefficients between the group in the top H quartile 
and the group in the bottom H quartile. The data contains US firms in compustat datasets between 1971 and 2003 that have data available in CRSP. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for 
investment variables are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and three asterisks are 
statistically significant at the ten, five, and one percent respectively.  
 
Dependent  variable Bottom Quartile 
b              c 
2nd Quartile 
b              c 
3rd Quartile 
b              c 
Top Quartile 
b            c 
Top – Bottom 
b∆           c∆  
1/t tI A −  0.1020***        0.1640*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.1360***        0.1864*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.1292***      0.1937*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.1773***        0.2272*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0752***        0.0633*** 
(0.000)            (0.001) 
 
1/t tCAPX A−  0.0364***         0.0317*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0447***        0.0407*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0477***      0.0459*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0609***          0.0605*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0246***        0.0288*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
 
1/t tACQ A−  
0.0237***         0.0404*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0216***        0.0377*** 
(0.000)            (0.000) 
0.0217***      0.0435*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0383***          0.0612*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0146**          0.0207** 





Dependent  variable Bottom Quartile 
b              c 
2nd Quartile 
b              c 
3rd Quartile 
b              c 
Top Quartile 
b            c 
Top – Bottom 
b∆           c∆  
1/t tRD A−  0.0591***         0.0811*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0515***        0.0691*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.0558***      0.0809*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0720***            0.0784*** 
(0.000)                 (0.000) 
0.0129**        -0.0027 
(0.039)               (0.721) 
 
1/t tIINC A−  
 
0.0194**             0.0356*** 
(0.049)              (0.004) 
0.0716***           0.0622*** 
(0.000)               (0.000) 
0.0311***       0.0756*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.0762***           0.0726*** 
(0.000)                (0.000) 
0.0568***         0.0370** 
(0.000)             (0.029) 
1/t tSalePPE A−  -0.0016             -0.0051*** 
(0.228)              (0.001) 
-0.0030**           -0.0054*** 
(0.016)                (0.002) 
-0.0021*        -0.0048*** 
(0.059)          (0.004) 
-0.0013               -0.0031* 
(0.168)                (0.059) 
-0.0002          -0.0021 
(0.862)            (0.364) 
 
1/t tNetI A −  
0.1643***           0.2319*** 
(0.000)              (0.000) 
 
0.1221***           0.1889*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.1425***      0.2054*** 
(0.000)          (0.000) 
0.2083***              0.2370*** 
(0.000)                  (0.000) 
0.0440**         0.0051 
(0.025)            (0.857) 
1/t tA A−∆  0.3724***          0.4499*** 
(0.000)              (0.000) 
0.4490***         0.3946*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.3810***      0.4402*** 
(0.000)           (0.000) 
0.6961***          0.6392*** 
(0.000)               (0.000) 
0.3237***        0.1894** 




−∆  0.4266***          0.6440*** 
(0.000)              (0.000) 
0.4339***         0.4897*** 
(0.000)             (0.000) 
0.2946***      0.3785*** 
(0.000)           (0.000) 
0.6036***         0.5638*** 
(0.000)              (0.000) 
0.1770***        -0.0802 





-0.0160***            0.0073 
(0.003)              (0.373) 
 
-0.0264***        -0.0148* 
(0.000)              (0.072) 
-0.0247***     -0.0070 
(0.000)          (0.380) 
-0.0196***        -0.0222*** 
(0.000)              (0.006) 
-0.0036       -0.0296** 








Overvaluation and Firm Investment Decisions   
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in investment at time t divided by total 
assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item #128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions 
(compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is 
increase in investments (compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  total assets at 
time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total 
assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 1/t tA A+ −∆  is increase in total assets include only 
positive differences between total assets at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative 
differences between total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute value of the 




 is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization (compustat item #14) at time t divided by  
total assets at time t-1. 
0 1
Firm
tDev> −  is firm overvaluation measure  at time t-1 which is the positive difference between the market value of firm at time t and the fundamental 
value of the firm at time t [ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )it tv θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level 
accounting values (θ ). The individual time t values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + + .  Mispricing 
at the aggregate  level ( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples 
(
tα ’s) and the  fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values ( tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . The long run 
aggregate multiples (α ’s) are the over time average of (
tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied by long run multiples and current book values, 
[ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The Industry classification is based on  Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
1/t tCapIssue A−
is the sum of equity issued and debt issued at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tEIssue A− is equity issued at time t (compustat item #108) divided by 
total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tDIssue A−
 is debt issued at time t (compustat item #111) divided by total assets at time t-1. RME is the residual market effect. It is represented by 
the residual from the following regressing: 
1 0 1 2 3( / )
firm Agg
it it it it itM B Dev Dev Gα α α α ε− = + + + + . 
 
The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative values for investment variables 
are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. 
 
Panel A shows the results for investment variables. Panel B shows the results for the changes in total assets. Regression coefficients are estimated using OLS regression with 
p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All Variables are firm and year mean adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and 












Panel A: Investment Decisions as the Dependent Variables                                                                            
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Panel B: Changes in Total Assets Decisions as the Dependent Variables 
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Undervaluation and Firm Investment Decisions 
 
Dependent variables: Investment 
1/t tI A −
is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D expenses, and increase in 
investment at time t divided by total assets (compustat item #6) at time t-1. 
1/t tCAPX A−
 is capital expenditures at time t (compustat item 
#128) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tACQ A−
 is acquisitions (compustat item #129) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tRD A−
is R&D expenses at time t (compustat item #46) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tIINC A− is increase in investments 
(compustat item #113) divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tSalePPE A− is sale of PP&E  at time t (compustat item #107) divided by  
total assets at time t-1. Net investment 
1/t tNetI A − is the difference between Investment (I) and the sale of PP&E (SalePPE) at time t 
divided by total assets at time t-1. Change in total assets 
1/t tA A−∆  is the difference between total assets at time t and the total assets at time 
t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
+
−∆  is increase in total assets include only positive differences between total assets at time t and 
the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1/t tA A
−
−∆  is decrease in total assets include only negative differences between 
total assets  at time t and the total assets at time t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1. Decrease in total assets is represented by the absolute 




 is income before extra ordinary items(compustat item #18) plus deprecation and amortization 
(compustat item #14) at time t divided by  total assets at time t-1. 
0 1
Firm
tDev< −  is firm undervaluation measure  at time t-1 which is the 
negative difference between the market value of firm at time t and the fundamental value of the firm at time t [ ( ; )it it tlnM v θ α− ]. The 
fundamental value of the firm i[ ( ; )
it t
v θ α ] is obtained by applying annual, aggregate regression multiples (α ’s) to the firm-level accounting 
values (θ ). The individual time t values of the ( tα ’s) are obtained using the model, 
0 1 2 3 ( 0) 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itit jt jt it jt it jt it NI jt it itln M ln B ln NI ln NI D LEVα α α α α ε<= + + + × + +
.  Mispricing at the aggregate  level ( Agg
itDev ) is the difference between  
the fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and time t aggregate multiples ( tα ’s) and the  
fundamental value of the firm at time t based on time t accounting values (
tθ ) and long run aggregate multiples (α ’s), ( ; ) ( ; )it t itv vθ α θ α −  . 
The long run aggregate multiples (α ’s) are the over time average of (
tα ’s). Growth ( itG ) is the difference between the valuations implied 
by long run multiples and current book values, [ ( ; )it itv lnBθ α − ]. The aggregate level is either at the industry or at the market level. The 
Industry classification is based on  Fama & French 12 industry classification. 
1Re /t tCap t A−
is the sum of equity repurchased and debt retired at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1Re /t tE p A −
is equity 
repurchased at time t (compustat item #115) divided by total assets at time t-1. 
1Re /t tD t A −  is debt retired at time t (compustat item #114) 
divided by total assets at time t-1. RME is the residual market effect. It is represented by the residual from the following regressing: 
1 0 1 2 3( / )
firm Agg
it it it it itM B Dev Dev Gα α α α ε− = + + + + . 
 
The data contains US firms in compustat between 1971 and 2004. Total assets variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Negative 
values for investment variables are ignored.  Financial and Utilities firms are not included in the analysis. 
 
Panel A shows the  results for investment variables. Panel B shows the results for the changes in total assets. Regression coefficients are 
estimated using OLS regression with p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All Variables are firm and year mean 
adjusted. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients starred with one, two, and three asterisks are statistically significant at the ten, five, and 
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Panel B: Changes in Total Assets Decisions as the Dependent Variables 
Dependen
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This study analyzes the effect of stock market mispricings on corporate 
investment decisions. Particularly, this study addresses the three possible 
explanations of the relation between mispricings and corporate investments 
that are mentioned in Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Stein (1996). The 
study finds evidence supporting the three explanations: Managers’ market 
timing activities, managers’ catering behavior, and managers’ confusion about 
the future state of the industry.  
 
By decomposing the market to book ratio into firm mispricing, industry 
mispricing, and growth components, the study shows that corporate 
investment decisions are determined by all of these components after 
controlling for financial slack. In addition, the study finds that corporate 
investments in general are determined by market timing-motivated equity and 
debt transactions. Consistent with our predictions, the study shows that the 
relation between mispricing and investment is more pronounced in financially 
constrained firms and in firms held by short horizon shareholders. Further 
testing the types of investment distortions caused by stock mispricing, the 
study finds that firms overinvest in capital expenditure, R&D, and acquisitions 
but underinvest in capital expenditure and R&D only. In addition, overvalued 
firms tend to reduce their fixed assets less while undervalued firms tend to 
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